The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a Proposal for a  First-to-Invent  Exception for Domestic Applicants by Takenaka, Toshiko
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Articles Faculty Publications
2003
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise? A
Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive
Patent Law Treaty and a Proposal for a "First-to-
Invent" Exception for Domestic Applicants
Toshiko Takenaka
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and
the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a
Proposal for a "First-to-Invent" Exception for Domestic Applicants, 11 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 259 (2003),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/350
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
A Review of the Current Draft of the
Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a Proposal
for a "First-To-Invent" Exception for Domestic
Applicants
By Toshiko Takenaka, Ph.D.*
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................ 260
I. Historical Background ............................................................................... 264
A. Pre-1993 Activities ............................................................................. 264
B . Post-1993 ............................................................................................ 266
C. Resumption of U.S. Leadership ......................................................... 271
II. Review of the Most Recent SPLT Draft ................................................... 273
A. First-To-File Principle ....................................................................... 275
1. Published P rior A rt .................................................................... 275
2. Undisclosed Prior Art ................................................................ 277
B. Article 9: Grace Period ...................................................................... 280
C. Articles 10 and 11: Description Requirements ................................. 284
1. E nablem ent ................................................................................ 285
2. W ritten D escription .................................................................... 286
3. B est M ode .................................................................................. 287
4. C laim D efiniteness ..................................................................... 287
D. Claim Interpretation and the Doctrine of Equivalents ..................... 287
* Toshiko Takenaka is an Associate Professor of Law and Director of Center for Advanced Study
and Research on Intellectual Property (CASRIP) and Intellectual Property and Technology LL.M.
Program at the University of Washington School of Law. She received an LL.B. from Seikei
University, Tokyo in 1981 and an LL.M. and Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 1990
and 1992. I would like to thank Prof. Rochelle Dreyfuss at New York University School of Law
and Mr. Stephen Kunin at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for their invaluable
comments and helpful discussions, and my research assistants Ms. Mary Atkinson, Ms. Elaine
Abeyta-Montoya and Mr. Joe Meara, for their editing on my several drafts.
260 TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 11:259
1. Fundamental Rules .................................................................... 287
2. Special Rules .............................................................................. 291
E. Article 12: Conditions of Patentability .............................................. 293
1. Patent Eligible Subject Matter ................................................... 293
2. Utility/Industrial Applicability ................................................... 295
3. N o velty ....................................................................................... 297
4. Inventive Step ............................................................................. 298
III. Review of the Impact on U.S. Practice Resulting from the Most
Recent SPLT Draft and a Proposal to Change the SPLT in Respect
of the Best Practice ..................................................................................... 300
A. Novelty and Priority ........................................................................... 300
1. Published Prior Art .................................................................... 300
2. Unpublished Prior Art: Revision of§ 102(e) ............................. 309
B. Grace Period ...................................................................................... 312
C. Description Requirement ................................................................... 317
1. Enablement and Written Description ......................................... 317
2. Best Mode .................................................................................. 321
D. Claim Interpretation and the Doctrine of Equivalents ..................... 322
/. Fundamental Rules .................................................................... 322
2. Special Rules .............................................................................. 327
3. Use-of-Product Claims .............................................................. 333
E. Conditions of Patentability ................................................................ 334
1. Patent Eligible Subject Matter ................................................... 334
2 . U tility ......................................................................................... 3 39
3. N o velty ....................................................................................... 34 1
4. Inventive Step/Non-obviousness ................................................ 342
F. Other Issues ........................................................................................ 345
IV. Proposal for Maintaining First-To-Invent Exception for Domestic
Inventors ..................................................................................................... 347
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 349
Introduction
Harmonizing the substantive law of patent systems around the world proves
to be a difficult task despite the proclaimed benefits of establishing a global patent
2003] The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
system. 1 The most difficult hurdle is the United States' adherence to the first-to-
invent system.2 Although commentators advocate the benefits of patent harmoni-
zation and the first-to-file system, 3 the United States inventors' attachment to the
first-to-invent principle is so strong that past international negotiations that would
have led the United States to relinquish its first-to-invent system ended in failure.
4
The establishment of a global patent system has become an urgent necessity
for patent offices in advanced industrial countries, particularly the United States,
Japan, and Europe. The number of patent applicants seeking protection outside of
the country of origin has drastically increased because of market globalization.
5
When the patentable subject matter in areas such as biotechnology and computer
software was expanded, the number of patent applications in those areas increased,
as did the level of education necessary for examiners of such subject matter.6 En-
actment of the Bayh-Dole Act 7 in the United States and its equivalent legislation in
Asia and Europe brought new patent applicants, who play an important role in the
development of patent policy. The enactment of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods of
E.g., Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, The Long-Term International View of Patents and Trademark,
INT'L INTELL. PROP. LAW & POL' Y, 14-1, 14-2 (2000).
2 Bruce Lehman, Intellectual Property Under The Clinton Administration, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 395 (1993); Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-Definition
of "First-to-Invent", 49 ALA. L. REV. 755 (1998); Peter A. Jackman, Essay: Adoption of a First-
to-File Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67 (1997); Vito J. DeBari, International
Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States' First-To-File Debate, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687 (1993).
Robert M. Sherewood, Why A Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World,
in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68
(1993); Kate H. Murashige, Symposium: Intellectual Property: Article: Harmonization of Patent
Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591(1994); Robert W. Pritchard, Article: The Future is Now -The Case
for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291 (1995); Gerald J. Mossinghof &
Vivian Ku, Article: World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 535 (1998).
4 The last negotiation in which the United States participated to mandate the first-to-file principle
was held in the Diplomatic Conference in The Hague, June 1991. The proceedings of the Diplo-
matic Conference is published in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, RECORDS OF
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY SUPPLEMENTING THE PARIS
CONVENTION AS FAR AS PATENTS ARE CONCERNED (1991).
Over the period between 1985 and 1999, the number of applications has increased seven times.
Although the increase in number of applications by domestic applicants remained the same, the
number of foreign applicants increased six times. For a discussion on increased applications, see
Setsuko Asami, A View Toward the Global Patent - Mutual Exploitation of Examination Results,
27 AIPPI J. 12, 13-15 (2002).
6 The USPTO hires more patent examiners with electrical engineering backgrounds and MBA's to
deal with new types of technologies. See George Leopold, Examiners sought as patent filings hit
1,000 per day-U.S. looking for 500 good engineers, in ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct.
29, 2001 Monday, at 11; Michael Bednarek, The Outlook for Patents in the Financial Services In-
dustry, ELECTRONIC BANKING LAW & COM. REP., 8 (Mar. 2002).
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994).
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TRIPS), 8 expanded participation of
-developing countries in the global market and induced inventors in industrial coun-
tries to seek patents in those developing countries. 9 In addition, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) faces the new challenge of retaining patent
examiners when the industry is experiencing a shortage of well-trained patent pro-
fessionals.10 To make matters worse, the recent changes in prosecution history es-
toppel are expected to significantly increase the administrative burden on the
USPTO. 11 In short, the USPTO will not survive without implementing a system to
reduce this administrative burden.
It is all the more urgent that the new initiative for patent harmonization under
the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) be successful because of the necessity to
reduce the administrative burden on the patent offices. The most frequently used
patent offices, the USPTO, 12 the European Patent Office (EPO), 13 and the Japan
Patent Office (JPO) 14 partially solved this problem by expanding collaboration
among their examination offices by sharing databases, prior art search results, etc. 15
To address this urgent need, the Paris Union member states' delegations to the
SPLT initiative agreed to limit the scope of the negotiations to substantive issues
relating to the grant of a patent, where harmonization is essential for patent offices
to reach the same examination result. 16 Creating a system to enable participating
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
The number of applications by foreign applicants shot up after the enactment of the TRIPS
Agreement. See Asami, supra note 5, at 14.
1o Del Jones, Skilled Examiners Leave; Patent quality in peril, research, idea protection may falter,
some warn, as tech upstarts lure away workers, USA Today, Sept. 11, 2000, at 5B.
1, See generally Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, (2002), 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705. For a discussion of this change, see infra Part III.D starting at note 506.
12 USPTO patent application statistics, at http://www.uspto.gov.
, The European Patent Office was created under the "Convention on the Grant of European Pat-
ents," Oct. 5 1973, art. 4, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 2, 13 I.L.M. 270, 277 [herein-
after European Patent Convention]. EPO patent application statistics, at http://www.european-
patent-office.org.
I4 JPO patent application statistics, at http://www.jpo.go.jp/homee.htm.
" Michio Ichikawa, Towards a Global Patent System: JPO's View, Presentation at 2001 CASRIP
High Technology Summit Conference (July 21, 2001) (transcript available at http://
www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Symposium/Number7/Pub7Contents.html).
,6 Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Com-
mittee on the Law of Patents, 6th Session, Sept. 24, 2001, art. 8(2), art. 2, [hereinafter WIPO
Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session)]. (note that Article 2 explains the limited
scope of SPLT, see World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents, 6th Session, Oct. 3, 2001, note 2.01, available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/
session_6/index.htm.
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offices to mutually recognize examination results is the goal. The cost of interna-
tional patent prosecution is expected to decrease and procedures for applicants to
obtain patents in different countries simplified by using this system.
There has not been sufficient debate in patent law circles regarding the cost of
harmonization, particularly the loss of diversity.17 A legal commentator properly
pointed out some of the benefits of diversity, such as conforming the law to local
preferences, providing a check on government through competition, and permitting
experimentation and innovation in the law. 18 However, in addition to addressing
the benefits of harmonization advocated by the majority of scholars, including the
legal commentator himself, there is urgency to address the needs of patent of-
fices. 1
9
Several legislative efforts and international agreements have removed major
variations in the substantive patent law in TRIPS countries. Case law in this area is
dominated by the policy of promoting the useful arts and innovations and brings
some uniformity to patent jurisprudence in the United States, Europe, and Japan.2 °
Thus, the impact of harmonization brought by the new initiative might be, in fact,
marginal.
Accordingly, in Part I of this paper I review the past efforts of patent har-
monization. In Part II, I review the current draft of the SPLT and compare its ma-
jor articles with Title 35 of the United States Code, the European Patent Conven-
tion (EPC),2 1 and Japanese Patent Law (JPL).22 In Part III, I analyze the changes
expected by the integration of the SPLT into U.S. patent practice and examine if
such changes would result in the best patent practice. I propose that the best prac-
tice takes into account underlying patent policies in such instances in which the
changes merely reflect a compromise with the European/Japanese practice. In par-
ticular, in Part III, I also argue that such changes brought about by the SPLT are
marginal because the current U.S. system is, in reality, a first-to-file system with
limited exceptions for first-to-invent priority. Implementation of the SPLT in the
United States only requires removing that exception and introducing a simple, user-
friendly system that is particularly beneficial to applicants with limited resources.
However, all the legitimate benefits of and compelling policy reasons for a first-to-
7 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685
(2002).
18 Id. at 703.
Id. at 693.
20 Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System with Its U.S. Counterpart Through
Judge-Made Law: Interaction Between Japanese and U.S. Case Law Developments, 7 PAC. RIM L.
& POL'Y J. 249 (1998).
2! European Patent Convention, supra note 13, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090), 13 I.L.M.
270.
22 Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959.
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file system still may not convince die-hard first-to-invent advocates. Therefore, in
Part IV, I propose maintaining an exception for use of the existing system and crea-
tion of a quasi-second tier system for patent protection. Such a system will give
these first-to-invent advocates a chance to experience the acclaimed benefits of the
first-to-file system while keeping first-to-invent options open until they are ready to
completely convert to the first-to-file regime.
I. Historical Background
A. Pre-1993 Activities
The first major efforts to bring uniformity to patent systems around the world
and to promote collaboration among patent offices started with the execution of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883 (Paris Conven-
tion).23 Uniformity of patent legislation was an important goal at the beginning of
negotiations. 24 However, recognizing significant differences in national laws and
industrial developments, the Paris Union relinquished the idea of a substantive uni-
form patent law and took a more realistic view, adopting only the very basic princi-
ple of utting foreign patent applicants on an equal footing with domestic appli-
cants. J As a result, the 1883 Paris Convention included provisions for national
treatment 26 and right of priority. 27 Unfortunately, it did not include any require-
ments with respect to patentability or infringement. 28
Over the last century, the number of members of the Paris Union significantly
increased, which created different factions representing different interests.29 Con-
flicting interests between developed and developing countries regarding the neces-
sary minimum level of protection have become obvious, making it almost impossi-
ble for the members to reach an agreement to revise provisions in the Convention.
Two attempts to introduce a worldwide grace period failed. 30 As a result, no revi-
sion has been made since the conferences held in Nice in 1957 and in Lisbon in
1958. Despite the deadlock, Article 19 of the Paris Convention allows member
23 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 25 Stat. 1372, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
24 Feidrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years of International Cooperation - the Role of the Paris
Convention in the Past, Present and Future, 15 I.I.C. 1, 5 (1984).
25 Id.
26 Paris Convention, supra note 23, art. II-II1, 25 Stat. at 1375, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313.
27 Paris Convention, supra note 23, art. IV, 25 Stat. at 1375, 828 U.N.T.S. at 313.
28 JOSEPH STRAUS, GRACE PERIOD AND THE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW: ANALYSIS
OF KEY LEGAL AND Socio-ECONOMic ASPECTS 6 (2001).
29 Beier, supra note 24, at 14.
'0 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 6.
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states that share similar interests to execute special agreements for the protection of
industrial property.
31
Substantive aspects of a country's patent law, such as requirements for pro-
tection and exclusive rights, reflect the level of industrial development in each
member state, and, thus, it is more difficult for member states to reach a consensus
on these issues than on procedural aspects. Accordingly, the Paris Union decided
to deal with unification of formality and procedural aspects first. In the 1960s,
member states commenced negotiations to create a special agreement that stream-
lined multinational applications. 32 This effort resulted in the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT), which came into force on January 24, 1978.33 In drafting the PCT,
all substantive issues were deliberately left out of the negotiations. Thus, the PCT
emphasized that the results of an international preliminary examination are merely
advisory and have no binding effect. 34 The authority to grant a patent is left exclu-
sively with the member states in which protection is sought.
The private sector started a new initiative to unify substantive patent law in
the early 1980s. 35 In its 1982 Moscow meeting, the International Association for
the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI)36 adopted a resolution to establish a
uniform international grace period that allows inventors who disclose their inven-
tions prior to filing patent applications to obtain patents as long as they file an ap-
plication within the grace period. 37 When the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) supported this resolution, the Paris Union decided
to investigate the feasibility of adopting a worldwide grace period either as part of
the Paris Convention or as a special agreement under Article 19.38 This effort to
adopt a uniform grace period expanded to negotiations for harmonizing certain sub-
stantive patent law provisions. After a series of expert committee meetings, the In-
ternational Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) pre-
pared the "Basic Proposal" for the Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention
(PLT).39 The Basic Proposal was submitted to the Hague Diplomatic Conference
1' Paris Convention, supra note 23, art. XIX, 25 Stat. at 1379, 828 U.N.T.S. at 357.
11 Gerald J. Mossinghof & Vivian S. Ku, Article: World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA
529, 535 (1998).
33 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
34 Id., art. 33 (1), 28 U.S.T. at 7679, 1160 U.N.T.S. at 248.
3 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 6.
36 AIPPI is a group of IP owners and IP lawyers. The group was developed for promoting IP protec-
tion. General information about the group is available at http://www.aippi.org/.
37 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 7.
31 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 7.
" STRAUS, supra note 28, at 12; HAROLD WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION 25 (1993).
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in 1991 with the expectation to complete the treaty negotiation and execute the
PLT.40
However, the PLT Basic Proposal initiative failed to lead to a harmonization
of substantive patent law. Although actively involved in the negotiations, the
United States realized that if it were to execute the treaty the U.S. patent system
would have to undergo a major change because the PLT Basic Proposal is based on
the first-to-file principle with an international twelve-month grace period.4 1 How-
ever, under the first Bush administration, the United States was ready to commit to
this major change at the urging of the report published in 1992 by the Advisory
Commission on Patent Law Reform. 42 Introducing the Patent System Harmoniza-
tion Act of 1992, experts testified to the superior efficiency of the first-to-file sys-
tem, compared to the first-to-invent system, at the joint hearing before the Sub-
committee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administra-
tion of the House Committee on the Judiciary.43 However, once the Clinton ad-
ministration came into office, all patent harmonization negotiations were put on
hold.44 Upon the appointment of Bruce Lehman as the new Commissioner of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1993, the United States indefinitely
postponed the conference to finalize the PLT Basic Proposal. 45
B. Post-1993
As far as the international effort for patent harmonization is concerned, the
United States is the target of criticism from its trading partners, particularly Europe
and Japan. Many hold the view that the hard efforts expended in negotiating the
PLT Basic Proposal were wasted by the refusal of the United States to conclude the
negotiations. However, the United States has made substantial efforts over the last
decade to prepare its patent system to make the transition to a first-to-file system by
instituting several major patent law revisions. The United States also took an active
role in the international arena to harmonize patent laws in both substantive and pro-
cedural aspects. It is very important to note that these efforts removed many issues
that would have been negotiated had the PLT Basic Proposal been adopted.
40 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 13.
4' Kevin Cuenot, Note: Perilous Potholes in the Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 J.
LAW. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 112 (1999).
41 Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, A Report to the Secretary of Commerce, at 43-50
(1992), reproduced in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 313 (2001).
41 S. 2605, 102nd Cong. § 1140 (1992); H.R. 4978, 102nd Cong. (1992).
4 Kim Taylor, Note: Patent Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The "First To File" De-
bate Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 521 (1994).
4 Remarks of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 392 (Aug. 26, 1993).
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First, the United States led discussions to raise the minimum standard for in-
tellectual property protection by expanding the scope of GATT.46 This effort con-
cluded with the execution of the TRIPS Agreement 47 and brought about the most
significant changes with respect to the harmonization of substantive patent law
since the establishment of the Paris Union.48 Although the first-to-file dispute and
other non-trade related issues are intentionally left for negotiation through the
WIPO forum, for the first time TRIPS succeeded in setting the fundamental re-
quirements for patentability 49 and required each member state to provide patent
protection in all fields of technology.
50
Second, although the United States suspended its effort to harmonize substan-
tive patent law in the WIPO arena, it continued to actively engage in negotiations to
harmonize formality and procedural requirements in the patent granting procedure
under the PLT. After the failure of attempts to harmonize substantive patent law
through the PTL Basic Proposal, the Paris Union members shifted the focus of the
PLT negotiations to formality and procedural aspects to keep the momentum of
harmonization going and to retain U.S. participation in negotiations. 51 In this new
effort, the United States took a key role by setting the scope for harmonization and
creating an interface with the PCT.52
Although the PCT extensively harmonized formality requirements, the scope
was limited to requirements regarding the content of the application and the estab-
lishment of the date of the application. Furthermore, the PCT only applies to inter-
national applications filed under the PCT (PCT route).53 Formality requirements
4 ULRICH JOOS & RAINER MOUFANG, GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
1989).
41 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
48 For a general discussion of the significance of the TRIPS Agreement, see Joseph Straus, Implica-
tion of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS - THE
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 170 (Friedrich-
Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); Sam Ricketson, The Future of the Traditional Intel-
lectual Property Conventions in the Brave New World of Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights, 26 I.I.C. 872 (1995).
49 Ricketson, supra note 48, at 889.
10 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27 para. 1, 33 I.L.M at 93-94.
5, Toshiko Takenaka, Recent Developments on the WIPO Patent Harmonization Consultative, 2-2
CASRIP Newsletter 9 (Winter 1998).
92 See, e.g., Study on the Interface Between the SPTL, the PLT and the PCT, at 2, World Intellectual
Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 6th Session (Sept. 24, 2001),
available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_6/doc/scp6-5.doc [hereinafter WIPO
Interface Study].
'3 Under the principle of independence of patents under the Paris Convention, inventors must obtain
a patent in each country in which they seek protection. This requires filing of multiple applica-
tions to different patent offices. The PCT enables inventors to obtain the effect of applications in
plural patent offices by filing one international application with a member patent office, which is
20031
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
under the PCT do not bind regular applications filed in multiple countries claiming
priority under the Paris Convention (Paris route).54 The Patent Law Treaty (PLT),
executed in 2000,55 addressed this issue. The treaty significantly eased the burden
of applicants seeking to obtain patents in multiple countries through both the PCT
and Paris routes.
Third, the United States adopted all elements proposed by the Patent Law Re-
form Advisory Commission (Commission).56 In its 1992 report, the Commission
recommended the adoption of a provisional application filing system and a limited
prior-user's right in exchange for a worldwide grace period. 5 " Additionally, the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) 58 established a "domestic priority
system" and allows inventors to file a provisional application that will not be exam-
ined but will establish a priority filing date once a complete application is filed un-
der § 11 l(a).59 The goal of the Patent Reform Commission in recommending a
provisional application was to provide a simple and inexpensive method to estab-
lish an early priority date on which the novelty and non-obviousness of an inven-
tion will be examined.60 The current provisional application attains this goal by al-
lowing applicants to file an application at a reduced cost without claims or
inventors' oaths and declarations.
As part of the 1999 American Inventor Protection Act,62 the First Inventor
Defense Act of 1999 introduced a limited quasi-prior-user's right. 63 In its 1992 re-
appointed as a receiving office. This option of filing a single application to obtain effects in mul-
tiple patent offices is called the PCT Route. See RICHARD SCHWAAB, Chapter 26: Rights and pro-
cedures under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, in IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE (6th ed.
1995).
14 In contrast to the PCT Route, inventors may choose to file applications separately with different
offices by taking advantage of the priority right system under Paris Convention Article 4. This op-
tion of filing separate applications is called the Paris Route. PCT international applications are
more expensive than regular national applications because of additional costs resulting from coor-
dination among patent offices and administration at WIPO. If the number of countries an inventor
wishes to seek protection is small, filing separate applications is less expensive than filing an in-
ternational application.
11 Patent Law Treaty, June 2, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047 (2000).
56 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 313.
. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 317.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter
URAA]. URAA was the implementing legislation of TRIPS Agreement.
Id. at § 532(b). For a general discussion, see DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.02
[1][g].
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 318.
35 U.S.C. § 11 l(b)(2), and (b)(8) (2000).
62 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (The text
of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 is contained in Title IV of S. 1948, the Intellec-
tual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999).
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port, the Commission defined the prior-user right as a right to raise a defense of
prior use of a patented invention to a claim of infringement under the first-to-file
system. 6 4 The first-inventor's defense can be asserted against a claim of infringe-
ment if an inventor acted in good faith and actually reduced the subject matter to
practice at least one year before the effective filing date of the disputed patent and
commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date of the disputed
patent. 65 Although this defense is available only regarding methods of doing or
conducting business, 66 the "method" is broadly defined to cover processes resulting
in products because the statute refers to the sale or other disposition of a useful end
product of such method.6 7 While maintaining the first-to-invent system, the United
States no longer requires first inventors to challenge a patent that was erroneously
granted to a second inventor in order to continue to use their inventions. Instead,
first inventors can simply raise a defense to infringement by establishing that they
were the first-to-invent and the first-to-use in this country.
Finally, major differences between U.S. substantive patent law and patent
laws of other developed countries have been removed through the enactment of the
1994 URAA and the 1999 American Inventor Protection Act. The URAA removed
the worst aspect of the U.S. first-to-invent system, discrimination against foreign
applicants, at least for applicants from NAFTA and WTO member states to comply
with the non-discrimination policy under TRIPS. 68 Prior to the establishment of
the WTO, the U.S. first-to-invent system effectively discriminated against inven-
tions made outside the United States by preventing foreign applicants for U.S. pat-
ents from establishing a date of application by reference to knowledge or use of the
invention in a foreign country. It is natural for foreign inventors to engage in
activities that give rise to their inventions in their own countries. Thus, it is likely
that foreign inventors were prevented from taking advantage of the first-to-invent
system, even if they were the first-to-invent, unless the knowledge or use of the in-
vention was sent to someone, such as a patent attorney in the United States. 70 As
61 Id. at 1501 A-555-557. For a general discussion, see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 16.03 [4].
64 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 321.
65 35 U.S.C. § 273 (b)(l) (2000).
66 35 U.S.C. § 273 (a)(3) (2000).
67 35 U.S.C. § 273 (a)(1) (2000); CHISUM, supra note 59, § 16.03 [4].
68 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 93-94. This prohibits member states
from discriminating inventions with respect to the place of invention. This provision was in-
cluded to eliminate the US discriminative practice regarding the establishment of the invention
date in foreign countries.
69 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988); Harold C. Wegner, TRIPS Boomerang - Obligations for Domestic Re-
form, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 535, 543 (1996).
70 See, e.g., Harold Wegner, The One in Ten Thousand Chance for Foreign Usage of the American
First Inventor System, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 175 (1994).
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of January 1, 1996, inventors from NAFTA and WTO member-nations can rely on
activities within the territory of NAFTA and WTO member countries to establish
first inventorship. 7 1 Although foreign applicants may still be discouraged from
engaging in complex and expensive interference procedures, the 1994 WTO
Revision put foreign applicants on an equal footing with U.S. applicants.
Another serious flaw of the pre-1994 U.S. patent system was the patent term
provision that resulted in submarine patents. 72 Although European and Japanese
patent systems adopted a patent term of twenty-years from the filing date, prior to
WTO, the U.S. statute established the patent term from the date of issuance. 73 By
intentionally extending prosecution and delaying issuance of the patent, applicants
abused the system and tried to capture technologies which were long believed to be
in the public domain by redrafting claims to cover such technologies based on the
original disclosure filed years before but kept secret during the prolonged prosecu-
tion. 74 To address this problem, the 1994 URAA changed the patent term from
seventeen-years from the date of issuance to twenty-years from the filing date and
brought the U.S. term in line with European and Japanese terms. 75
Another major difference between the United States and European and Japa-
nese patent systems was the absence of a system in the United States for early pub-
lication of the application before patent issuance. Under the European Patent Con-
vention and Japanese Patent Law, the content of all applications are automatically
published eighteen-months from the priority date regardless of the stage of exami-
nation.76 An early publication system completely eliminates submarine patent
problems and results in a number of economic benefits by making available to the
public technological information included in the applications. The Domestic
35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (2000). Congress passed the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements and
amended Section 104 to allow evidence in WTO member countries to show the priority. With re-
spect to NAFTA countries, the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
made it possible to establish the priority based on evidence in these countries.
72 David L. Marcus, Is the Submarine Patent Torpedoed?: Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson and the Re-
vival of Continuation Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 525 (1997); Samuel C. Miller III,
Undue Delay in Prosecution of Patent Applications, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 729
(1992).
7 The Patent Act of 1861 set the term of seventeen-years from the date of issuance. An Act in Ad-
dition to "An Act to promote the Progress of the useful Arts," [sic] 12 Stat. 246, § l(b) (1861).
For the historical developments on the term of US patents, see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 16.04[1].
For a good example of this type of submarine patent abuse practice as adopted by Mr. Lemelson,
see, e.g., M. Scott Carey, Article: I Intellectual Property: B. Patent: 3. Defenses: A) Doctrine of
Laches: Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 219 (1998).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
16 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 93, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 32-
33, 13 I.L.M. 270, 293; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 64.
7 John Duffy et al., Symposium: Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the
Legal and Economic Effects of Publishing Patent Applications after Eighteen Months of Filing, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 601, 606-07(1998); Paul A. Ragusa, Note: Eighteen Months to Publi-
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Publication of Foreign Filed Patent Applications Act of 1999, 78 which is part of the
1999 American Inventor Protection Act, introduced an early publication system and
enables the USPTO topublish the content of an application after eighteen-months
from the priority date.79 Although applicants who do not wish to obtain patents
outside the United States can prevent publications of their applications by filing a
request, a risk of submarine patents resulting from the unpublished applications is
marginal because more than 75 percent of all U.S. applications are also filed out-
side the United States. 80 Moreover, applicants are strongly discouraged from tak-
ing advantage of the exception to prevent publication because additional protection
through a newly introduced provisional right is not available unless applications are
published. 8'
In short, although the United States did not actively participate in the WIPO
forum over the past decade beyond the formality harmonization discussions, the
United States has been active in revising its own patent system and setting an inter-
national standard toward a global patent system through multilateral and bilateral
negotiations. 82 This effort provides the platform that Paris Union members will
start negotiating from, which is completely different from the early 1990s when the
PLT Basic Proposal failed.
C. Resumption of U.S. Leadership
The change of U.S. administrations again brought a significant movement for
furthering patent harmonization in the international arena. 83 At the fourth Standing
Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP) held in November 2000, the United States
returned to play a key role in international negotiations through the WIPO and pro-
posed to limit the scope of negotiations to issues related to the drafting, filing, and
examination of patent applications to facilitate work-sharing among patent of-
fices.84 This U.S. proposal for furthering "deep harmonization" of both law and
cation: Should the United States Join Europe and Japan by Promptly Publishing Patent Applica-
tions?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 143 (1992).
11 American Inventors Protection Act, supra note 62, § 4501-08. For a general discussion see
CHISUM, supra note 59, § 11.02 [4][e].
79 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
80 Duffy et al., supra note 77, at 606.
8, 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2000).
82 Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, The Long-Term International view of Patents and Trademarks, 4 INT'L
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y 14-1, 14-2 (2000).
81 The second Bush administration was elected in November 2000 and did not take office until Janu-
ary 2001. Since US delegations have always been interested in harmonization, they became active
with anticipation of the administration change by late 2000.
84 Report, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 4th
Session, at 4 (Dec.7, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_4/
index.htm.
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practice, with the goal of mutual recognition or according full faith and credit to
examination results, was widely supported by the SCP delegations.
85
In keeping this limited scope and goal in mind, WIPO's International Bureau
presented a first draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) at the fifth SCP
session held in May 2001 .86 Many provisions in the first draft included two alter-
natives so delegations could register their preferences. SCP Delegations reviewed
the first draft article by article and indicated their enthusiasm for continuing nego-
tiations.87 Based on this May 2001 draft, the USPTO listed issues related to vari-
ous substantive patent law aspects and sought public opinion. 88 These issues relate
to points in the first draft that will require the United States to change current prac-
tice.89
WIPO's International Bureau further revised the first draft, reflecting the
comments presented at the fifth session, and presented a second draft in the sixth
session in November 2001.90 The discussion at the sixth session began with a re-
port from the U.S. Delegation that included opinions indicating divided positions
on many issues, including the first-to-file-principle. 91 Although the U.S. Delega-
tion was not ready to clarify its position, it nevertheless supported the SPC's effort
to establish the best practices for substantive patent law. 92 Incorporating all com-
ments at the sixth session, the most recent draft of the SPLT is now circulating
among SPC delegations for review.93 This most recent draft was presented at the
seventh meeting held May 6 to May 10, 2002, at WIPO headquarters in Geneva,
Switzerland. The discussions and negotiations at the seventh meeting highlighted
different views on several provisions in the latest draft. Therefore, several more re-
,1 Setsuko Asami, A View Toward the Global Patent-Mutual Exploitation of Examination Results,
2002 AIPPI J. 12, 16 (2002).
16 Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Com-
mittee on the Law of Patents, 5th Session, Apr. 4, 2001, available at http://www.wipo.org/
scp/en/documents/session_5/index.htm.
87 Id.
11 Requests for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive Requirements of
Patent Laws, 66 FED. REG. 15,409, 15,410 (Mar. 19, 2001).
11 Draft Report, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Pat-
ents, 6th Session, Nov. 28, 2001, at 3, available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/
session_6/index.htm [hereinafter WIPO Draft Report (6th Session)].
', WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16.
11 WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 3.
92 Id.
11 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session).
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visions are expected before submitting to the Diplomatic Conference of Paris Union
General Assembly for adoption of a new treaty.
94
II. Review of the Most Recent SPLT Draft
The SPLT is different from any previous treaty dealing with the substantive
aspects of patent law. The degree of harmonization the SPLT tries to accomplish is
much more comprehensive than the Paris Convention 95 or WTO-TRIPS96 because
the articles and regulations establishing the basic conditions for patentability and
description requirements reflect the current practices in major patent jurisdictions,
such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, and gives direction as to which of
these practices should be adopted. However, the scope of the SPLT is narrower
than the last failed draft of the Patent Law Treaty97 because the SPLT does not ap-
ply to infringement issues.
98
Although the SPLT's primary goal is to deal only with substantive law issues,
the draft treaty includes some formality and procedural requirements closely related
to substantive patent law requirements.99 Particularly, one can view description re-
quirements for the specification and claims and allowable amendment require-
ments 100 as substantive patentability requirements if viewed in combination with
patentability conditions, such as utility.1l 1 These formality and procedural issues
are also governed by the PCT10 2 and the PLT. 103 However, these provisions are
9 Two more revised drafts were posted by WIPO Int'l Bureau since the submission of this article.
Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Com-
mittee on the Law of Patents, 8th Session, Nov. 25 to 29, 2002, available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/scp-ce/index-8.htm; Draft Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 9th
Session, May 12 to 16, 2003, available at http://www.wipo.int/news/en/index.html?
wipo-contentframe=/news/en/conferences.html [hereinafter WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law
Treaty (9th Session)].
9' Paris Convention, supra note 23.
91 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
11 For a discussion of the treaty draft, see discussions associated with supra note 39.
18 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93.
91 For an example of the above, see Article 5 - application and Article 6 - unity of invention.
,01 This requirement prevents applicants from amending claims and specifications to include subject
matter, which extends beyond the content of the application as of the priority date. This require-
ment is parallel to the written description requirement under § 112 para. I, European Patent Con-
vention, supra note 13, art. 123(2), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 35, 13 I.L.M. 270,
299 and Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. l7bis.
, Such provisions include Article 7, Observation, Amendments or Correction of Applications; Arti-
cle 10, Enabling Disclosure; and Article 11, Claims. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(7th Session), supra note 93.
02 Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 33.
101 Patent Law Treaty, supra note 55.
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also included in the SPLT because the applicable scopes of the PCT, PLT, and
SPLT are different. 
104
The SPLT is applicable to both the PCT route international applications and
Paris route applications.105 Formality requirements under the PCT were originally
developed to uniformly handle PCT route international applications filed in differ-
ent patent offices. To further harmonize formality requirements applicable to both
the Paris route and PCT route applications and to avoid any conflict between the
PCT and the PLT, PLT Article 6 incorporated PCT formality requirements. 10 6
Thus, under the PLT, the PCT requirements apply to both Paris and PCT route ap-
plications. 107 However, both the PCT and the PLT include a clear disclaimer of
any binding effect with respect to substantive patent law issues. 10 8 Since some
formality requirements (e.g., enabling disclosure) are linked with a substantive pat-
ent law requirement (e.g., utility), the SPLT includes provisions for these substan-
tive-law-linked requirements to ensure that once the SPLT is executed, both sub-
stantive and formality aspects of these requirements bind patent offices in
examining PCT and Paris routes applications. 1 0
The most recent SPLT draft is primarily based on the law and practice of
European countries, namely, the European Patent Convention.110 Since Japan has
already revised many aspects of its patent law to harmonize with the European Pat-
ent Convention, many provisions in the current SPLT have already been incorpo-
rated into Japanese Patent Law. However, a significant number of provisions obvi-
ously reflect the U.S. patent statute and U.S. case law, which will require the EPC
and JPL to change in order to execute the SPLT. Furthermore, WIPO's Interna-
tional Bureau intentionally drafted some unique provisions that are different from
both the U.S. and European/Japanese patent law and practice.
In the field of intellectual property, the law and practices developed by Euro-
pean countries were adopted "as is" for previous international standards.111 Thus,
some European scholars may view the current draft of the SPLT as unfairly favor-
For a general discussion on the relationship between SPLT, PCT and PLT, see WIPO Interface
Study, supra note 52.
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, at 9.
10, Patent Law Treaty, supra note 55, art. 6, 39 I.L.M. at 1052.
I'l WIPO Interface Study, supra note 52, at 2.
108 Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 33, arts. 27(5), 33(5); Patent Law Treaty, supra note 55,
art. 2(2), 39 I.L.M. at 1050.
'u WIPO Interface Study, supra note 52, at 6.
11 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 93, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090), 13
I.L.M. 270.
" A good example is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The procedure under the PCT closely
parallels the procedure at the European Patent Office.
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ing the U.S. system and argue for adoption of the European Patent Convention "as
is." 112 Americans may view the current draft as still too European but find it better
than any other draft prepared for the PLT or the PCT, as it reflects a fair bargain be-
tween the U.S. and European/Japanese systems. The next section of this paper re-
views important articles in the current SPLT draft and discusses whether the provi-
sions in these articles are American, European, or unique in comparison with Title
35 of the United States Code, the EPC, and JPL.
A. First-To-File Principle
1. Published Prior Art
SPLT Article 8 provides the definition of both published and unpublished
prior art references. 113 It makes prior art any information which has been made
available to the public before the application date and earlier applications pending
in the patent office on the application date. Its current text follows the European
model overall because it mirrors the definition of the prior art in the EPC 1 14 as well
as JPL. 115 This article addresses the most controversial issue, the first-to-file ver-
sus the first-to-invent debate between the United States and the rest of the world.
1 16
SPLT Article 8 corresponds to 35 U.S.C. § 102 and defines the prior art on the ba-
sis of the first-to-file principle. Unlike the lengthy and complex provisions in §
102, Article 8 is very simple and easy to understand.
SPLT Article 8(1) 117 can be viewed as corresponding to § 102(a) and §
102(b) regarding the published prior art.118 However, Article 8 is different from §
102(a) because the current 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) determines the novelty of invention
12 See, e.g., Sven J.R. Bostyn, International Harmonization of the Patent System, AIPPI J., Nov.
2002, at 384.
13 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8.
114 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(2), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090),
18, 13 I.L.M. 271, 286.
11 Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(1).
16 1991 PLT Basic Proposal included the first-to-file priority provision in Article 4(4). Wegner supra
at 39. The priority provision is reserved in the most recent draft. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 4(1). Obviously, the definitions of the prior art were
adopted based on the first-to-file principle. For a general discussion of the first-to-file v. first-to-
invent debates, see Heinze Bardehle, A New Approach to Worldwide Harmonization of Patent
Law, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 303 (1999); David W. Okey, Constitutionality of a
Multi-National Patent System (Part 1), 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 657 (1999); Okey,
"Constitutionality of a Multi-National Patent System (Part II), 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 927 (1999).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(1).
,, ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 313 (1998).
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as of the invention date, instead of the filing date. 1 19 Moreover, SPLT Article 8(1)
is applicable to both disclosures by inventors and third parties1 2° in contrast to §
102(a), which only applies to disclosures by third parties. 12 1 In contrast, § 102(b)
is similar to Article 8(1) in determining the prior art as of the filing date and giving
a definition of the published prior art.122 It also applies to both inventors and third
parties. 123 However, the prior art that becomes available during the one-year grace
period is excluded from the definition of prior art.124 Thus, one can view § 102(b)
as the combination of the SPLT Article 8(1) definition of prior art and Article 9, the
allowance of a grace period.125
Further, § 102 includes provisions that do not exist in SPLT Article 8. Spe-
cifically, § 102(c) governing abandonment126 and § 102(d) governing foreign ap-
plications do not fall into the definition of Article 8.127 Inventors' secret commer-
cial use that gives rise to public use or an on sale bar under § 102(b) is not included
in the prior art. 128 Although first-to-file patent professionals view these provisions
as a type of prior art, U.S. patent professionals distinguish these statutory bar provi-
sions from the prior art provisions because of the different policies underlying these
two sets of provisions. Statutory bar provisions, § 102 (b), (c) and (d), are unique
to the U.S. patent system because they were introduced to encourage early filing
and to remedy the problem inherent in the first-to-invent system, i.e., the delay in
filing an application. 129 Because the novelty provision under the first-to-file prin-
ciple inherently includes a mechanism for encouraging early filing, the SPLT does
not include any additional definitions for published prior art except for Article 8(1).
Another major difference in Article 8(1) is that by defining prior art as "all in-
formation, which has been made available to the public anywhere in the world in
- 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) provides the invention was known or used " . .before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent" (emphasis added).
121 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(i).
12 1 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) limits the scope of the prior art to inventions by others.
122 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
2 Id. The term "by others" in § 102(a) is removed from § 102(b).
4 ld. The invention was patented or described in a printed publication " .. more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States" (emphasis added).
12. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9.
126 For a general discussion see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 6.03.
127 Id. at § 6.04.
-21 Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 516, 68 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (2d
Cir. 1946). This bar does not apply to third party activity. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Gar-
lock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
121 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829).
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any form," there is no discrimination between domestic and foreign prior art. 130
This provision also mirrors the EPC and JPL. 131 In contrast, under the current U.S.
patent statute, only information which is described in a published patent or printed
publication constitutes the prior art if the invention has become available outside
the United States. 132 If information is not in a written form but has become known
or used, such as sale of an invention without any written disclosure, the information
must be available in the United States to constitute the prior art under § 102(a) and
(b). 133
As briefly discussed above, Article 8(1) is also different from § 102(a) and (b)
because the critical factor for determining whether information constitutes the prior
art under Article 8(1) is the availability of information to the public. 134 Regardless
of the circumstances surrounding the disclosure, any form of making information
available to the public constitutes prior art. 135 In other words, as long as the inven-
tion is kept secret, it does not constitute prior art. This simple definition reflects the
ordinary meaning of prior art and parallels the definition of prior art under the EPC
and JPL. 136 In contrast, as far as inventors' activities are concerned, the definition
of the prior art under the U.S. patent system is complicated and difficult to under-
stand. A public use may not constitute "public use" under § 102(b) if the use falls
within the experimental use exception.137 A secret use may constitute "public use"
under § 102(b) if the use is for a commercial purpose. 138
2. Undisclosed Prior Art
SPLT Article 8(2) 139 corresponds to 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) and (g) in prescrib-
ing the effect of unpublished prior art. 140 Article 8(2) is, in essence, European be-
cause it defines the unpublished prior art under the first-to-file principle. However,
130 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(1).
'3' European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(1).
132 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2000).
'13 Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (9th Cir. 1973).
134 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, at 16.
131 Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines under the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, World Intel-
lectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 7th Session, Mar. 6,
2002, available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/sessioin7/index.htm, [hereinafter
WIPO Draft Regulations and Guidelines (7th Session)], rule 8(1).
136 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29.
17 Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 129 (1878).
38 Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).
131 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(2).
140 ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 313.
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it also reflects some American influence because it uses prior art provisions to de-
termine the priority among multiple applications for the same invention. This is the
same approach taken by Title 35 U.S.C., which does not include any separate pro-
vision for the first-to-invent priority but includes § 102(e) and (g), which define an
earlier invention as prior art and give the patent a defeating right only to the earlier
invention. 141
This SPLT and U.S. approach differ from the European and Japanese ap-
proach that provides separate provisions to determine the first-to-file priority, if
more than one application is filed for the same invention. 142 The EPC and JPL
view the effect of an earlier application as creating a right to a European or Japa-
nese patent. 143 This right includes both priority rights to obtain a patent and defen-
sive rights to prevent others from obtaining a patent. These European and Japanese
patent rights are not limited to the claimed subject matter but also cover subject
matter described but not claimed in the applications. 
144
The most significant difference between Article 8(2) and 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
and (g) is what constitutes prior art. Because Article 8(2) defines prior art under
the first-to-file principle, an earlier application instead of an earlier invention con-
stitutes prior art under Article 8(2). 145 Under 35 U.S.C., an earlier invention is de-
termined under the priority rule provided in § 102(g). In contrast, under the SPLT,
an earlier application is determined by the priority date or actual filing date granted
by a patent office upon fulfillment of the formality requirements necessary to estab-
lish the filing date under the PCT and PLT. The whole content of the application is
prior art under the SPLT, 146 as is the case in 35 U.S.C. with respect to an earlier in-
vention 147 and in the EPC and JPL regarding an earlier application. 148
Another important difference between SPLT Article 8(2) and 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) and (g) is the timing concerning when the prior art patent-defeating effect
becomes available. U.S. courts and the USPTO distinguish between an affirmative
141 Id. at 322.
142 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 60(2), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
20, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39.
143 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 60(1), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
20, 13 I.L.M. 270, 287; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 33.
144 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(3), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
19, 13 I.L.M. 270, 287; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29bis.
4 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(2).
,46 WIPO Draft Regulations and Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 9(l) and (2).
147 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000); Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 391
(1926).
,41 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 19,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29bis.
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priority effect entitling one to obtain a patent from a defensive effect to defeat the
patentability of later inventions. 149  The affirmative right is attached only to
claimed subject matter. In contrast, the defensive right is associated with claimed
or unclaimed subject matter disclosed in the specification. U.S. courts introduced
this distinction through statutory interpretation limiting the effect of secret prior art,
§ 102(e) and § 102(g), and refused to give unclaimed but disclosed subject matter
the patent-defeating effect as of the foreign priority date. 150 As a result, any un-
claimed subject matter disclosed in an unpublished pending U.S. application is
given prior art effect only as of the actual filing date. 151 In contrast, neither the
EPC nor JPL discriminate between claimed and unclaimed subject matter and give
both the effect of prior art as of the priority date. 15 2 The SPLT took the Euro-
pean/Japanese approach by expressly rejecting the discriminative approach adopted
by the USPTO and U.S. courts. Rule 9(2) requires patent offices to give prior art
effect as of the priority date as long as the subject matter is disclosed in the unpub-
lished earlier application and its previous application on which a priority is
claimed. 15
3
The SPLT is also European with respect to the applicable scope of unpub-
lished prior art.154 The EPC and JPL follow the same restrictive approach, limiting
the use of secret prior art for rejecting later claims only for lack of novelty. 155 Un-
der current U.S. case law, the USPTO can use the content of an earlier application
under § 102(e) to reject later claims for lack of both novelty and non-
obviousness. 156 Over the U.S. Delegation's objection, this restrictive scope was
moved from the Regulation into Article 8(2) of the SPLT. 157 The SPLT Regula-
, For a general discussion of the definitive patent-defeating right under the US patent system, see
ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 824.
1.0 Regarding § 102(e), see In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 863 (C.C.P.A. 1966); regarding § 102(g), see
In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1970).
'5' ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 824.
'5 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(3), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
19, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29bis. For a
general discussion of the effect of prior right, see generally Richard Wiezoreck, Convention Ap-
plications as Patent-Defeating Prior Rights, 6 I.I.C. 135 (1975).
'5' WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 9(3). This
requirement is incorporated into Article 8(2) in WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th
Session) supra note 94.
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(2).
' ' European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(3), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
19, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. l9bis. How-
ever, see infra note 426, the JPO uses a relaxed identity rule that falls between the novelty and in-
ventive step standard for determining novelty under Article 29bis.
156 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (1965).
'" WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, at 14. US dele-
gates requested to change Rule 9 so that Article 8(2), "prior art," should apply to both novelty and
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tion also limits the applicability of the double patenting doctrine to identical inven-
tions. 15
8
However, Article 8(2) has an American aspect in that it excludes the applica-
tion of unpublished prior art when the earlier application was filed by the same ap-
plicant of the later application that is under examination as of the filing date of the
later application. 159 This exception to the application of unpublished prior art was
introduced to avoid the so-called "self-collision" problem. 160  Title 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) provides a similar exception by excluding as prior art earlier applications by
the same inventor.161 Japanese Patent Law also provides a similar exception. 162 In
contrast, the EPC does not provide an exception to avoid self-collision and, thus,
needs to introduce such an exception once the SPLT is executed. 163
B. Article 9: Grace Period
SPLT Article 9 provides an exception to the prior art under Article 8 and de-
fines information which does not affect the patentability of a claimed invention al-
though the information is made available to the public prior to the filing date. 164 It
provides two options, Alternative A and B, for setting conditions for a grace period.
Alternative A provides details of categories of disclosures that qualify for the grace
period. 165 In contrast, Alternative B only recites the general principle of a grace
period and sets a period of twelve-months for the grace period while leaving details
of conditions regarding the disclosure categories, etc., to the Regulations. 166 There
is no substantial difference between the two alternatives because the same condi-
tions in Alternative A will be provided in the Regulations. However, by providing
inventive step/non-obviousness. See also, WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Ses-
sion), supra note 93, at 21.
WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 9(1)(c).
, Id. at rule 9(4).
Without an exception, an inventor's own application will prevent him from obtaining a patent on
his new but obvious improvements.
6, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2000). With respect to non-obviousness determination, the invention dis-
closed in the early application is excluded from the prior art if the invention and the claims under
the examination were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the
same person at the time that the invention was made under 35 U.S.C. § 103(g) (2000).
,62 Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29bis.
'6 GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 388 (200 1).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9.
161 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9, alternative A.
Alternative A was adopted in the Eighth and Ninth Session Drafts. WIPO Draft Substantive Pat-
ent Law Treaty (8th Session) supra note 94, art. 9; WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(9th Session) supra note 94, art. 9.
,6 Id. at art. 9, alternative B.
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the conditions in the Regulations instead of the Treaty, Alternative A gives member
states flexibility to change the conditions.
Article 9 is European because it provides a grace period as an exception to the
novelty requirement under the first-to-file principle. Joseph Straus, a scholar of a
first-to-file country, defines a grace period as "a specific period of time prior to the
inventor or his/her successor in title filing of a patent application, during which dis-
closures of an invention do not forfeit a right to patent the invention."' 167 The sig-
nificance of a grace period is very different in the first-to-invent and first-to-file
systems. Under the first-to-file system, an invention must be new and not obvious
from the prior art as of the filing date, thus the principle is to refuse to patent old
inventions. 168 The grace period is an exception to the first-to-file principle. A
grace period system allows patent offices to remove from the prior art certain cate-
gories of information that have become available as of the filing date so that patent
offices can grant patents to an old or obvious invention. Because both Alternatives
A and B provide a grace period as an exception to the first-to-file novelty require-
ment by removing certain categories of information from the prior art, Article 9 is
European.
Under a true first-to-invent system, a grace period is not an exception, but a
principle that the invention is new and non-obvious as of the invention date even if
the invention has become old prior to the filing date through a disclosure by an in-
ventor or third party. 169 However, to encourage early disclosure through a patent
application, U.S. case law modified the true first-to-invent system by introducing
statutory bars that prevent inventors from obtaining a patent after the expiration of a
grace period if inventors engage in one of the activities listed in § 102(b) and
(d). 170 Thus, a statutory bar that limits a period for filing an application after a dis-
closure is an exception. Neither Alternative A nor B follows this American ap-
proach.
However, the grace period of Article 9 is an extensive modification of the
European approach because both Alternatives A and B reflect the American ap-
proach and cover a much broader scope of categories of information that qualify to
take advantage of the grace period than the scope under the EPC and JPL. Because
a grace period is an exception, both the EPC and JPL limit the categories of infor-
mation and prescribe detailed conditions for taking advantage of the exception.171
167 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 3.
"6 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29. This princ;-
ple is already discussed in the previous section.
!69 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
176 Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23.
'7, European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 55, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Crnnd. 7090) 19,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 30.
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The scope of categories available for a grace period under the EPC is very narrow;
only two categories of information can qualify for a grace period: 172 (1) a display
at an international exhibition as allowed under the Paris Convention 173 and (2) an
evident abuse in relation to the applicant and his legal predecessor. 174 The scope of
categories under JPL is broader than the EPC because, in addition to an evident
abuse 175 and a display at an international exhibition, 176 JPL qualifies for a grace
period to (1) a disclosure by the inventor for the purpose of experiment; (2) a dis-
closure by the inventor in a printed publication; and (3) a disclosure by the inventor
in a printed publication at a science meeting recognized by JPO Commissioner.
177
However, it limits activities that qualify for a grace period to these categories. Both
the EPC and JPL require applicants to request the grace period upon application. 1
78
Further, the grace period is six months from the actual filing date for the EPC and
the JPL. 17
9
In contrast, because the principle underlying the U.S. patent system is to
award patents to new and non-obvious inventions as of the invention date, the U.S.
patent statute provides no limitation with respect to categories of information that
qualify for the grace period.1 80 Information that may constitute the prior art under
§ 102(a) if the information is disclosed by a third party is not prior art under §
102(b). 18 1 The grace period under § 102(b) is twelve-months from the actual filing
date instead of six-months. 182
,71 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 55(1)(a), (1)(b), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20
(Cmnd. 7090) 19, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286.
171 Paris Convention, supra note 23, art. 11, 25 Stat. at 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. at 339.
174 A publication without the inventor's consent is considered to constitute evident abuse. However,
what constitutes an evident abuse should be further clarified by EPO case law. For a general dis-
cussion regarding what act gives rise to an evident abuse, see ROMAULD SINGER ET AL., THE
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 174 (Rev. Eng. ed. 1995).
,7 Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 30(2).
76 Id. at art. 30(3).
"7 Id. at art. 30(1).
78 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 55, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 19,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 30(4). Appli-
cants also need to submit document(s) showing that an invention is the same invention disclosed
prior to the filing date and can fall within one of categories for taking advantage of the grace pe-
riod. Under the EPC, such document(s) must be filed at the filing date, but, under the JPL, such
document(s) can be filed within 30 days from the filing date.
European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 55, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 19,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 30(4).
180 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
181 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). (§ 102(a) does not apply to disclosures by inventors and their licen-
sors).
182 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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Article 9 is more closely in line with the U.S. system. It adopts the twelve-
month grace period of the U.S. 183 and has fewer restrictions on the scope of infor-
mation qualified for the grace period than the European and Japanese systems do.
Like 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), any category of information is qualified for the grace pe-
riod as long as the information resulted from acts of inventors and acts directly or
indirectly derived from the inventor. 184 Article 9 also allows a grace period for un-
authorized disclosures by a patent office. 185 The major difference between Article
9 and 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) regarding conditions for the grace period is that the start
date of the grace period under the Regulations is the priority date instead of the ac-
tual filing date. 
186
Regarding the priority of entitlement to a patent between two inventors during
the grace period, Article 9 adopts the European approach because a first-to-file
principle controls the priority. Because Article 9 does not allow the removal from
the prior art of disclosure by a third party (Inventor A) with respect to an invention
by the inventor (Inventor B) of the claim under examination, a third party's (Inven-
tor A) early application constitutes the unpublished prior art under Article 8(2).187
This early publication will prevent the inventor (Inventor B) who disclosed the in-
vention during the grace period but was the second-to-file from obtaining a patent.
The third party (Inventor A) who is the first-to-file can obtain a patent only if she
files an application prior to the disclosure by the inventor (Inventor B) who tried to
take advantage of the grace period. This is exactly the same practice as the current
grace period system under the EPC and JPL.188
This approach is very different from the American approach. Under the U.S.
first-to-invent system, a third party's (Inventor A) early application does not pre-
,' An option of the six-month grace period term was included in the Eighth and Ninth Session
Drafts. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (8th Session), supra note 94, art. 9; WIPO
Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th Session), supra note 94, art. 9.
'84 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9.
15 Id. art. 9, alternative A (1)(ii). This category includes disclosures by a patent office regarding the
information contained in (a) another application filed by the inventor and should not have been
made available to the public by the Office, or (b) an application filed without the knowledge or
consent of the inventor by a third party which obtained the information directly or indirectly from
the inventor.
86 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9, alternatives A, B.
87 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, at 16.
'8 An applicant who is the second-to-file and disclose an invention during the grace period cannot
obtain a patent under the first-to-file principle under the European Patent Convention, supra note
13, art. 83, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 27, 13 I.L.M. 270, 291; and Tokkyo Ho
[Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39. An applicant who is the first-to-file but
failed to file an application prior to the disclosure by the second-to-file during the grace period
cannot obtain a patent for lack of novelty under the European Patent Convention, supra note 13,
art. 54, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286 and Tokkyo Ho [Japanese
patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29. The first-to-file can obtain a patent only if he files an
application prior to the disclosure by another inventor.
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vent an inventor (Inventor B) who discloses his invention during the grace period
from obtaining a patent if she (Inventor B) shows an earlier invention date under
the priority rule of § 102(g).18 9 Since the third party's (Inventor A) filing date is
presumed to be the invention date, an inventor of the disclosure (Inventor B) bears
the burden to establish priority over the first-to-file inventor (Inventor A).1 90
SPLT Article 9 provides intervening rights for a third party who started to use
an invention after the invention was disclosed to the public but before the actual fil-
ing date or priority date of the application for a patent on the invention. 191 Many
delegations indicated concern over the rights of thirty parties affected by the intro-
duction of a grace period. 192 The most persuasive argument raised against the in-
troduction of a grace period is that it gives rise to legal uncertainty with respect to a
right of a third party who obtains information from a disclosure and starts to use the
information with a belief that the information fell into the public domain. 193 To
avoid any hardship on such a third party who, in good faith, used an invention or
prepared to use an invention during the grace period, Alternative A provides a right
to the party to continue to use the invention. 19 4
C. Articles 10 and 11: Description Requirements
The SPLT not only requires two of the three separate disclosures required in
the specification of a U.S. patent application under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1,195 the en-
ablement and written description requirements, but also requires claim definiteness,
as does 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2. Overall, the SPLT's description requirement is more
similar to the European system because it does not require the inventor to specify
the best mode and views the written description requirement as a requirement for
claims, instead of a requirement for specifications. 196 The language of the descrip-
tion requirements in the SPLT 197 mirrors the language of the EPC, although U.S.
,8 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (2000).
'9' For more discussion on the role of the filing date in a priority contest, see infra note 348.
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9, alternative A(4).
191 WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 23.
' STRAUS, supra note 28, at 58.
114 The Eighth and Ninth Session Drafts provides this right in Article 9(5). WIPO Draft Substantive
Patent Law Treaty (8th Session), supra note 94, art. 9; WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(9th Session), supra note 94, art. 9.
115 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 7.01; In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470 (C.C.P.A.
1977).
196 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 84.
117 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. I 1(3)(b).
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influence is evident in the parts of the text that reflect U.S. case law and practice.
198
1. Enablement
The enablement requirement is provided in Article 10.199 The language of
Article 10 is primarily imported from the EPC.200 However, Articles 10 and 11
were modified by U.S. influence. Article 10(1) is a combination of EPC and 35
U.S.C. § 112, 1. The first half of Article 10(1) copied the language of Article 83
of the EPC,201 as well as Article 28, 1(a) of WTO-TRIPS. 202 The last half closely
parallels the text of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 that provides the enablement require-
ment. 203 Under U.S. case law, the enablement requirement includes two elements.
The first element requires that a specification include a disclosure of how to
make 204 and how to use the product recited in the claim.205 SPLT Article 10 ad-
dresses this first element of the enablement requirement.
The second element of the enablement requirement prescribes the relationship
between the claims and the disclosure in the specification. 20 6 In essence, claims
should not be so broad as to cover non-enabled embodiments. If no reasonable cor-
relation exists between the narrow disclosure in the specification and the broad
claim, the specification does not meet the requirements of enablement. 217 If the
scope of the claims is broader than the scope of disclosure, the claims are rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 as not being supported by the original claim or by an
enablement disclosure.
208
,98 The term "possession" reflects US case law. E.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 10.
200 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 83, 84, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
27-28, 13 I.L.M. 270, 291.
20, Id., art. 83.
202 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
203 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the in-
vention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and ex-
act terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same ... ").
104 Gould v. Hellwarth, 472 F.2d 1383, 1387, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 489, 491 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
20 In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 139 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For a general discus-
sion of the concept of undue breadth, see CHIsUM, supra note 59, § 7.03[7].
210 In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 18, 24 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
20 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2173.04
(8th ed. Aug. 2001).
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Furthermore, the second element of enablement also requires that the specifi-
cation must disclose any claimed invention in such clarity as to enable one skilled
in the art to practice the invention without undue experimentation.
209
Article 10 addresses the second element through Rule 10,210 which lists fac-
tors developed by U.S. courts to decide whether undue experimentation is neces-
sary to practice the claimed invention. 211 The EPO and JPO adopted this U.S.
practice and use similar factors for assessing undue experimentation. 12 Thus, this
second element of the enablement requirement is both American and Euro-
pean/Japanese in nature.
2. Written Description
The written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 is provided for in
SPLT Article I 1(3)(b) as part of the description requirement for claims. 2 13 Al-
though the SPLT adopts the European approach of viewing the written description
as fulfilling a requirement for claims to be supported by the specification, it is
modified by a strong American influence. 214 The language of Article 1 1(3)(b) is a
restatement of the written description requirement in U.S. case law.215 The U.S.
Delegation insisted on this requirement over the objections of other delegations that
209 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510, 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For a
general discussion of the concept of undue breadth, see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 7.03[4].
210 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 10.
2 in re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1404, 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
12 T0639/95, Biopolimers/MIT, Decision of Technical Board of Appeals, Jan. 21, 1998, at 4; Japa-
nese Patent Office Examination Guidelines part VII, ch. 2, 1.1, available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartVI1-2.pdf [hereinafter JPO Examination Guidelines].
213 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16, art. 11(3).
214 The Japanese delegation pointed out two approaches for rejecting unreasonably broad claims: (1)
a requirement for claims being supported by the specification and (2) a requirement for specifica-
tions to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention. WIPO Draft Report (6th Session),
supra note 89, at 28.
211 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-4, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir.
1991). However, over objections from the US delegations, the term "possession" was removed
from the Eighth and Ninth Session Drafts. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (8th Ses-
sion), supra note 94, art. 11(3); WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th Session), supra
note 94, art. 11(3). Instead, the term "subject matter which he (the applicant) recognized and de-
scribed" is inserted Rule 12. WIPO Draft Regulations Under The Substantive Patent Law Treaty,
Nov. 25-29, 2002 (8th Session) available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/
scpce/index_8.htm [hereinafter WIPO Draft Regulations (8th Session)]; WIPO Draft Regulations
Under The Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th Session) available at http://www.wipo.int/
news/en/index.html?wipo-content.frame=/news/en/conferences.html [hereinafter WIPO Draft
Regulations (9th Session)]. This term "recognized and described" appears to parallel to the writ-
ten description standard in the recent Federal Circuit case law. Regent of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Enzo Bio-
chem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1329, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (The disclosure must allow one skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity of the
subject matter purportedly described.).
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the requirement is redundant with the enablement requirement under Article 10 and
unnecessary. 2
16
3. Best Mode
A primary reason to view the SPLT description requirement as European is its
failure to require inventors to disclose the best mode for carrying out their inven-
tions.217 The SPLT current draft does not require any disclosure of the best mode,
although WTO-TRIPS expressly gives member states an option to require such dis-
closure.2 18 Because neither the EPC nor JPL requires a disclosure of best mode,
lack of this provision indicates that member states should not require a disclosure of
the best mode contemplated by the inventor as of the filing date.2
19
4. Claim Definiteness
SPLT Article 1 (1) and (2) provides the description requirement for claims
and, thus, should be read to correspond to the claim definiteness requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 112, 2.220 SPLT Article 11(1) mirrors the first sentence of EPC Arti-
cle 84.221 Article 11(2) and (3) copy the second sentence of EPC Article 84, di-
vided into two parts, with words added for clarification. 222 Except for some minor
variations of terms, 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 and EPC Article 84 are essentially the
same. 223 JPL Article 36, 5 closely parallels EPC Article 84. In substance, the
current draft of Article I 1 is both American and European/Japanese.
D. Claim Interpretation and the Doctrine of Equivalents
1. Fundamental Rules
Although member states agreed to limit the scope of international negotia-
tions to issues relating to patent granting procedures and expressly guaranteed the
freedom of member states to apply their own substantive requirements for deter-
mining infringement, 224 the SPLT addresses issues relating to claim scope and
216 Id.
21,7 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000).
2 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 29, para. 1, 33 I.L.M at 94.
219 Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 928, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1037 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
220 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16, art. 11.
221 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 84, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 28,
13 I.L.M. 270, 291.
222 Id.
223 The U.S. delegate is trying to use the exact term used in 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2. WIPO Draft
Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 27-28.
224 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 2.
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claim interpretation. 225 It is necessary to address such issues because claims define
the subject matter that will be examined for the determination of patentability. 226
Because of the significant impact on examination results, provisions for claim in-
terpretation were modified extensively through each draft revision. At the sixth
session, WIPO's International Bureau removed two articles for claim interpretation
and protection scope that were included in the SPLT but were independent from
Article 11 that provides the description requirement for claims. 227 In place of the
two articles, which provided for both claim interpretation and the doctrine of
equivalents, only one general principle for claim interpretation was added, Article
11(4). However, in the most recent draft, WIPO's International Bureau expanded
Article 11(4) to provide for both claim interpretation and the doctrine of equiva-
lents.22
8
SPLT's fundamental rules for claim interpretation and protection scope are
neutral as to both the U.S. and European/Japanese approaches because the rules fol-
low the European approach in the EPC but clarify them with restatements of U.S.
case law. SPLT Article 1 1(4)(a) provides a rule that, while the language of claims
defines the subject matter to be examined, the patent offices can take into account
the description and drawings in the specification, as well as the general knowledge
of one skilled in the art as of the filing date.229 This rule closely mirrors the lan-
guage of articles in the EPC and JPO, establishing the roles of claims and other
parts of the patent document.230 However, SPLT Article 11 (4)(a) lists, as a claim
interpretation aid, the general knowledge of one skilled in the art,23 1 which neither
the EPC nor JPO expressly endorses for use in claim interpretation. 232 Like U.S.
case law,233 the SPLT uses the perspective of one skilled in the art, as of the filing
date, to interpret claims. 234 This paragraph was added to avoid claim interpreta-
225 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 10, 12.
2 Draft Report, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Pat-
ents, 5th Session, Sept. 27, 2001, at 21, available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/
session_5/index.htm.
227 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16, at 26-27.
22 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 11 (4).
229 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 1 1 (4)(a).
230 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 69(1), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
23, 13 I.L.M. 270, 288; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 70(1), (2).
23, WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. I1 (4)(a).
292 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 69(1), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
23, 13 I.L.M. 270, 288; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 70(1), (2).
233 Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1654-55 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
214 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. I 1(4)(a).
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tions that limit the literal coverage to what is explicitly disclosed in the specifica-
tion and drawings.
235
Further, the most recent draft added a rule requiring patent offices to give due
account to equivalents of the elements expressly recited in the claims.236 Since
neither the EPC nor JPL provides for equivalents and 35 U.S.C. provides equiva-
lents only with respect to means-plus-function claims, it is not clear how patent of-
fices and courts should apply Article 1 1(4)(b). However, if the article is read to
parallel the protocol of the EPC for claim interpretation, the article requires protec-
tion beyond literal infringement, including protection from infringement by equiva-
lents, and prohibits strictly limiting protection to the literal meaning of claims.
237
Rule 12 of the SPLT Regulations expressly endorses the prohibition against strict
literal interpretation. 238 Japanese courts also follow the same approach in giving
protection by equivalents if certain conditions are met.
239
Although the U.S. patent statute does not include any provisions for claim in-
terpretation, except for a special rule for means-plus-function claims in § 112,
6,240 the rules in Article 11(4) closely parallel claim interpretation rules developed
by U.S. courts. The first rule in Article 11(4)(a), to use claim language as the pri-
mary basis for interpretation while taking into account the general knowledge of
one skilled in the art at the time of filing, reflects the use of claim interpretation
aides, such as specification, drafting, and file wrapper, by U.S. courts. 24 1 The sec-
ond rule in Article 11 (4)(b), taking into account equivalents of claimed elements,
reflects protection under the doctrine of equivalents and literal equivalents under §
3 Notes, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law Patents, 7th
Session, Mar. 18, 2002, at 33, available at http:/Iwww.wipo.org/scplen/documents/session-71
index.htm.
236 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. I 1 (4)(b).
237 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 69(1), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
23, 13 I.L.M. 270, 288.
238 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(1)(b).
Rules for claim interpretation under Article 11(4) has been moved to Rule 13 in the Eighth and
Ninth Session Draft Regulations. WIPO Draft Regulations (8th Session), supra note 215, rule
13(l)(b); WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session), supra note 215, rule 13(l)(b).
29 Tsubakimoto Seiko v. THK K.K., 1360 HANREI JIHO 32 (Sup. Ct., 1998). An English translation
by the author is published by the Supreme Court; see Toshiko Takenaka, The Supreme Court Af-
firmed the Presence of the Doctrine of Equivalents Under Japanese Patent System, CASRIP
NEWSLETTER, Winter 1998, at 1.
140 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (2000).
241 Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 702 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
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112, 6, both of which are firmly endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.242 Thus,
Article 11 (4) follows the European/Japanese approach and the U.S. approach.
SPLT Rule 12243 restates the Federal Circuit's canons of claim interpreta-
tion.244 Rule 12(1)(a) codifies the rule that claim terms should be given their ordi-
nary meaning as understood by one skilled in the field of the invention.245 Rule
12(2)(a) codified a prohibition against reading limitations into the claims from the
specification and the preferred embodiment. 246 Rule 12(2)(b) provides the excep-
tion to the above two rules, the doctrine of the patentee as lexicographer: 247 if a
description in the specification clearly altered the ordinary meaning of claim terms
and gave them a special meaning, the terms are limited to the special meaning.
248
However, Rule 12(2)(b) can be read to go beyond the Federal Circuit's can-
ons of claim construction and guarantee broad claim interpretation. The Rule pro-
hibits reading limitations into the claims from the specification, stating the fact that:
[the] claimed invention includes additional features not found in the examples disclosed
in the application or patent, lacks features found in such examples or does not achieve
every objective or possess every advantage cited or inherent in such examples shall not
remove that claimed invention from the scope of the claims.
This clause can be read to prohibit the Federal Circuit's practice of interpret-
ing the scope of claim terms in light of support found in the written description,
which effectively reads some limitations into the claims from the specification.
250
As to the protection by equivalents under Article 1 1(4)(b), 251 Rule 12(5)252
codifies the function-way-result test and known-interchangeability test used by U.S.
242 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28, 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1870-71, 1876 (1997).
243 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12.
244 KIMBERLY MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 206-13 (1999).
214 CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1153, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); CHISUM, supra note 59, § 18.03 [2][b][ii].
246 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1458, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1176 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
247 CHISUM, supra note 59, at § 18.03 [3].
248 Desper Prods., Inc. v. Qsound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1336-38, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088,
1096-97 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
241 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(2)(b).
The language is slightly modified to simplify and clarify the provision in the Ninth Draft Regula-
tions. WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session) supra note 215, rule 13(2)(b).
2 0 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1476-77, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, 1501
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
291 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 1 (4)(b).
292 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(5).
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courts to find equivalency between the claimed element and the accused infringing
element.253 Although European and Japanese tests for finding equivalency are
similar to the U.S. known-interchangeability test,254 Rule 12(5) is more closely in
line with the American and Ja anese approach in adopting the time of infringement
to apply the equivalence test.355 In contrast, some European countries apply the
test as of the filing date.256 Further, Rule 12(6) expressly endorses the U.S. prac-
tice of limiting the literal scope and equivalent scope by the statements made by the
applicant oratent owner during the prosecution and opposition/re-examination
proceeding. 257
2. Special Rules
Contrary to the fundamental rule, rules for special claims in Rule 12(3)
through 12(6) are very European/Japanese. 258 Rule 12(4)(a) and (b) sets forth a
rule for interpreting means-plus-function claims and requires a claim construction
to cover any structure or materials that are capable of performing the recited func-
tion. 259 This rule parallels the claim construction doctrine adopted by the EPO and
JPO, 260 but conflicts with claim construction by U.S. courts under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6.261
253 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518-19, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1645-46 (Fed. Cir. 1995), en banc, rev'd and remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion, 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997). The Ninth Session
Draft Regulations adopted the insubstantial difference test, which more closely reflects the test
adopted in the Hilton Davis opinion. WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session), supra note 215, rule
13(5)(i). It also added a new test to prevent a finding of equivalence if a person skilled in the art
had no reason to assume that the equivalent element had been excluded from the claimed inven-
tion. WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session), supra note 215, rule 13(5)(ii). This new test paral-
lels the test used by European countries. E.g., Catnic Components Ltd. and Another v. Hill and
Smith Ltd., [1981] FSR 60, [1982] RPC 183 (H.L. 1980).
214 Toshiko Takenaka, Case Comment: The Judgment of Supreme Court of Japan, Feb. 24, 1998 (in
Japanese), Feb. 24, 1998, HANREI JIHO No. 1688 (1999).
255 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 19,41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1867; Tsubakimoto Seiko v. THK K.K., 1360
HANREI JIHo 32 (Sup. Ct. 1998). The Ninth Draft also adopts the time of infringement. WIPO
Draft Regulations (9th Session) supra note 215, rule 13(5).
256 Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Apr. 29, 1986, 18 I.I.C. 795 (1987).
237 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(6).
238 These rules are renumbered as Rule 13(4)(a), (b) and (c) in the Ninth Session Draft Regulations.
WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session) supra note 215, rule 13(4).
259 Id. at rule 12. For simplification, the Eighth and Ninth Draft Regulations removed Rule 12(4)(b)
and retained Rule 12(4)(a) as Rule 13(4)(a). WIPO Draft Regulations (8th Session), supra note
215, rule 13(4)(a); WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session), supra note 215, rule 13(4)(a).
26 T292/85 GENENTECH I/Polypeptide Expression, 1989 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF EPO 275, 282
(1989); JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, at part 1, ch. 1, § 2.2.2.1 (6), available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partl- !.pdf.
161 In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Rule 12(4)(c) provides a special rule for interpreting product-by-process
claims and requires claims to be construed in terms of the product.262 This rule re-
flects claim construction adopted by the EPO and JPO. 263 The USPTO follows this
approach by requiring the product recited in the claim be new and non-obvious
from the prior art, independent from the process recited in the claim.
264
However, in determining infringement, two panel decisions of the Federal
Circuit have adopted conflicting views. The Scripps court followed the European
approach and held that a product-by-process claim should not be limited to prod-
ucts made by the process recited in the product-by-process claims. 265 In contrast,
the Atlantic Thermoplastics court reviewed the Supreme Court cases and held that
product-by-process claims extend only to the end-product made by the process re-
cited in the product-by-process claims.266 These conflicting panel decisions intro-
duced serious confusion in lower courts' claim interpretation of product-by-process
claims. 267 Although the Atlantic Thermoplastic court endorsed the USPTO to ap-
ply a claim construction during the prosecution different from that for the validity
and infringement during litigation,268 more recent U.S. case law seems to require
the USPTO to apply the same claim construction rules for patentability, validity
and infringement. 26 Thus, the Federal Circuit's adoption of the Atlantic Thermo-
plastic approach may bring a change in the USPTO's current examination practice.
Such change will result in a conflict with the current draft Rule 12(4)(c).
Rule 12(4)(d) provides for construction of claims directed to use of a product
and is also in line with European and Japanese practice but conflicts with current
U.S. practice. 270 Both the EPO and JPO expressly endorse inclusion of use claims
in their applications. Both uphold patentability of a new use in a known old prod-
uct if such use is inherent but not made available to the public through the prior art,
as long as the subject matter drafted in the product claim is limited to the particular
161 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12.
2'3 T150/82 IFF/Claim Categories, 1984 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF EPO 309, 312 (1984); JPO Examina-
tion Guidelines, supra note 212 , at part I, ch. 1, § 2.2.2.1 (7), available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartI- 1.pdf.
264 In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 1348, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 147 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
265 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580-81, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1013-14 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
216 Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846-47, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,
1490-91 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
267 Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics Gmbh, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16, 31-32, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1825, 1837-38 (D. Mass. 2000).
268 Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., 970 F.2d at 846, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1491.
261 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1539-41, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1553-54 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194-96, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1849-50.
270 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(1), 12(2).
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use.271 In contrast, the USPTO and U.S. courts reject patentability of a new use in
a known old product. 272 They also reject patentability of a new use in an analo-
gous compound of a known product if the new use is inherent in the known prod-
uct.2
73
E. Article 12: Conditions of Patentability
1. Patent Eligible Subject Matter
SPLT Article 12 lays out all four essential conditions for patentability re-
quired under U.S. law: (1) patent eligible subject matter; (2) utility under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101; (3) novelty under § 102; and (4) inventive step/non-obviousness under §
103.274 In particular, the SPLT's definition of patent eligible subject matter 275 was
one of the most controversial articles276 because this definition differed signifi-
cantly from European practice and can be read to conflict with WTO-TRIPS Article27.27
Until the sixth session, Article 12(1)(a) only required a claimed invention to
be made or used in any field of activity and did not expressly limit the invention to
be within a field of technology. 278 Thus, the previous proposed scope read much
more broadly than the current draft scope of patent eligible subject matter. 279 Re-
sponding to criticisms of the original broad language "in any field of activity," the
WIPO International Bureau added Article 12(l)(a) to the SPLT's most recent draft
to limit patentable subject matter to products or processes in "all fields of technol-
ogy." Article 12(l)(b) further explains the scope of patentable subject matter and
271 G2/88 MOBIL OIL/Friction Reducing Additive, 1990 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF EPO 93, 98-99
(1990); JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part II, ch. 2, § 1.5.2 (2), available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partll-2.pdf.
272 Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1945-46 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). For a general discussion of patentability of new use claims under U.S. case law, see
CHISUM, supra note 59, at § 1.03 [8][a], ROBERT MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 489 (1992).
273 In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-94, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1900-02 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
274 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(1 )(a).
277 Id. at art. 12(1).
276 The controversy over the definition of subject matter is so serious that the definition is completely
removed from the Eighth Session Draft Treaty. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (8th
Session), supra note 94, art. 12(1). The definition in the seventh session reappeared in the Ninth
Session Treaty Draft although the delegations agreed to postpone the discussion on eligible sub-
ject matter. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th Session), supra note 94, art. 12(1).
27 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 25, 33 I.L.M at 93.
278 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(l)(a).
279 European delegates objected to the current draft and requested to insert the term "in any field of
activity" to be consistent with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 93-
94; Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 30.
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lists items that do not constitute patent eligible subject matter.280 The list of patent
ineligible subject matter in the most recent draft does not include controversial
items, such as computer software and methods of doing business.281
The SPLT's original definition of patent eligible subject matter is very much
American. Obviously, WIPO's International Bureau intentionally adopted the
broad language to reflect the Federal Circuit's broad definition of patent eligible
subject matter, which permits the granting of patents on any subject matter as long
as such subject matter produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result.282 The cur-
rent draft definition is still in line with the U.S. definition because the patent eligi-
bility test of the Federal Circuit, if interpreted in the context of the U.S. Supreme
Court precedent on the question, also requires the subject matter to be in a techno-
logical art or an application of a law of nature.
283
In contrast, the EPC expressly lists computer software and methods of doing
business as patent ineligible subject matter284 and thus, is narrower than the scope
of patent eligibility under the most recent SPLT draft. European countries tradi-
tionally require the claimed invention to have a technical character to give rise to
patent eligible subject matter;285 therefore, the EPC Rule expressly requires the
claims to be defined in terms of the technical features of the invention.286 In inter-
preting patent eligibility under the EPC, the EPO applies the technical character re-
quirement to limit the scope of patent eligible subject matter by requiring a techni-
cal contribution. 287 The EU recently published a proposal for a directive with
respect to the patentability of computer implemented inventions and endorsed the
EPO's application of the technical character requirement. 288 The new draft defini-
28o WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(1)(b).
2' European Patent Convention, art. 52(2), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090), 18, 13 I.L.M.
271, 285. Not only European delegates but also many other delegates requested to list computer
software and business methods as being exempt from patent eligible subject matter. WIPO Draft
Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 31.
282 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541-45, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1555-58,
285 For more detailed discussion, see infra Part III.E. 1.
214 EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52(2)(c), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd.
7090), 18, 13 I.L.M. 271, 285.
285 Guidelines for Substantive Examination, European Patent Office, part C, ch. IV, §§ 2.1-2.2, avail-
able at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui-lines/e/index.htm [hereinafter EPO Ex-
amination Guidelines]. This requirement comes from case law doctrines from EPC member
states. For example, regarding German case law, see WOLFGANG BERNHARDT & RUDOLF
KRASSER, LEHRBUCH DES PATENTRECHTS 89 (1986).
288 Implementing Regulations to Convention on the Grant of European Patents, European Patent Of-
fice, part III, ch. II, § 29(1), available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/
contents.html.
287 GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 414 (2d ed. 2001).
288 The Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Oct. 19, 2000, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketl/en/indprop/soften.pdf.
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tion, introducing the field of technology limitation, reflects a compromise of this
restrictive European approach and the broad U.S. approach.
The scope of patent eligibility under the most recent SPLT draft is also in line
with Japanese practice. The earlier draft definition could be viewed as broader than
patent eligible subject matter under Japanese Patent Law because it did not ex-
pressly require utilization of a law of nature. 289 However, regarding the patentabil-
ity of computer software and business methods, the Japanese requirement for patent
eligible subject matter is broader than the European requirement because, under
Japanese law, a claimed invention gives rise to patent eligible subject matter if the
invention uses computer hardware resources, which, thereby, utilize the law of na-
ture. 290 To clarify that computer software as such is patent eligible subject matter
as a product invention, the JPO recently introduced a bill to revise the definition of
invention exploitation, which revision became effective on January 1, 2003.291 In
short, the scope of patent eligibility under Japanese Patent Law closely parallels the
scope under 35 U.S.C. and the SPLT.
2. Utility/Industrial Applicability
In addition to Article 12(1), Article 12(4) of the most recent draft provides a
separate requirement of industrial applicability/utility. 292 Until the sixth session,
the SPLT took a unique approach, different from both European/Japanese and U.S.
approaches because the draft did not expressly provide for any utility or industrial
applicability requirement. 293 According to the WIPO International Bureau, the ear-
lier draft did not include a separate provision for utility because such a requirement
is subsumed in other requirements, such as patent eligible subject matter and en-
ablement. 294 This approach could be viewed to reflect recent U.S. case law be-
cause one can view Federal Circuit decisions requiring a useful result for determin-
ing patent eligibility as having merged patent eligible subject matter and utility. 295
"I Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 2(1).
190 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part VII, ch. 1, § 2.2.1, available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartVII-I.pdf. (An information processing by software
constitutes patent eligible subject matter if it concretely utilizes hardware resources.).
29 Law for Revising Part of Patent Law, Law No. 24 of 2003. Toshiko Takenaka, JPO's New Bill to
Revise Patent and Trademark Law Will Prepare Japan for Network Society, CASRIP
NEWSLETTER, Winter 2002, at 7.
292 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12.
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16, art. 12.
WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 30.
194 Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines under the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, World Intel-
lectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 6th Session, Sept. 24,
2001, available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/enldocuments/session_6/index.htm, [hereinafter
WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (6th Session)], rule 13.
29. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139 (1999).
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With respect to biotechnology, the USPTO addresses specific utility issues under
the enablement and written description requirements.
296
However, the most recent draft added a separate industrial applicability re-
quirement to accommodate requests from EPC countries and many other countries
that follow the European tradition. 297 SPLT Article 12(4) provides three options to
define industrial applicability. 298 The first option is the broadest and defines indus-
trial applicability as being made or used for exploitation in any field of commercial
activities. 299 The second option defines industrial applicability as being made or
used in any kind of industry. This definition is narrower than the first option be-
cause it imported the language of industrial applicability from the EPC.3° ° The
EPO interprets the language to deny patentability for methods of medical treatment
for humans or animals as not having industrial application. 30 1 Japanese Patent Law
includes language similar to the EPC,302 and, thus, the JPO excludes medical
methods from patentability for lack of industrial applicability. 30 3 The third option
requires a specific, substantial, and credible utility, which mirrors the USPTO's in-
terpretation of U.S case law dealing with specific utility. 30 4 This option is nar-
rower than the second option because it excludes inventions having only potential
uses. 305 However, the option can also be viewed as being broader than the second
option because it does not exclude medical methods. Thus, depending on the op-
tion being adopted, the industrial applicability under the SPLT is either American,
European/Japanese, or broader than any of the current systems.
Further, responding to requests from developing countries, the most recent
draft introduced Article 12(5), a catch-all provision to exclude certain types of in-
299 Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, "Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Application under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. I 'Written Description' Requirement" 66 Fed. Reg.
1099, 1099-1104 (Jan. 5, 2001).
297 WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 31-32.
"I WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(4).
299 The Ninth Session Draft Treaty added the term "economic" between the terms "commercial" and
"activities." WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (8th Session), supra note 94, art. 9;
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th Session), supra note 94, art. 12(4) alternative A.
European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 57, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 19,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286. The Ninth Session Treaty Draft includes a note that the second option is
modeled after PCT, supra note 33, art. 33(4).
301 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 52(4), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
18, 13 I.L.M. 270, 285; EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. 4, § 4.2.
9,2 Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29.
301 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part II, ch. I § 2.1, available at http://
www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partll- l.pdf.
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (2001).
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 695-96 (1966).
[VOL. 11:259
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
ventions from patentability. 3° 6 Although Article 12(5) indicates that the conditions
for excluding inventions are given by the Regulations, rules for such conditions
have not been published by WIPO's International Bureau.
3. Novelty
The novelty provision in SPLT Article 12(2) provides that a claimed inven-
tion is novel if it does not form part of the prior art.307 This provision is European,
Japanese, 30 8 and American, although the language of Article 12(2) closely parallels
the language of the EPC Article 54.309 The U.S. patent statute does not include any
particular provision that parallels the language of Article 12(2).310 However, U.S.
practice is perfectly in line with the most recent SPLT draft novelty requirement
because Rule 14 further explains the application of the novelty standard under Arti-
cle 12(2) and simply codifies the anticipation rule developed by U.S. courts. 3 11
Rule 14(l)(i) codifies the single prior art rule under the identity requirement in
Lewmar Marine Inc.,3 12 and Rule 14(l)(ii) codifies the enablement requirement for
finding anticipation in Titanium Metals Corp.
3 13
Rule 14(2) was added to clarify the scope of prior art used by examiners in
patent offices. 3 14 The rule endorses the expansive view of U.S. courts that estab-
lishes the scope of a prior art reference to be from the perspective of a person of or-
dinary skill in the art. This view allows the USPTO and courts to find anticipation
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(5). At the Eighth
Session, delegations decided to postpone the discussion on this catchall provision. WIPO Draft
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (9th Session), supra note 94, art. 12(5).
310 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16, art. 12(2).
308 However, only with respect to the unpublished prior art that corresponds to the prior art under the
SPLT Article 8(2) does the JPO use a slightly relaxed standard. JPO Examination Guidelines, su-
pra note 212, part II, ch. 3, 2.4, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartIl-3.pdf.
30" European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286.
310 The US statute provides for novelty requirements under § 101 and § 102.
"I WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 14.
32 Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The Ninth Session Draft Regulations provides this rule in Rule 14(l)(b). WIPO Draft Regulations
(9th Session), supra note 215, rule 14.
313 Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 773 (Fed. Cir.
1985). The Ninth Session Draft Regulations provides this rule in Rule 14(l)(a). WIPO Draft
Regulations (9th Session), supra note 215, rule 14.
34 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 14. From
the Eighth Session, WIPO International Bureau started to prepare practice guidelines separate
from the draft regulations. Practice Guidelines Under the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, World
Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 8th Session, Nov.
25 to 29, 2002, available at http://www.wipo.intlnews/en/index.html?wipo-content-frame=/
news/en/conferences.html [hereinafter WIPO Practice Guidelines (8th Session)].
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even if an element is merely inherently disclosed, as long as one skilled in the art
would recognize the element. 3 15 In spite of the single prior art rule, draft guide-
lines allow patent offices to use other references provided that such references are
used as evidence for determining the scope of a primary reference and whether a
primary reference enables the claimed invention. 316 This use of other references
parallels the U.S. courts use of extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence for (1) showing a
characteristic is inherent in the primary prior art reference 317 and (2) for determin-
ing the enabling nature of a prior art reference. 3 18 The rule under the SPLT Guide-
lines for determining the novelty of generic and species disclosures 319 is also
common in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
320
A unique feature of Rule 14 is that it defines the time at which a prior art ref-
erence is evaluated as the time when the prior art has become available to the pub-
lic.321 United States, European, and Japanese patent statutes do not clarify the par-
ticular point of timing to evaluate a prior art reference. 322 This rule reflects the
EPO practice in which the examiner reads a prior art reference as one skilled in the
art would on the effective date of the document (e.g., the effective date of a previ-
ously published document would be its publication date). 323
4. Inventive Step
The SPLT Article 12(3) requires an inventive step which exists in a claimed
invention if the differences and similarities between the claimed invention and the
prior art as a whole would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art.
324
This definition of the inventive step mirrors the European definition of inventive
WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 14(2)(a).
WIPO Practice Guidelines (8th Session), supra note 314, guidelines under art. 12(2) and rule 14.
316 Id. at guidelines under rule 14, G3.04, at 33.
3 Cont'l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1749
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
Titanium Metals Corp., 778 F.2d at 781, 227 U.S.P.Q.2d at 776.
319 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines, supra note 135, rule 14, G3.02 and G3.03.
WIPO Practice Guidelines (8th Session), supra note 314, guidelines under art. 12(2) and rule 14.
320 CHISUM, supra note 59 § 3.02[2]; EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, §
7.4; NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA, CHUKAI TOKKYO Ho [ANNOTATED PATENT LAW] 258 (2d ed., 2000).
321 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, art. 14(l)(ii),
(2)(a), (2)(b).
32 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(2), 1978 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No.
121 of 1959, art. 29.
323 EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 7.3.
324 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(3).
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step.325 However, the substance of the SPLT's inventive step is the American doc-
trine of non-obviousness because the method of assessing inventive step in Rule
15326 and the corresponding Guidelines 327 fairly parallels the method of assessing
non-obviousness under U.S. case law. Rule 15(1) codifies the rule that permits a
combination of multiple prior art references for rejecting claims for lack of non-
obviousness.328 Rule 15(4) also reflects U.S. practice 329 because it codifies the
Federal Circuit's test of suggestion or motivation to combine more than one prior
art reference. 330 The Guidelines further explain the test by listing factors that U.S.
courts take into account in finding a motivation. 331
Moreover, the SPLT Guidelines for the methodology of assessing inventive
332333 334step332 codifies the Graham inquiry and secondary considerations.   In con-
trast, neither the SPLT nor its regulations expressly endorse the practice uniformly
adopted by EPC member states, the problem-solution approach, used to assess in-
ventive step.335 Since the SPLT's European definition of inventive step also uses
the term "obviousness" and the definition will be applied in the manner used by the
USPTO and U.S. Courts, the SPLT's inventive step/non-obviousness standard is
more American than European.
32s European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 56, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 19,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286.
326 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 93, rule 15.
327 Id. at 35-37; WIPO Practice Guidelines (8th Session), supra note 314, guidelines under art. 12(3)
and rule 15.
328 DONALD S. CHISUM, ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 38 (2000) [hereinafter ELEMENTS
OF U.S. PATENT LAW]; For a combination of teachings in more than one prior art reference, see
CHISUM, supra note 59, § 5.04[ 1].
329 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 15(4).
330 Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg., 864 F.2d 757, 776-77, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 93, guidelines under
rule 15, G4.02.
332 Id. (guidelines under rule 15, G4.01).
3 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
134 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, guidelines under
rule 15, G4.04.
'3 EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 9.5. For a general discussion of
the problem solution approach, see generally George S. Szabo, The Problem and Solution Ap-
proach in the European Patent Office, 26 I.I.C. 457(1995).
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III. Review of the Impact on U.S. Practice Resulting from the Most Recent
SPLT Draft and a Proposal to Change the SPLT in Respect of the Best
Practice
The review of the current draft of the SPLT in Part II of this paper reveals that
it reflects a fair bargain between the United States and Europe/Japan. The U.S.,
European, and Japanese patent statutes have already been harmonized with respect
to many issues. However, differences remain where the language of the provisions
for these issues is based on the European Patent Convention. The SPLT modified
the European approach to reflect USPTO practice and U.S. case law. Nevertheless,
many believe that adoption of the SPLT will bring a significant change in U.S.
practice, particularly regarding the adoption of the first-to-file principle under
SPLT Article 8. This belief is based on the view that the U.S. first-to-invent system
is vastly different from the first-to-file protocol followed by the rest of the world.
However, is the U.S. first-to-invent system in fact very different from the
first-to-file system? Will adoption of the most recent draft of the SPLT bring a ma-
jor change in U.S. practice? In an attempt to answer these questions, this part of the
paper examines the impact of the SPLT on current U.S. practice and analyzes if
changes brought by the SPLT will benefit U.S. patent applicants and patent owners.
The analysis particularly focuses on the interests of small inventors, namely indi-
vidual inventors and public-funded research institutions such as universities, whose
resources for patent applications are limited. Further, some provisions in the most
recent SPLT draft are simply European/Japanese because the majority of Paris Un-
ion member states follow the European tradition or are merely a compromise be-
tween the United States and the European/Japanese practices and, thus, do not nec-
essarily reflect the best practice. Accordingly, this section also criticizes these
provisions with respect to underlying policies and proposes changes.
A. Novelty and Priority
1. Published Prior Art
i) First-To-File
Adoption of the most recent draft SPLT Article 8(1) will require the United
States to abandon the first-to-invent principle in favor of awarding the patent to the
first-to-file. Some believe this shift in the priority principle will bring a drastic
change in the U.S. patent system. 336 However, while some hold this belief,337 the
change brought by adoption of the SPLT will in fact be marginal. First, the major-
336 Many commentators compare first-to-invent and first-to-file with a presumption that they are very
different, for example, see Stephanie Gore, "Eureka! But I filed too late... ": The Harm/Benefit
Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 293 (1993).
See, e.g., George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate - First-to-Invent vs. First-to-File, 7 DUKE
L.J. 923 (1967); Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: A Solution To The
United States' First-To-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 687 (1993).
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ity of U.S. patent applicants and owners are interested in obtaining patents outside
the United States and, thus, have already adopted the practice of first-to-file.
33 8
Unless inventors follow the first-to-file principle, their rights for patent or priority
in major markets such as Europe and Japan are lost for lack of novelty.
Further, the examination practice of the USPTO also follows the first-to-file
system, with a limited exception for the first-to-invent. The USPTO determines the
novelty and non-obviousness under § 102(a) as of the filing date for the majority of
applications because the filing date of a U.S. patent application with an adequate
disclosure of the invention is presumed to be the invention date. 33 9 Only if an ex-
aminer finds a reference published earlier than the filing date is an inventor given a
chance to eliminate the prior art reference by showing an earlier invention, unless
the subject matter is claimed in a U.S. patent.34 0 However, unsophisticated inven-
tors often fail to take advantage of this practice because they do not keep records of
activities resulting in the invention and cannot show an earlier invention with cor-
roborative evidence. 34 1 It follows then that if § 102(a) is restated reflecting this
current USPTO practice, the language should read that "an invention was known or
used by others ... before the application (not invention as currently provided) ex-
cept that an inventor can establish an invention date prior to the disclosure." 
3 42
The view that the United States has a first-to file system is also supported by
the fact that § 102 (b) functions like the priority and novelty provisions under the
first-to-file system. 34 3 This is because the USPTO determines the patentability
(i.e., novelty and non-obviousness) of inventions based upon the filing date, and
certain activities that occur more than one-year prior to the filing date will serve as
an absolute bar to patentability. 34 4 This fundamental rule is common to all first-to-
file countries. 34 5 Since the 1829 Pennock decision, inventions have been excluded
338 Id.
311 Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31 (1878); Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1570, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1911, 1914 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
3- 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2001). Further, an inventor can eliminate a prior art reference by showing that
the reference is his own work under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2001) (actually is a disclosure of appli-
cant's own work not that of another).
1'4 Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (C.C.P.A. 1996) (The inventor of
this case failed to establish his diligence due to a lack of corroborative evidence to support his ac-
tivity).
311 Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative
Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 621
(2002).
311 ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 206. However, these provisions serve a philosophically different
role in the first-to-invent system from the first-to-file system as their functions are keyed with the
patent-defeating activity, thus removing the priority.
3- 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
345 Id.
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from the definition of first inventions if they were publicly used or on sale prior to
the filing date.346 Introduction of a grace period by the Patent Act of 1839 made it
possible for inventors to obtain patents on publicly known inventions as of the fil-
ing date only if an application was filed within the grace period. 347 This means
that the U.S. patent system awards the majority of patents to inventions that are
new and non-obvious as of the filing date with a one-year grace period in which in-
ventors are allowed to exploit their inventions to find commercial value.
The heart of the U.S. first-to-invent system, the priority rule under § 102(g),
also primarily follows the first-to-file principle by favoring inventors who file their
applications first.348 This is because any party who is not the first-to-file, a junior
party, bears the burden of presenting evidence as to the date of actual reduction to
practice or earlier conception. 349 A junior party also bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion with respect to all issues of fact for establishing priority.350 If the junior
party filed an application before issuance of a patent to the first-to-file, the burden
of persuasion is to prove an earlier invention by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 35 1 Once a patent issues to the first-to-file, the junior party must prove an
earlier invention by clear and convincing evidence.352 Further, U.S. case law re-
quires applicants to produce corroborative evidence relating to the complex legal
concepts required to show priority.353 Due to this heavy burden, the first-to-invent
but second-to-file often fails to establish priority over the first-to-file but second-to-
invent. 3
54
In addition to this difficulty of showing an early invention date, the high cost
associated with an interference proceeding discourages second-to-file inventors
346 Pennock, 27 U.S. 1.
31, An Act in addition to "An act to promote the progress of the useful arts" [sic]. 5 Stat. 353, 353-55
(1839), reprinted in CHISUM, supra note 59, at Appendix 13.
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
, CHISUM,supra note 59, § 10.03[1][c][iii].
350 Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1862 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 543, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1864.
32 Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190-91, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
3 See generally Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
114 See generally Edwards v. Strazzabosco, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd.
App. 2001) (A panel of the trial section at the USPTO Board noted a 75 percent success rate for
senior parties over junior parties.); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-To-invent System Has
Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 425 (2002) (Dur-
ing the period between 1983 and 2000, of the total of 2,858 interference cases, 1917 were favor-
able to the first-to-file inventors.). However, see Charles L. Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions
in Patent Interferences, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 163, 181 (2002) (The author points
out a conflict between the assessment of the Edwards panel and the last interference statistics pub-
lished by the USPTO).
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from taking advantage of the first-to-invent priority rule. 355 As a result, only a
very small portion of U.S. applicants, less than 0.1%, engage in a priority contest in
an interference proceeding. It follows that, under the current USPTO practice, the
impact of eliminating the first-to-invent exception should be minimal.
The first-to-invent system is often viewed as being more favorable to small
inventors than the first-to-file system.356 This assessment, however, is a myth.357
It is doubtful that many inventors with limited budgets can afford to take advantage
of the expensive interference regime. 358 Small inventors believe that the first-to-
invent principle favors them in that they can rely on a mere conception of an inven-
tion and remove the financial burden of filing an application. 359 However, mere
conception is never sufficient to show a date of invention under the current U.S.
first-to-file priority rule.
3 60
In principle, under the current U.S. priority rule, the priority is granted to the
first person who reduces the invention to practice. 361 This principle is supported
by the patent policy that encourages not only creation of useful inventions but also
disclosure of inventions through reduction of the invention to practice. 362 An in-
ventor can reduce his invention to practice by filing an application with the
USPTO363 or by constructing and testing a prototype. 364 Although small inventors
Only a very small portion of applicants, less than 0.1 percent, engages the priority contest in inter-
ference proceeding. Mossinghoff, supra, note 354, at 427. Charles R. B. Macedo, First-To-File:
Is American Adoption of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA
Q.J. 193 (1990).
Ned L. Conley, First-To-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779
(1991).
-" Mossinghoff, supra note 354, at 425 (The data provided by USPTO confirms that the current first-
to-invent system does not favor small entities.); Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the
U.S. Priority Rules Really Necessary? (July 20, 2002) (unpublished draft submitted for address at
2002 CASRIP High Technology Summit Conference, on file with Texas Intellectual Property
Law Journal) (The authors' data empirically indicates that the interference proceedings are more
often used by large entities.).
118 As of 1992, the average legal cost of an interference that goes to final hearing has been estimated
at $100,000. Macedo, supra note 355, at 219. According to a survey conducted by American In-
tellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) in 2001, the median of the estimated cost inclusive
in a two party interference is $200,000. AIPLA, Report of Economic Survey 2001 90 (2001).
First-to-invent advocates focus solely on the cost of application but pay no attention to the cost of
reducing the invention to practice, which is necessary for establishing the priority under the US
first-to-invent system. For example, see Conley, supra note 356, at 783.
.60 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
6I Id. See also, for a general discussion of the priority rule, CHISUM, supra note 59, § 10.03[ 1].
362 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 10.08[l ].
361 See generally Hazeltine Corp. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1190, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1744 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
16 See generally Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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express their concern over filing costs, 3 65 constructing and testing a prototype is
often even more expensive than filing an application.
The priority rule provides an exception to the first-to-reduce-to-practice prin-
ciple by allowing inventors to rely on the date of conception. 366 However, unless
an inventor reduces the invention to practice, he or she cannot rely on the concep-
tion date.367 Moreover, an inventor must continuously work on the invention to re-
duce it to practice because an inventor's lack of activity on the invention gives rise
to a lack of diligence and prevents the inventor from relying on the date of concep-
tion.368 Even if an inventor reduces the invention to practice, an unreasonable de-
lay in filing an application with the USPTO gives rise to abandonment and prevents
an award of priority. 369 Unfortunately, lack of funding seldom justifies a delay
caused by lack of diligence or abandonment.
370
In short, the current United States' first-to-invent priority rule disfavors in-
ventors who stop working on an invention before filing an application with the
USPTO. Taking into account the hardships that a first-to-conceive but second-to-
reduce to practice inventor encounters under the current priority rule, the belief that
the U.S. first-to-invent system favors small inventors is not only false, but it is also
misleading. Many unsophisticated inventors may lose a chance to obtain a patent
because they are misled by the language "first-to-invent," believing that their early
conception of an invention can establish priority under § 102(g).
Even worse, this discrepancy between the current language of § 102(a) and
(g) and USPTO practice creates needless complexity in the system, which makes it
difficult for both U.S. and non-U.S. patent applicants and patent owners to under-
stand.371 This discrepancy also gives an excuse to other countries to criticize the
United States for following a first-to-invent system, when in practice the United
States follows a first-to-file system. Revising § 102(a) to reflect a first-to-file sys-
tem will bring the statute more in line with USPTO practice and eliminate the com-
plexity. To simplify the patent system and to discourage inventors from relying
369 Conley, supra note 356, at 783.
366 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986); CHIsUM, supra note 59, § 10.03[1].
16, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
36 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000); Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634
(C.C.P.A. 1966).
369 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000); Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); see, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 59, § 10.07[4][b] (stating "poverty or illness are rarely
sustained as excusing the entire period of inactivity").
370 See generally Griffith v. Kanamaru, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 892 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1986).
Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-invent Principle from a Comparative
Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 621
(2002).
[VOL. 11:259
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
only on a mere conception of an invention to establish their right to a patent, it is
best to remove the exception of awarding priority to an earlier inventor.
ii) Removal of Geographical Restrictions
An adoption of SPLT Article (1) will require the United States to remove the
geographical restrictions that limit the definition of prior art.372 This change will
simplify the USPTO's examination practice and prepare the U.S. patent system for
a networked society. The current U.S. system discriminates between written and
unwritten information and removes from the prior art unwritten information that is
available only in foreign countries. 373 This distinction introduces unnecessary
complexity in examination at the USPTO.
It is a common practice for scientific meetings and conferences to publish
submitted papers and proceedings through the Internet. This practice has intro-
duced a difficult question as to whether information on the Internet that is not
printed out constitutes a printed publication and, if the information qualifies only as
known information, whether the information is known in this country. It is very
difficult to identify where information on the Internet is known. Obviously, this
distinction is outdated with the recent development of a network society.
374
A legal commentator also argues that the geographical limitation is unconsti-
tutional because the copyright and patent clause prohibits a grant of patents on
inventions in the public domain.376 Taking account of the recent development of
network society and technologies, the limitation effectively allows the patenting of
such inventions. She also points out other reasons for removing the Zeographical
limitation, including a prevention of US piracy from foreign countries. 377
Further, it is arguable that the geographical limitation on the prior art may
violate the spirit of non-discrimination under TRIPs by conditioning the effect of
prior art on the place of invention.378 Even worse, the discrimination functions
372 SPLT Article 8(1) defines the prior art as all information that has been made available to the pub-
lic anywhere in the world in any form. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session),
supra note 93, art. 8(1). SPLT Regulation Rule 8 explains any form that includes oral communi-
cation, display, and use of the invention. WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th
Session), supra note 135, rule 8.
373 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2000).
311 To address this concern, Japanese patent law was revised to remove geographical restriction on
non-documentary prior art in Article 29, § 1, and made foreign public use and knowledge as the
prior art for rejecting an application regarding both novelty and inventive step. Law to Revise
Part of Patent Law and Other Industrial Property Laws, Law No. 41 of 1999 (Japan).
371 U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8.
176 Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a
Small World, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 697 (2003).
371 Id. at 725.
371 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27, 33 I.L.M. at 93-94.
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against U.S. inventors because foreign activities do not trigger the grace period,
which gives foreign applicants more time to exploit the invention prior to filing for
a U.S. patent. 379 Removal of geographical limitations will improve the U.S. sys-
tem by eliminating examination complexity and discrimination against U.S. inven-
tors.
iii) Meaning of "Public Use"
An adoption of SPLT Article 8(1) will also require the United States to elimi-
nate the secret-commercial-use bar and experimental-use exception under §
102(b). 380 The elimination of these doctrines will make the application of priority
and novelty provisions simpler and easier for U.S. applicants and patent owners to
understand what types of activities will forfeit their rights to a patent. The novelty
rule under the U.S. patent system is complicated and difficult to understand because
case law changed the meaning of a public use under § 102(b). While an inventor's
public use may not constitute "public use" under the patent statute if the use falls
within the experimental-use exception,38 1 a secret use may constitute "public use"
under the patent statute if the use is for a commercial purpose. 382
These doctrines, experimental-use exception and secret-commercial-use bar,
were introduced to promote the following four policies: (1) avoid detrimental reli-
ance by the public with respect to inventions the public reasonably has come to be-
lieve are freely available; (2) encourage early disclosure through a patent applica-
tion; (3) preserve a reasonable time for the inventor to determine the potential value
of the invention; and (4) prevent an inventor from attempting to extend the patent
term by adding the period of secret use to the statutory twenty years. 383
However, these policies can also be well served by adopting the first-to-file
system with a grace period and, in turn, these complex doctrines will be unneces-
sary. A determination of novelty based on the filing date under SPLT Article 8 dis-
courages a disclosure prior to the filing date and gives enough incentive to file
early.384 The third policy is well served by introduction of a one-year grace period
William LaMarca, Reevaluating the Geographical Limitation of 35 U.S.C. 102(b); Policies Con-
sidered, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 25 (1996).
The prior art under the SPLT, Article 8(1) at 16, includes only information that has been made
available to the public. WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93,
art. 8.
Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 134.
Egbert, 104 U.S. at 336.
3 Tone Brothers, Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 1994). For a general discussion on the underlying policies, see CHISUM, supra note 59, §
6.02.
a1 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8.
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if the current draft SPLT Article 9 is adopted.385 The fourth policy has marginal
value under the modern intellectual property system where trade secrets and patents
coexist.3 86 Under the first-to-file system, an inventor is given an option to protect
the invention as a trade secret while taking the risk that a third party will file
first. 387 Since patent owners in other countries enjoy this option, U.S. patent own-
ers would be unfairly disadvantaged unless the same option is given to them by
adopting the first-to-file system.
Elimination of these doctrines will also serve U.S. applicants and patent own-
ers well because these doctrines introduce uncertainty in the validity of U.S. pat-
ents. This uncertainty results from a difficult question as to whether an activity
prior to the critical date falls within the statutory definition of "public use" or "on
sale." 388 In addition, the policy of early application is easily frustrated by the pres-
ence of these doctrines because inventors can avoid triggering a grace period by
carefully drafting claims to distinguish subject matter on sale, which will effec-
tively extend a grace period.389
Moreover, the secret-commercial-use bar and the experimental-use exception
mislead U.S. inventors. The secret-commercial-use bar is a judicially developed
doctrine.390  Nothing in the language of § 102(b) suggests that a secret use falls
within the definition of "public use" or "on sale" when the use is for a commercial
purpose. 39 1 Although U.S. case law indicates that this bar is applicable only to the
act of an inventor, as opposed to an action by a third party,392 nothing in § 102(b)
suggests any discrimination between the inventor's act and the act of another. 393
Thus, U.S. inventors are very likely to be misled into believing that commercial ex-
"I Id. at art. 9.
311 See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1974).
A secret commercial use of an invention does not give rise to the prior art under either the EPC or
JPL. Like the SPLT Article 8, information must have been made publicly available for constitut-
ing the prior art. European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(2), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20
(Cmnd. 7090) 18, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Patent law, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(1) (Japan).
The Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit's "totality of circumstances" approach applied to
decide whether an act falls within the "statutory public use" or "on sale" as being unnecessary,
vague, and uncertain. See Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1641, 1646 (1998).
See generally UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
190 See generally Egbert, 104 U.S. 333.
N 1 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2000). The statute simply lists "public use" and "on sale" in parallel as ac-
tivities preventing inventors from obtaining a patent.
392 W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
313 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2000). The statute does not include any restriction(s) regarding the actor
who engages in the listed activities.
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ploitation of an invention would not prevent them from obtaining a patent as long
as the inventions are kept secret. The secret-commercial-use bar is the so-called
"secret prior art," which has been extensively criticized because it introduces uncer-
tainty into the validity of U.S. patents. 3
94
The experimental-use exception is also a judicially developed doctrine. 395 No
language for the doctrine is found in the prior art definition under § 102.396 This
exception is seen as giving inventors enough time to perfect an invention. 397 How-
ever, the complexity of conditions necessary to apply the doctrine has in fact cre-
ated a pitfall for inventors who often forfeit their right to a patent by failing to meet
a condition. 398 In short, elimination of these complex judicial doctrines would
make the U.S. patent system simpler and more manageable by U.S. inventors and
reduce the risk of forfeiture of rights to a patent for inventors who are not familiar
with these judicially created doctrines.
iv) Removal of § 102(c) and § 102(d)
An adoption of SPLT Article 8 and revision of § 102(a) and (b) will make §
102 (c) (abandonment) unnecessary because a first-to-file model inherently moti-
vates inventors to file an application with the USPTO as early as possible. Even
under the current patent statute, the USPTO seldom cites § 102(c) for rejecting
claims because § 102(b) subsumes activities that may give rise to abandonment un-
der § 102(c). 399 Only the following two situations may fall under § 102(c) but not
§ 102(b): (1) non-commercial secret use of an invention; and (2) public use result-
ing from an inventor's action giving rise to abandonment during the grace pe-
riod. 400
Regarding the first situation, allowing inventors to keep their inventions se-
cret without commercial exploitation would not conflict with the policy of prevent-
ing inventors from extending the patent term. Thus, there is no justifiable reason to
punish an inventor by eliminating the right to obtain a patent if he or she decides to
114 C. Douglas Thomas, Article: Notes Secret Prior Art - Get Your Priorities Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 147 (1996).
See generally Elizabeth, 97 U.S. 126.
3 6 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); CHISUM, supra note 59, § 6.02[7].
197 Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1645 (1998) (citing Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement
Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877), the Court explained the right of inventors to conduct extensive testing
without losing his right to obtain a patent for his invention-even if such testing is conducted pub-
licly).
For a good example see the Lough case. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Although the doctrine is often invoked by inventors, US courts
rarely sustain the doctrine. CHISUM, supra note 59, § 6.02[7].
9 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 6.03.
40 Id. at § 6.03[I][c][ii].
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wait to file an application and take the risk of an earlier application being filed by a
third party. In the second situation, an inventor should have an absolute right to use
the grace period to make a decision regarding filing of an application, regardless of
whether or not acts by the inventor lead to reliance by a third party as to the inven-
tor's intention to seek a patent. 40 1 Also, in an exceptional case, a third party that
relied on the inventor's act of abandonment is protected by the estoppel doctrine.
40 2
A removal of § 102(c) makes the U.S. system simpler, and the impact would be
marginal.
An adoption of SPLT Article 8(1) will require the United States to eliminate §
102(d). This section aims to encourage foreign applicants who obtain patent pro-
tection abroad to promptly file with the USPTO. 03 This goal is already well
served by the priority system under the Paris Convention because the Convention
requires applicants to file in another country within one-year of the application date
of the first filing (priority date) within the Paris Union. 404 Meeting the require-
ment under the Paris Convention automatically meets the one-year filing require-
ment under § 102(d).4 °5 Therefore, since the USPTO seldom cites § 102(d) for re-
jecting claims, the impact of removing § 102(d) will be minimal.
Additionally, § 102(d) has a serious flaw in that it unfairly discriminates
against inventions made outside the United States because it imposes an additional
bar to foreign originated inventions. Thus, it is arguable that § 102 (d) may violate
the non-discrimination provision in WTO-TRIPS with respect to the place of inven-
tion.406 Not only is § 102(d) unnecessary, but it also provides a source of criticism
from U.S. trade partners and should be removed.
2. Unpublished Prior Art: Revision of§ 102(e)
i) The Hilmer Doctrine
The adoption of SPLT Article 8(2) will require the United States to revise §
102(e) to make a pending application prior art as of the filing date of the later ap-
plication (instead of the invention date under the current law). It will also require
the United States to eliminate the Hilmer doctrine.407 The Hilmer doctrine gives
4o, United States courts have never found abandonment during the grace period. See, e.g., CTS Corp.
v. Piher Int'l Corp., 527 F.2d 95, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 419 (7th Cir. 1975). For a general discus-
sion, see CHiSUM, supra note 59, § 6.03[1][c][i].
402 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 19.05[3].
403 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 6.04[1].
1o4 For a general discussion of § 102(d) and the Paris Convention, see Donald S. Chisum, Foreign
Activity: Its Effect on Patentability Under United States Law, II I.I.C. 26 (1980).
4O1 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (2000).
4 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 93-94.
401 Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255.
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effect to § 102(e) prior art as of the actual U.S. filing date instead of the foreign
priority date, despite the fact that 35 U.S.C. § 119 allows a claim of priority for ap-
plications originally filed in foreign countries. 40 8 Revising § 102(e) will have a
marginal effect on current U.S. practice. With respect to the change from the in-
vention date to the filing date, as discussed in the context of § 102(a), the USPTO
examines the majority of applications under the first-to-file principle. 409 This is
also true with respect to the prior art under § 102(e). Applicants can eliminate §
102(e) prior art only if they can establish an earlier invention date.4 10
Elimination of the Hilmer doctrine will better serve U.S. inventors by elimi-
nating the illogical problems resulting from its application.411 The strongest argu-
ment against the Hilmer doctrine is that application of Hilmer results in a double
patenting problem through the issuance of multiple patents to obvious inventions,
12although there are other arguments from the international patent community. 4 13
The double patenting problem is somewhat remedied by the Deckler decision be-
cause the Deckler court applied the interference estoppel doctrine broadly and pre-
vented the applicant from seeking a second priority contest with respect to obvious
inventions through an interference proceeding.414 This expansive use of the estop-
pel doctrine effectively prevents multiple patents being issued on obvious inven-
tions as long as claims are contested through an interference proceeding. Accord-
ingly, some commentators even view Deckler as essentially overruling Hilmer.
4 15
The execution of the SPLT will provide a good opportunity to remove the
controversial Hilmer doctrine because there is no justifiable reason to keep the doc-
trine over criticisms from U.S. trade partners. First, disclosure of patentability on
4o8 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 14.05[3].
4- See supra note 339 for a discussion of USPTO's examination practice.
4,0 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2001). Further, an inventor can eliminate a prior art reference by showing that
the reference is his own work under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2001).
41 Many legal commentators points out the problems caused by the application of Hilmer doctrine.
See ELEMENTS OF U.S. PATENT LAW, supra note 328, at 104; Harold Wegner, TRIPS Boomerang -
Obligations for Domestic Reform, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 535 (1996); Kevin L. Leffel,
Comment, Hilmer Doctrine and Patent System Harmonization: What Does A Foreign Inventor
Have At Stake?, 26 AKRON L. REV. 355 (1992).
412 ELEMENTS OF U.S. PATENT LAW, supra note 328, at 104.
4 The Hilmer doctrine is also extensively criticized for violating the priority right provision under
the Paris Convention Article 4, as well as the non-discrimination policy provision as to the place
of invention under TRIPS Agreement, art. 27, para. 1. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27,
para. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 93-94.
414 See generally In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Kate H.
Murashige, The Hilmer Doctrine, Self Collision, Novelty and the Definition of Prior Art, 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 549 (1993).
4"1 See Charles E. Van Horn, Effects of GATT7 and NAFTA on PTO Practice, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 231, 234 (1995).
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indistinguishable inventions brings no benefits to the public. 4 16 Second, the Hilmer
court's major concern in using the foreign priority date for a patent-defeating effect
was to prevent the expansion of secret prior art.4 17 This concern over secret prior
art has been significantly remedied by the introduction of an early publication sys-
tem under the 1999 AIPA because the content of all applications will be automati-
cally published after eighteen-months from the filing date. 4 18 The risk will be fur-
ther reduced if the United States adopts the first-to-file principle and eliminates any
prior art effect of secret prior inventions.
Finally, the Hilmer doctrine introduced unnecessary complexity in determin-
ing the § 102(e) prior art effect of international applications filed under the PCT
because the current provision discriminates against applications published in a lan-
guage other than English.4 19 This discrimination can be viewed as violating the
non-discrimination provision under TRIPS.4 20 To clarify the holding of Deckler
and ensure compliance with TRIPS, § 102(e) prior art should be redefined under
the first-to-file principle by clearly negating the applicability of the Hilmer doc-
trine. Such revision will bring only a marginal impact on the current practice be-
cause the Hilmer doctrine has been seldom raised in the USPTO and court proceed-
ings since its adoption.
4 2 1
ii) Applicable Scope
Adoption of SPLT Article 8(2) will also require the United States to stop us-
ing § 102(e) prior art in non-obviousness determinations because the SPLT requires
member states to use § 102(e) prior art in novelty determinations only. 422 Although
the impact of such a change may be minor, this restrictive use of § 102(e) prior art
is not the best practice when taking into account the policies underlying the double
patenting doctrine. It is very likely that WIPO's International Bureau adopted this
approach simply because the majority of Paris Union member states have adopted
this approach.
The primary policy underlying the double patenting doctrine is to prevent
patentees from extending their terms by obtaining multiple patents on the same in-
416 ELEMENTS OF U.S. PATENT LAW, supra note 328, at 104.
417 In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 877, 149 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 480, 495 (C.C.P.A. 1966). The practical po-
tential effect of pushing back the date of the unpublished, secret disclosure ultimately will have an
effect as prior art references in the form of U.S. patents by the full one-year priority period of §
119.
48 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2000).
419 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(l) (2000).
420 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27, 33 I.L.M. at 93-94.
421 The author conducted database search and found that only 44 cases have cited Hilmer over the
past four decades. The Federal Circuit has not cited Hilmer since the Deckler decision.
422 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(2).
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vention.423 However, the SPLT's restrictive use of § 102(e) prior art allows issu-
ance of multiple patents on obvious variations.4 24  By filing applications on
obvious inventions before the eighteen-month early publication of the early
application, inventors can effectively extend the twenty-year patent term up to the
eighteen-months.
Further, issuance of multiple patents on obvious inventions also leads to a
double jeopardy problem because obvious inventions often qualify as equivalents
under the doctrine of equivalents. 425 Because the SPLT rule requires disclosure of
the identity of the applicants and inventors only as of the filing date of the later ap-
plication that is under examination, applicants and patent owners can freely transfer
rights for obvious inventions during patent prosecution and after patent issuance.
This follows that competitors are exposed to a risk of suit by different patent own-
ers regarding the same subject matter if the subject matter literally infringes a claim
of one owner and infringes a claim of another under the doctrine of equivalents.
Due to these concerns, the JPO uses a relaxed novelty standard for rejecting claims
that are substantially the same as subject matter disclosed in a pending earlier ap-
plication under the Japanese Patent Law Article 29 bis. 426
This additional separate protection for obvious inventions is unnecessary be-
cause it is very likely that these variations are protected by equivalents under the
SPLT.427 It follows then that the SPLT guarantees double protection for obvious
inventions. Because a disclosure of obvious variations makes only marginal con-
tributions to the state of the art, there is no reasonable justification to keep the re-
strictive application, especially with the risk of the double jeopardy problem result-
ing from such application.
B. Grace Period
The most significant benefit the SPLT will bring to U.S. applicants and patent
owners is the worldwide adoption of a grace period. The world-wide twelve month
grace period, unlike the questionable benefits provided by the current U.S. first-to-
invent system, will bring a real and substantial benefit to small inventors.428 A
first-to-file system without a grace period provides "disincentives" for small inven-
tors, particularly universities, public research organizations, and government agen-
423 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 9.01.
424 SINGER, supra note 176, at 211.
42S Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents after Hilton Davis: A Comparative Law Analysis, 22
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 479 (1996).
426 Toshiko Takenaka, The Substantial Identity Rule under the Japanese Novelty Standard, 9 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 220, 228-29 (1991).
427 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rules 12, 12(5).
428 The six month option was introduced in the Eighth Session Draft Treaty. WIPO Draft Substantive
Patent Law Treaty (8th Session), supra note 94, art. 9.
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cies to be open and prompt in reporting research results in the scientific literature.
The SPLT, with the first-to-file principle and a non-restrictive one-year grace pe-
riod, will be the most beneficial to small inventors, enabling American researchers
to freely engage in joint activities with researchers from other countries.
The last two decades have seen an expansion of patent eligible subject mat-
ter,429 which resulted from participation in patent procurement and enforcement by
universities and public research institutions. 430 In addition, the enactment of the
Bayh-Dole Act4 31 and its equivalents in the United States and other countries has
made it necessary for universities and public research institutions to acquire rights
in the fruits of their research and has encouraged commercialization through tech-
nology transfer.432 Although technology transfer offices were almost non-existent
when the last effort toward patent harmonization started in the early 80's, these of-
fices now play an important role in patent procurement and enforcement. 433 With-
out a grace period, public research organizations are either denied access to the pat-
ent system or must adopt corporate methods of controlling information. Both
practices are adverse to innovation in the public interest. This argument applies not
only to U.S. universities, but it also applies worldwide.
434
Under the first-to-file system that all other countries follow, any disclosure
forfeits a right to a patent. However, the majority of other countries provides a
grace period and excludes pre-filing disclosure of an invention from the prior art in
examining the invention. 435 Among those countries providing a grace period, 57%
adopted a six-month grace period and 30% adopted a one-year grace period. 436 Of
these, 52% provide for a grace period starting from the actual filing date and 45%
provide a grace period starting from the priority date under the Paris Conven-
429 Typical examples are biotechnological inventions and computer software. For a general discus-
sion, see Charles R. McManis, Patent Law and Policy Symposium: Re-Engineering Patent Law:
The Challenge of New Technologies: Introduction, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2000); Arti Rai,
Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 199 (2000); Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41 (1998).
0 McManis, supra note 429.
411 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994)).
412 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium on Regulating Medial Innovation: Public Re-
search and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663 (1996).
433 These institutions were permitted to claim the ownership of publicly funded research results after
the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.
414 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 51.
43- According to the survey conducted by AIPPI Japan Group, 87 percent of 177 national and re-
gional patent systems provide for some type of grace period systems. Report: A Grace Period for
Patents, AIPPI Japan Group, 1 (Dec. 2000).
416 Id. at 2.
20031
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
tion.437 Most countries adopt a disclosure-specific grace period, in which only cer-
tain categories of disclosure are qualified to take advantage of a grace period.438
The most popular disclosure-qualified categories include: (a) experimental use; (b)
disclosure by an applicant; (c) disclosure by a third party; (d) abuse of right; (e)
display at an international exhibition; and (f) presentation at a scientific meeting. 439
Even in a country with a disclosure-specific grace period such as Japan, a sig-
nificant number of applicants take advantage of the grace period.440 A survey of
Japanese applicants revealed a willingness to expand the grace period to harmonize
with the U.S. grace period and revealed criticism against the limited sco e of activi-
ties entitled to the grace period under the European Patent Convention.
441
In contrast, European applicants are reluctant to provide a grace period cover-
ing a more general scope of activities. 4 4 2 Industry experts emphasized the disad-
vantages of a grace period in introducing legal uncertainty.443 Since most countries
have a disclosure-specific grace period, the novelty of an invention depends on a
determination of whether a pre-filing disclosure qualifies under one of the listed
categories. This results in significant uncertainty in patent validity. Further, when
a pre-filing second disclosure occurs, the restrictive system requires determination
of whether the second disclosure originates from an earlier pre-filing disclosure that
qualified under the listed categories. This increases administrative costs and may
result in a significant examination delay. 444 However, those who advocate for the
adoption of a grace period point to the change in the socio-economic environment
resulting from the participation of universities and research organizations and em-
phasize the necessity to develop a system to encourage early academic publication
while maintaining a right to a patent.
445
Since the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act,446 participation by universities in
the patent system has become vital to science and technology innovation in the
United States because university-based research can have an important effect on
411 Id. at 3.
... id. at 4.
411 Id. at 4.
-o Id. at 26.
44, Report: A Grace Period for Patents, AIPPI Japan Group at 33.
442 See generally Joseph Straus, The Grace Period in Patent Law: A Look at Europe, 7 Int'l Intell.
Prop. L. & Pol'y 27-1 (2001).
443 Albrecht H~ini, Comments on the Introduction of an International Period of Grace, 16 IIC 580,
582 (1985).
444 Straus, supra note 442, at 27-2.
"I Straus, supra note 442, at 4-5.
446 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, supra note 431.
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markets and on the direction of public support for government-sponsored research.
Without patent backing, potential investors have little incentive to invest in inven-
tions that may challenge existing markets or which, once developed, are merely du-
plicated by others who were unwilling to take the risk of developing the invention
into a commercial product. However, without a worldwide uniform grace period,
the patent rights of U.S. research organizations are lost outside the United States,
and, therefore, these organizations also may decline to take advantage of the U.S.
grace period because potential licensees often prefer to receive a worldwide li-
cense. '4 7 To maintain active participation by universities and public research or-
ganizations, the United States should insist on a generous grace period with the
term of twelve months, instead of the six months.
Article 9 shows a strong American influence and brings more changes to
European and Japanese patent practices than to U.S. practice. 35 U.S.C. is in line
with SPLT Article 9 in limiting the applicable scope of a grace period to disclo-
sures by the inventor.448 The SPLT also provides a grace period for disclosures by
a third party, including a patent office, who obtains information from the inventor
and by a patent office that derives information either directly or indirectly from the
inventor's own act. 449 The term "others" in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) can be interpreted
to cover these disclosures.
However, the SPLT still brings some significant changes to the current grace
period under § 102(b). 450 Among these changes, the most significant is the effect
on the prior art of third party activities during the grace period. Under the current
first-to-invent principle, a third party's disclosure constitutes prior art under §
102(a), but the inventor can eliminate the disclosure as prior art by establishing an
earlier invention date.451 Under the SPLT grace period, an inventor can no longer
establish an early invention date because the SPLT follows the first-to-file princi-
ple. Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 102 should be revised accordingly.
Under the revised § 102, which follows SPLT Articles 8 and 9, a third party's
disclosure before the inventor files an application will jeopardize the novelty of an
invention, even if the inventor can remove his own disclosure through the operation
of the grace period.452 If the party files earlier than the inventor's disclosure, the
third party is entitled to a patent unless there is some other reason for unpatentabil-
ity. In contrast, if the third party files an application later than the inventor's dis-
"' Interview with Gerald Barnett, Director, Software Venture Group, Univ. of Wash. Office of Tech-
nology Transfer and Intellectual Property, in Seattle, WA (Apr. 2001).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9(1)(i).
Id. at art. 9(l)(ii)-(iii).
450 For a comparison between Article 9 and 35 U.S.C., see supra Part I.B.
45 1 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2001). For a general discussion of Rule 131 practice, see supra note 340.
452 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(1).
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closure, but earlier than the inventor's application date, neither the third party nor
the inventor can obtain a patent.453 The impact of this change is marginal when an
inventor is not the first-to-file because of the difficulties in establishing an earlier
invention date.454 When the inventor is the first-to-file, but a third party discloses
the invention prior to the inventor's filing date, the inventor will still be able to con-
tinue to use the invention because the third party is not the first to file and, thus,
will not be entitled to the patent.
455
Further, adoption of SPLT requires the United States to expand the scope of
the first-to-invent defense that is currently limited to methods of doing business.
456
The conditions for giving rise to the defense should be revised to cover a third party
who used the invention for the business purpose or started preparation for such use
during the period between the date of the disclosure by the applicant and the filing
date regardless of the timing to actually reduce the invention to practice.
457
Adoption of Article 9 will bring a tremendous benefit to small inventors. In
the past, small inventors (particularly public research institutions) were unable to
take full advantage of the grace period under the United States patent system be-
cause industry-licensees prefer to obtain international licenses. If rights outside the
United States, particularly in significant markets like Europe and Japan, are lost due
to a pre-filing disclosure, the value of their inventions are substantially diminished
with respect to these prospective licensees. 4 58 Moreover, due to limited budget and
resources in making filing decisions, small inventors need to assess the commercial
value of their inventions by communicating with prospective licensees. However,
the lack of a grace period in other countries makes this communication difficult.
Accordingly, adoption of Article 9 will enable small inventors not only to take full
advantage of the grace period under the United States patent system, but also to
preserve their patent rights in Europe and Japan. Obviously, the uncertainty about
which European countries are concerned has not been a serious issue in the United
States and other countries that have some form of grace period.459
411 Inventor applications are rejected under SPLT Article 8(2), and third party applications are re-
jected under SPLT Article 8(l).
4 For a discussion of the priority, see supra Part III.A. 1.
411 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 8(2).
416 35 U.S. C. § 273 (2001).
117 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 9(5).
, For a discussion of grace period under EPC and JPL, see discussions associated with supra notes
171-79.
411 STRAUS, supra note 28, at 91.
[VOL. 11:259
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
C. Description Requirement
1. Enablement and Written Description
Adoption of the SPLT will bring only minor changes to the U.S. description
requirement, except for the removal of the best mode requirement, because SPLT
Articles 10 and 11 modified the language of the EPC to reflect U.S. practice.
4 60
However, the most recent SPLT draft is confusing and should be revised to address
the distinction between the enablement and written description requirements.
The draft treaty requires disclosure of the enablement in the specification
4 6 1
and in the written description as part of the claims.4 62 Both requirements address
the same policy considerations regarding the relationship between the scope of
claims and the scope of disclosure in the specification and, thus, seem redun-
dant.4 6 3 Further, by providing the enabling requirement as part of a written de-
scription requirement, the most recent SPLT draft ignored the policy consideration
regarding the entitlement of priority. Consideration of entitlement of priority is tra-
ditionally addressed by the written description requirement for patentability and is a
distinct policy consideration from the enablement requirement. In light of this dis-
tinct underlying policy, the SPLT should provide the written description require-
ment as part of the requirements for amendments.
4 6 4
Over the years, the U.S. courts developed case law to distinguish the enable-
ment requirement from the written description requirement in terms of the different
policy considerations underlying the two requirements. 4 6 5 The policy underlying
the enablement requirement is to ensure that inventors provide sufficient informa-
tion about the claimed invention to enable a skilled person to make use of the in-
vention without undue experimentation. 46 6 The enablement requirement is poten-
tially at issue for every claim in every patent because every patent must make the
invention sufficiently available to the public as the bargain for the exclusive
4- For a discussion of description requirement compared with US practice, see supra Part II.C.
461 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 10(1).
462 Id. at art. I I (3)(b).
463 WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 28. To clarify the relationship between the
requirements under Article 10 and 11, WIPO International Bureau conducted a comparative study
of the relationship between the claims to the disclosure and published a result of their study. Re-
quirements Concerning The Relationship of The Claims to The Disclosure, World Intellectual
Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 7th Session, May 6 to 10,
2002, available at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en/documents/session_7/index.htm [hereinafter WIPO
Claims-Disclosure Study (7th Session)].
161 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 7(3).
461 See generally In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
4M Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 927 F.2d at 1571, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006.
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right. 467 In contrast, the policy underlying the written description requirement is to
guard against the inventor overreaching by insisting that the invention be recounted
in such detail that a determination can be made as to whether or not future claims
are encompassed within the original creation. 468 The written description is at issue
only in limited circumstances where the entitlement of priority is at issue regarding
amendment, continuation or divisional applications, or an interference proceed-
ing.46
9
Obviously the confusion under the SPLT between the enablement and written
description requirements is exported from the United States because it was the U.S.
delegate that insisted on including Article 1 1(3)(b). 470 In the United States, this
confusion originates from the difficulty of statutory interpretation because both re-
quirements rely on the same sentence in the first paragraph of § 112.471 Ignoring
its own precedent to distinguish the two requirements with respect to their distinct
underlying policies, 472 in Regent of The University of California v. Ely Lilly, the
U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expanded the use of the written de-
scription requirement to original claims that have nothing to do with the entitlement
of priority. 473 Some Federal Circuit judges criticize this expansion as making the
written description and enablement requirements indistinguishable, 474 even though
the judges who decided the Ely Lilly case tried to distinguish the expanded written
description from the enablement requirement. 475 An academic commentator ar-
gues that the distinction between the written description requirement and the en-
ablement requirement is artificial and that the former should be subsumed in the lat-
ter as done by European countries. 476 Thus, if the expanded written description is
viewed as nothing more than an additional requirement for the enablement re-
467 ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 567.
464 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560; 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1114 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
469 ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 567.
410 WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 29.
47' Barker, 559 F.2d at 591, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 472.
472 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1612
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
471 Regent of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). For a criticism against this confusion, see Janice Mueller, The Evolving Application of
the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnology inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615
(1988); Harris Pitlich, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'y 209 (1998).
'7 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 42 Fed. Appx. 439, 446-47, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618,
1624 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting).
411 Id. at 440-41, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619-20 (Lourie, J., concurring).
476 Mark Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the "Written Description" Requirement
(and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 107 (2000).
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quirement, while ignoring the distinct underlying policies and expanding the appli-
cability to original claims, it is not necessary for the SPTL to provide a separate
subsection for the requirement.
Moreover, adding language to Article 11 can be viewed as endorsing the cur-
rent European practice of relying on the claim description requirement, rather than
the scope of disclosure, for rejecting overly broad claims. 477 This doctrine paral-
lels the undue breadth doctrine under U.S. case law. 478 Yet, U.S. courts apply the
undue breadth doctrine for failure to meet the description requirement for the speci-
fication under § 112, 1 instead of the description requirement for claims under §
112, 2. Japan also follows the U.S. model and rejects overly broad claims under
the description requirement for the specification.
479
The European practice of relying on the claim description requirement devel-
oped because EPO case law does not allow a rejection of overly broad claims, if the
disclosure describes at least one method of carrying out the invention under the de-
scription requirement for the specification, Article 83.480 To address concerns re-
garding overly broad claims, the EPO developed two lines of case law to reject
such claims under Article 83. One line adopted the U.S. concept of undue experi-
mentation481 and another line adopted a new concept of a claim description re-
quirement that is fully supported by the disclosure, Article 84.482 These two con-
cepts are redundant in that they address the same concern.483
As the current U.S. case law indicates, redundant requirements introduce un-
necessary complexity into the patent system. 484 Thus, the SPLT should remove
417 WIPO Claims-Disclosure Relationship Study (7th Session), supra note 463, Part II, note 6. See,
e.g., T770/90, PHILIPS/Image Enhancement Circuit, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE REPORT 438
(1992).
411 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For a discussion of the
undue breadth doctrine, see supra note 206.
471 WIPO Claims-Disclosure Relationship Study (7th Session), supra note 463, Part II, note 21. JPO,
Practices in Examination and Appeals under 1994 Revised Patent Law in Japan (1994); JPO Draft
Revised Examination Guidelines for Industrially Applicable Inventions (2001).
410 See, e.g., T281/86, 1989 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF EPO 202.
481 See, e.g., T787/89, BRITISH PETROLEUM/Diamond Identification, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE
REPORT 387 (1991).
482 T770/90, PHILIPS/Image Enhancement Circuit, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE REPORT 438 (1992).
For a general discussion of EPC Article 84 and overly broad claims, see SINGER, supra note 176,
at 369.
481 WIPO Int'l Bureau admits that the application violates both the enablement requirement under
EPC art. 73 and support requirement under art. 74, where a claim is unreasonably broad in con-
trast to the disclosure. WIPO Claims-Disclosure Relationship Study (7th Session), supra note
463, Part II, note 15.
"A WIPO Int'l Bureau also concluded that the enablement and support requirements are redundant if
they applied to an overly broad claim. WIPO Claims-Disclosure Relationship Study (7th Session),
supra note 463, Part II, note 15.
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one of these concepts so that patent offices and courts will be able to concentrate
their efforts on the refinement of the enablement requirement. 485 Between the two
concepts, the SPLT should remove the new concept associated with the claim de-
scription requirements under Article 11. This is because EPC Article 84, which
corresponds to SPLT Article 11, is viewed as a formality requirement and is ex-
cluded as a reason for revocation.486 The problem of overly broad claims is a sub-
stantive law issue and the necessity of revoking and invalidating overly broad
claims is clear from both U.S. and European experiences.487 In short, SPLT Article
11 (b) should be removed488 and Article (1)(a) must apply to circumstances where
the claim definiteness requirement applies under 35 U.S.C § 112 1 2.489
In contrast, if the written description requirement is viewed in the context of
the entitlement of priority, it is distinct from the enablement requirement and paral-
lels the provisions in the EPC and JPL for the entitlement of priority,, namely the
benefit of the original filing date or priority date for amended claims,49° the benefit
of an earlier application for a claim of priority under the Paris Convention, 491 and
the benefit of an earlier application for divisional applications.492 These provisions
govern the entitlement of priority resulting from additional new matter to claims as
well as to specifications. In contrast, U.S. practice applies the § 112 written de-
scription requirement only to the priority entitlement resulting from an addition of
new matter to claims.493 The priority entitlement resulting from an addition of new
411 Janis, supra note 476, at 107 (2000).
486 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 100, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 35,
13 I.L.M. 270, 294.
411 Sir Nicholas Pumfrey, Patent Protection of Broad Claims (Apr. 20, 2001) (unpublished manu-
script on file at the Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal).
The Eighth and Ninth Session Draft Treaty moved Article I I(b) to Draft Regulations. WIPO
Draft Regulations (8th Session), supra note 215, rule 12; WIPO Draft Regulations (9th Session),
supra note 215, rule 12. The term "possession" was replaced with the term "recognized and de-
scribed."
489 WlPO Int'l Bureau lists three examples that violate a requirement regarding claims in the context
of disclosure. Among the three, only two examples appear to violate 35 U.S.C. § 112, 12: a claim
is indefinite because an essential element for the function or operation of the invention is missing
from the claim; or (2) the claim is inconsistent with the disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 112, T 1 applies to
the third example, the scope of a claim covers an area, which is not recognized by the inventor, for
example, mere speculation. WIPO Claims-Disclosure Relationship Study, (7th Session), supra
note 464, Part III, note 40.
11o European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 123, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 44,
13 I.L.M. 270, 299; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 17bis(3).
41' European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 87, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 28-
29, 13 I.L.M. 270, 291; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. l7bis(3).
492 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 76, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 25,
13 I.L.M. 270, 289; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. l7bis(3).
491 See generally In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967). CHISUM,
supra note 59, § 7.04[l][e].
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matter to specifications is dealt with by a different provision, 35 U.S.C. § 132.
The only provision in the SPLT that relates to a requirement for the entitlement of
priority is Article 7(3),495 which corresponds to EPC Article 123 and JPL Article
l7bis. If SPLT Article 7(3) is interpreted as parallel to the EPC and JPL, Article
7(3) is applicable to both amendments to claims and the specification, in contrast
with U.S. practice. Thus, if it is necessary in the SPLT draft to reflect U.S. case
law regarding the written description requirement, the language of Article 11(3)
should be included in Article 7(3).
2. Best Mode
The impact of removing the best mode requirement is minimal because there
is no compelling reason to maintain the requirement. Such removal even benefits
U.S. inventors by preventing unnecessary delay in preparing applications and re-
ducing the risk of invalidity.
The best mode requirement aims to prevent inventors from concealing pre-
ferred embodiments. 496 Although the requirement functions to ensure a fair game
between applicants and the patent office,4 9 7 the public does not necessarily benefit
from the disclosure. Under the current case law, the best mode is determined sub-
jectively by the inventor's state of mind as of the filing date;498 thus, the mode be-
lieved to be the best mode might be the worst mode if examined objectively in the
view of one skilled in the art. Since there is no requirement to update the best
mode once an application is filed,499 any better mode developed after the applica-
tion would not be disclosed. Inventors are allowed to bury the best mode with
other modes 500 or employers can conceal information on the best mode from inven-
tors so that they can keep secret the best mode developed by others.5 0 1 The goal of
best mode, disclosing the best preferred embodiment, is well served in other coun-
tries without a separate requirement because applicants have enough incentive to
,41 In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214-15, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323, 326 (CCPA 1981); WIPO
Claims-Disclosure Relationship Study, supra note 464, Part II, note 28.
411 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 7(3).
411 In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311,313 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
497 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm'al Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-10, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1038
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
411 Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industrs. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1037
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
491 Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1745
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
10" Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 592, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
10, Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
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disclose the best mode to ensure that such mode is included in the literal claim
scope and is protected.5
02
In addition to the weak justification, the best-mode requirement has many se-
rious flaws. First, it introduces a significant delay in filing an application because
inventors must update the best mode whenever better modes are developed prior to
the filing. 503 This delay may prove fatal under a first-to-file system. Second, the
best mode requirement introduces uncertainty in the validity of patents because the
USPTO cannot examine the requirement during prosecution. Third, it is impossible
for a competitor to assess the validity of a patent with respect to the best mode re-
quirement without the discovery procedure in litigation.5°4 Case law is unclear
concerning the relationship between the preferred mode and the claimed subject
matter.
505
The application of the best mode requirement might also create a problem in
claiming priority under the Paris Convention because a foreign applicant who in-
tends to pursue patent rights in the U.S. must, before filing a priority application in
her country, predict what must be disclosed to comply with the best mode require-
ment. 50 6 Thus, a removal of the best mode requirement will simplify the U.S. pat-
ent system and remove uncertainty in the validity of U.S. patents.
D. Claim Interpretation and the Doctrine of Equivalents
1. Fundamental Rules
Adoption of the SPLT will not result in any substantial change in the current
U.S. practice of claim interpretation because SPLT Article 11(4) and accompanying
Regulations simply restate U.S. case law. 507 The rules for claim interpretation
fairly reflect the best rule adopted by all three jurisdictions. Although the SPLT
expressly excludes issues relating to infringement proceedings, 508 the most recent
draft added a new provision to guarantee protection beyond the language of a claim
502 TESTu TANABE & HAROLD WEGNER, JAPANESE PATENT LAW, Section 422 (1979), reprinted in
ADELMAN, supra note 118, at 629.
503 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 7.05[2].
504 Id.
101 Id. at § 7.05[l][e]. Prof. Chisum found this problem is more acute when the alleged undisclosed
mode is not a preferred embodiment of the claimed product or process but rather preferred meth-
ods of making or using a claimed subject matter or preferred apparatus and applications of the
claimed process etc. E.g., Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
-06 ELEMENTS OF U.S. PATENT LAW, supra note 328, at 183.
101 See supra Part II.D
"I WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 2.
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to include equivalents within the scope of patent protection. 50 9 This provision for
protection by equivalents was originally included in the SPLT draft but was re-
moved from the draft presented at the sixth session to limit the scope of negotia-
tions. 510 The SPC delegations have not reached agreement on whether the SPLT
will cover issues relating to the scope of protection conferred by patents.
The United States has not made its position clear regarding whether the SPLT
should cover issues relating to patent scope. Nevertheless, the USPTO sought pub-
lic comments on these issues, assuming the issues will be included in future nego-
tiations. 511 Particularly, the USPTO identified two different approaches used in
drafting claims to define the subject matter inventors regard as their invention, the
peripheral claim drafting approach and the central claim approach. 512
The true essence of the peripheral claim drafting approach requires courts to
determine the patent scope solely by relying on the language of the claims and pro-
hibits any expansion of protection beyond the scope defined by the claim language.
The role of the specification and other documents are limited in interpreting claims.
The United States system is considered to be a paradigm for the peripheral claiming
approach. 5 1
3
In contrast, the true essence of the central claiming approach gives little sig-
nificance to the language of the claims and allows courts to freely interpret the
claim scope by taking into account the specification, other parts of the patent
document, and the general knowledge of one skilled in the art. The claim drafting
practice in pre-1981 Germany was a paradigm for the central claiming approach.5 1
Under a three-part theory, German courts viewed claims only as a starting point and
freely expanded patent protection on the basis of a general inventive idea. 515
I09 ld. at Article 11(4), at 22. Further explanation of equivalents are included in Rule 12(5), see
WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(5).
5,0 The provision for scope of protection is not included in the SPLT second draft. WIPO Draft Sub-
stantive Patent Law Treaty (6th Session), supra note 16, at 27.
Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Requests for Comments on the Interna-
tional effort to Harmonize the Substantive Requirements of Patent Laws, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,409,
15,410 (Mar. 19, 2001).
512 For a general discussion of claim drafting approaches, see Toshiko Takenaka, Interpreting Patent
Claims: The United States, Germany and Japan, 17 I.I.C. Studies 27 (1995).
Id. at 3.
54 TAKENAKA, supra note 490, at 26.
For a general discussion of German law claim interpretation, see Jochen Pagenberg, New Trends
in Patent Claim Interpretation: Goodbye to the General Inventive Idea, 19 I.I.C. 788 (1988); Si-
jip, Scope of Protection Afforded by a European Patent, 10 I.I.C. 433 (1979); Winkler, The Scope
of Patent Protection, Past, Present and Future, 10 I.I.C. 296 (1979).
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However, U.S. courts allow an application of the doctrine of equivalents and
extend protection beyond the literal meaning of the claims. 516 Thus, the United
States does not strictly follow the peripheral claiming approach if one takes into ac-
count the doctrine of equivalents. True paradigms of the peripheral claiming ap-
proach were Japan, prior to a 1998 Japanese Supreme Court Decision, 517 and the
United Kingdom, prior to joining the EPC. Neither system permitted an application
of the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement. However, even under these sys-
tems, courts developed doctrines to expansively interpret the language of claims to
maintain equity between patentees and accused infringers.518 Although the U.K.
and Japanese courts developed the doctrines under the scheme of literal infringe-
ment, the effect of the doctrines is the same as the doctrine of equivalents.
Therefore, whether a patent system follows the peripheral claiming approach
or the central claiming approach is irrelevant. The more important issue is the ex-
tent of protection provided by all infringement doctrines in a particular system.
Regardless of the classification of doctrines that expand the protection beyond the
literal meaning of the claims, it is important to harmonize the extent of protection in
different countries, particularly in major markets for U.S. patent owners.
Even if the SPLT limits the scope of negotiations to issues relating to patent
granting procedures, it is necessary to address issues relating to the scope of patent
protection because such issues are intertwined with claim-drafting techniques and
prosecution strategies. If no expansion beyond the literal scope is allowed, appli-
cants may want to claim all possible variations that competitors may adopt and
maintain a divisional or continuation application pending throughout the patent
term in order to cover competitor embodiments within the literal scope by amend-
ing claims. Drafters of the EPC were also keenly aware of this necessity and in-
cluded EPC rules addressing the scope conferred by a European patent grant; al-
though, the scope of the EPC is limited to substantive patent law issues for a
granting procedure like the SPLT.519
The most recent draft properly reintroduced a provision for protection by
equivalents because the availability of such protection affects the literal scope of
claims the patent system should protect for accomplishing patent policy. For ex-
ample, in an unpredictable art such as biotechnology, if protection beyond the lit-
eral scope is available, applicants can draft specific and narrow claims to cover
only embodiments tested and disclosed in the specification, so as to avoid a rejec-
tion for lack of enablement. Courts can find infringement on variations of such
116 See generally Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865.
"t Tubakimoto Seiko v. T.H.K., 1630 HANREI JIHO 32 (Sup. Ct., 1998).
" For the United Kingdom, see J. A. KEMP, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION 1
(1983). For Japan, see Takenaka, supra note 490, at 39.
European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 69, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 23,
13 I.L.M. 270, 288.
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claims under the doctrine of equivalents or any other doctrine to provide proper
protection. However, if protection beyond the literal scope is not available at all or
is very limited, applicants should be allowed to claim a broad scope covering pos-
sible variations even if these variations have not been tested. Otherwise, the policy
for rewarding inventors inproportion to the contribution to the public through dis-
closure of the invention520 is undermined. Inventions in unpredictable arts con-
stantly receive lesser protection if a strict enablement requirement is imposed and if
no protection is given beyond the literal claim scope; although, many such inven-
tions are pioneer inventions, which contribute greatly to the state of the art. Thus,
to give proper protection to inventions in the unpredictable arts, the SPLT properly
provides general protection beyond the literal scope in light of the enablement re-
quirement and other patentability conditions.
The SPLT also introduced for the first time a new provision endorsing the
practice of using statements made during prosecution to restrict the scope of protec-
tion.521 This ractice is known to the U.S. patent community as prosecution his-
tory estoppel. However, excessive use against the patentee of communications
made with the patent office during prosecution to limit the language of the claims
and the scope may undermine well-established practices under a first-to-file model.
The new provision endorsing prosecution history estoppel may encourage excessive
use and, thus, should also include a statement that prohibits doctrine abuse.
A first-to-file priority rule necessarily urges applicants to rush to file an appli-
cation with the patent office as soon as an invention is complete. 523 Therefore, the
system presumes applicants will investigate the prior art and commercial value of
the invention after filing an application and perfect the claims when a request for
examination is filed.524 A significant number of applications are withdrawn from
prosecution because they fail to file a request for examination during the statutory
period. 525 Further, many applications were originally prepared by inventors and in-
house patent prosecution specialists, and the claims are later refined by patent at-
520 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 18.04[2][a][i].
2 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule l2(6).
522 For a general discussion of prosecution history estoppel, see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 18.05.
This aspect of insufficient time and information for preparing an application is viewed as one dis-
advantage of the first-to-file system. See Conley, supra note 356, at 788.
"A The disadvantage of insufficient information is remedied by a system to require an applicant to
file a request of examination. Patent Offices in the first-to-file countries including the EPO and
JPO examine applications only when an applicant filed a request of examination. See, European
Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 94, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 33, 13 I.L.M.
270, 288; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 48ter.
-2 Such statutory period is six months from the publication of search report under the EPC and three
years from the filing date under JPL. See, European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 94(2),
1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 33, 13 I.L.M. 270, 288; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent
law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 48ter(l).
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tomeys when a request for examination is filed.526 A first-to-file system presumes
imperfect claims in the original application and, thus, guarantees applicants the
right to amend claims without any disadvantage even if the original claims are im-
perfect. This practice makes it possible to disclose inventions early while limiting
prosecution cost and administrative costs at patent offices. 527 This practice also
helps small inventors by enabling them to file an application by themselves, thereby
reducing the costs of patent procurement.
The excessive use against the patentee of communications made during the
prosecution to limit the scope of protection, such as the new rule of prosecution his-
tory estoppel adopted by the Federal Circuit en banc in the Festo decision, under-
mines the practice of other countries following the first-to-file priority rule.528 Un-
der Festo, any amendment narrowing the literal scope gives rise to a presumption
of an estoppel bar and completely prevents a claim of the doctrine of equiva-
lents.529 The Supreme Court modified this new rule and gave patentees an oppor-
tunity for rebuttal. 530 However, patentees still bear the burden to overcome the
presumption by showing that the particular euivalent at issue is not reasonably
viewed as surrendered during the prosecution. 5 1 When an amendment is voluntar-
ily made, a reason for amendment is often unclear, making it difficult for a patentee
to show a circumstance for overcoming the presumption unless the equivalent
claimed by the patentee was not unforeseeable at the time of application.532 This
practice discourages acceptance of amendments proposed by a patent office. It also
encourages narrow and specific claim drafting and multiple applications to avoid
the presumption, which will significantly increase the administrative burden at pat-
ent offices and prosecution costs for applicants. 533 This practice also requires
small inventors to file an application with perfect claims, making it difficult for
them to file applications themselves. To avoid these consequences, it is important
526 For a general discussion of Japanese companies' patent procurement strategies, see HITACHI
SEISAKUSHO, HITACHI NO CHITEKI SHOYUKEN KANRI (HITACHI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT) 116-149 (1995).
521 This is the purpose for introducing a system for a request of examination. See KOUSAKU
YOSHIFUJI, TOKKYOHO GAISETSU [OUTLINES OF PATENT LAW] 293 (8th ed. 1988).
Festo Corp., 122 S.Ct. 1831, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
529 Id. at 1842, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1713.
530 Id.
531 Id.
i12 The circumstances for overcoming the presumption include: (1) "[t]he equivalents may have been
unforeseeable at the time of application..."; (2) "... the rational underlying the amendment may
bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question..."; and (3) "... there may be
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described
the insubstantial substitute in question." Id. at 1842, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714.
Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 592, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1891 (Plager J., concurring).
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that the SPLT include a statement prohibiting excessive use of prosecution history
estoppel, which may interfere with a patent applicants' right of amendment.
2. Special Rules
In contrast to the fundamental rules, claim interpretation rules for special
types of claims are significantly different from the current U.S. practice.53 4 In light
of underlying policies, most of these SPLT rules do not reflect the best practice but
simply adopted the European/Japanese rules, which are adopted by a majority of
Paris Union members.
i) Mean-Plus-Function Claims
Rule 12(4)(a) and (b) provide a rule for interpreting means-plus-function
claims, and adoption of the rule will require the United States to repeal § 112,
6.535 This repeal will serve U.S. patent applicants and patent owners well by
eliminating the confusion associated with a distinction in interpretation between
means-plus-function claims and other regular claims required by the special rule set
forth in § 112, 1 6.536 U.S. courts interpret § 112, 6 to apply only to means or
step-plus function claims and require a determination as to whether an element is in
means or step-plus-function format.537 However, significant confusion results
from the determination because it is often unclear whether the element was drafted
in such a format.538 This is particularly true in step-plus-function claims.
539
The special claim interpretation rule in § 112, 6 is not necessary if the claim
definiteness requirement is properly applied to indefinite claims in means-plus-
function format.540 U.S. courts often emphasize the unclear literal scope or overly
broad scope of means-plus-function claims. 54 1 The language of § 112, 1 6 was in-
troduced to remedy this concern. The literal scope may be unclear in undeveloped
areas of technology where knowledge in the field is scarce and where one skilled in
114 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(4).
"3 For a discussion of difference between the SPLT Rule and 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, see supra Part
II.D.2.
536 Toshiko Takenaka, What Japan Should Learn from U.S. Experiences: Test of Equivalences,
Means-Plus-Function Claims and Product-By-Process Claims, CASRIP NEWSLETrER 7, 10 (Win-
ter 2002).
Al-Site Corp. v. VSI int'l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
13, Takenaka, supra note 514, at 12.
119 See generally Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000).
, Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 11 (1946).
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the art would not know the scope.542 If this is the case, a patent office should reject
the claim for lack of definiteness by relying on § 112, 2. At the same time, in a
fully mature technological field, one skilled in the art can ascertain both equivalents
that perform the recited function and the functional limitations. If the subject mat-
ter is in a well-established technological area, there is no reason to discriminate be-
tween means-plus-function claims and regular claims. Thus, without the special
rule under § 112, [ 6, the scope is clear. Other countries, including Japan and EPC
countries, have adopted this reasoning; therefore, Japanese and European applicants
are allowed to use means-plus-function claims only if one skilled in the art rea-
sonably would understand what structures are included to perform the recited func-
tion. 54
3
In contrast, some U.S. means-plus-function claims are indefinite because the
special rule under § 112, 6 prevents unclear and indefinite claims from being re-
jected under § 112, 2. Section 112, 6 makes clear that the functional term in a
means-plus-function claim covers at least one embodiment in the specification;
thus, the USPTO is unable to reject means-plus-function claims for lack of defi-
niteness even if what constitutes equivalents is unclear to one skilled in the art.
In short, the rule provided in Rule 12(4)(a) and (b), widely used in other
countries, is better than the special rule under § 112 ,1 6. U.S. judges struggle to
handle means-plus-function claims and are required to do so under § 112, 6 of the
statute.544 A repeal of § 112, 1 6 will reduce the administrative burden at the
USTPO and improve the certainty of the literal scope of means-plus-function
claims.
ii) Product-By-Process Claims
Rule 12(4)(c) provides a claim interpretation rule for product-by-process
claims.545 Although this rule is in line with the claim interpretation principles
adopted by the USPTO in examining product-by-process claims as a product claim,
U.S. case law is unclear as to whether courts interpret product-by-process claims in
the same way as the USPTO. This is because of a conflict between two Federal
5 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part I, ch. 1, 2.2.2.1(6), available at http://
www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines[Partl- 1.pdf.
'4 GENENTECH/Polypeptide, supra note 260, 1989 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF EPO 275; JPO Examina-
tion Guidelines, supra note 212, part I, ch. 1, 2.2.2.1(6), available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partl- l.pdf.
Judge Randall Rader, Remarks at the Seminar of Claim Interpretation under U.S. Patent Law
(Nov. 19, 2001) (transcript available in the Institute of Intellectual Property, Tokyo, Japan).
141 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(4)(c).
[VOL. 11:259
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
Circuit panel decisions, Scripps546 and Atlantic Thermoplastic,54 7 which concern
the scope of product-by-process claims.
Adoption of the SPLT will require the United States to follow the Scripps
claim interpretation rule and extend patent protection to any product that has the
characteristics of the product resulting from the process recited in a product-by-
process claim. This expansive claim interpretation rule will encourage the use of
product-by-process claims. However, the use of product-by-process claims should
be discouraged because such claims have serious problems with the definitional and
notice function of claims; furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the
significance of these claim functions. 54 8 Accordingly, the SPLT should prohibit
the use of product-by-process claims or include a rule that product-by-process
claims should be interpreted to cover only the product resulting from the recited
process.
Product-by-process claims cannot satisfactorily define the subject matter,
thereby posing a serious problem for patent offices when examining such claims.
These types of claims are difficult or sometimes even impossible to examine be-
cause they lack a description of structure. Since patent offices do not have facilities
to conduct an experiment and manufacture the product, patent offices have no basis
to examine the product in terms of its physical characteristics. Recognizing this
problem, U.S. courts introduced a lesser burden for the USPTO to prove prima-
facie obviousness. 54 9 The USPTO can meet the burden if it cites a product that
reasonably appears to be either identical to or only slightly different from a product
recited in a product-by-process claim.
5 50
Product-by-process claims have little value to applicants. They are difficult
to issue because such claims are more likely to be rejected on grounds of anticipa-
tion and obviousness. Furthermore, the claims have more difficulty meeting the
disclosure requirements than true product claims, which are defined by physical
characteristics. First, a product-by-process claim must meet the same standard of
novelty and non-obviousness applicable to a true product claim. Such novelty and
non-obviousness should not depend on the method by which the product is
made. 55 1 Novelty and non-obviousness are difficult to argue in a product-by-
process claim because an applicant must distinguish the physical characteristics of
546 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
117 Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
148 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1871.
.49 In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535-36, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
550 Id.
See generally In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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the recited product from the prior art.552 However, a true product-by-process claim
does not recite any physical characteristics.
A product-by-process claim must also meet the same description requirement
standard applicable to a true product claim. It is very likely that product-by-process
claims will fail to meet the enablement requirement under SPLT Article 1055 3 if
they are interpreted according to Rule 12(4)(c), and protection is extended to cover
any product resulting from the process recited in the claim. This broad coverage
indicates that a product-by-process claim is considered a de facto genus claim of
species, i.e. these claims are directed to products resulting from different processes.
Under recent U.S. case law, on which SPLT Article 10 is based, a product-by-
process claim arguably fails enablement, particularly if the product relates to a
highly unpredictable technology. 5
54
It is also very likely that product-by-process claims will fail to meet the writ-
ten description requirement under Article 11. 555 Recent U.S. case law has made it
very difficult to overcome a rejection under the written description requirement if
the structure or physical characteristics are unknown and not disclosed in the speci-
fication. In the Ely Lilly case, the Federal Circuit required the patentee to disclose a
precise definition of a DNA sequence if the patentee wanted to protect the se-
quence. 5 56 A description of a method of producing the DNA sequence was consid-
ered an insufficient description. 557 Unless the specification discloses physical
characteristics of the product, a true product-by-process claim very likely violates
the written description requirement under SPLT Article 1 1(3)(b) for failure to dis-
close precise physical characteristics. 558
Despite the higher hurdle to obtain patents, U.S. applicants prefer to use
product-by-process claims because they believe that U.S. courts follow the rule of
extending protection to products not resulting from the rocess recited in the claim.
This rule is adopted in the most recent SPLT draft. Otherwise, product-by-
352 See generally In re Stephens, 345 F.2d 1020, 1023, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656, 658 (C.C.P.A.
1965).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 10(1).
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1376, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1141
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 11 (3)(b).
5 Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lily, 119 F.3d 1559, 1567, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
I5 d.
"5 However, see also In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559-60, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1216 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (endorsing the use of product-by-process claims when the product has already prepared
by the process recited in the claim.).
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 1 1(3)(b).
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process claims would serve no purpose because the coverage of a patent on a proc-
ess claim must extend to a product resulting from the process.
560
However, it is unclear whether U.S. courts follow the rule adopted in the most
recent SPLT draft because of the conflicting views adopted by two panel decisions
of the Federal Circuit relating to the literal scope of product-by process claims. The
Scripps court adopted the same view as SPLT Rule 12(4)(c) and held that a prod-
uct-by-process claim should not be limited to products made by the process recited
in the product-by-process claims. 561 The court nevertheless remanded the case for
infringement examination under the reverse doctrine of equivalents. In contrast, the
Atlantic Thermoplastics court reviewed the Supreme Court cases and held that
product-by-process claims extend only to the end product made by the process re-
cited in the product-by-process claims. 562 This claim interpretation, which views
product-by-process claims as a process claim, obviously conflicts with the rule in
the SPLT. The majority of U.S. lower court decisions have traditionally adopted
the view of Atlantic Thermoplastic.563 However, these conflicting panel decisions
introduced serious confusion into claim interpretation of product-by-process
claims.56
4
A review of the two Federal Circuit panel decisions reveals several problems
that may result from the expansive claim interpretation rule in the SPLT. In a dis-
senting opinion, from the denial of a rehearing of Atlantic Thermoplastic en banc,
Judge Newman, author of the Scripps opinion, emphasized the difference between
the claims in Scripps and the claims in Atlantic Thermoplastic.565 She viewed the
Scripps product as being a true product-by-process claim that directs to a new and
non-obvious product independent from the process recited in the claim; whereas,
she viewed the Atlantic Thermoplastic product as being new and non-obvious only
with respect to the process of making the product.
However, contrary to Judge Newman's belief, the Scripps product is not
completely new and non-obvious. Scientists had invented a process of concentrat-
ing human factor VIII:C in plasma before the Scripps invention was made. 566 It is
,6 As far as the U.S. is concerned, at one time, claims, including product-by-process, brought addi-
tional protection because the U.S. patent statute did not extend protection of a process to its end-
product. However, enactment of the 1988 Process Patent Amendment Act extended protection to
the end-product. This Act was part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1992 (2002) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2000)).
161 Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 927 F.2d at 1583, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1016.
162 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1490.
161 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 8.05[1]; ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW PROSPECTIVE § 2.6[10] (2d ed.
1991).
161 See generally Trs. of Columbia Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d 16, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1825.
161 Atlantic Themoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1281, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1802-04.
16 Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 927 F.2d at 1569, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1004.
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also arguable that Scripps merely invented a new less expensive process, rather
than a completely new product; thus, the patentability of the Scripps product de-
pended on the process of making the product. 567 The Scripps human factor is dis-
tinguishable from the old concentrated human factor only concerning purity and ac-
tivity, but such distinguishable characteristics were not recited in the claim because
Scripps used a product-by-process claim. In short, Judge Newman's distinction is
not valid.
If Judge Newman's view is correct, the Scripps court adopted exactly the
same approach as in the SPLT Rule. Remanding the case to the district court, the
court suggested applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents at the trial. The doc-
trine prevents a product-by-process claim from covering a product that resulted
from a different process if such product had characteristics that were substantially
different from the product resulting from the process recited in the claim.5 68 This
practice presents a serious problem for the public because the public does not know
whether a product resulting from a different process violates a product-by-process
claim unless the public uses the patented process and then compares the new and
old products. In short, a product-by-process claim has a serious flaw with respect
to the notice function.
In addition, many product-by-process claims are adopted only for conven-
ience and very little justification remains for allowing inventors to use product-by-
process claims. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court established the all-elements
rule by holding that each element in a patent claim is deemed material to defining
the scope of the patented invention, forbidding lower courts from using the doctrine
of equivalents to effectively eliminate anyv element in its entirely.5" ' This rule
should also apply to claim interpretation. 570 The expansive claim interpretation
rule in the SPLT clearly conflicts with this all-elements rule by ignoring process
limitations recited in the claim.
In short, product-by-process claims only introduce confusion in determining
patentability and validity, while giving the same protection as process claims.
Product-by-process claims fail to accomplish their public notice function. Such
claims have little value to applicants and patent offices. Thus, the current Rule
12(4)(c) should be replaced with a clear prohibition of such claims or alternatively
provide a restrictive claim interpretation rule to cover only products resulting from
the process recited in the claim.
161 Id. at 1580, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1014.
568 Id. at 1581, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1014.
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1871.
- For a discussion of the application of the all elements rule in claim interpretation, see CHISUM, su-
pra note 59, § 18.03 [4][a].
[VOL. 11:259
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
3. Use-of-Product Claims
Rule 12(4)(d) provides a claim interpretation rule for a claim directed to use-
of-product. 571 In principle, a product claim covers the product recited in the claim
regardless of the use. 72 However, Rule 12(4)(d) provides an exception to this rule
when a product claim recites a use limitation. In those circumstances the claim
should be construed to cover the product only for the recited use. In other words,
Rule 12(4)(d) requires patent offices to recognize functional features in a product
claim as elements to distinguish the prior art.
This practice makes it possible for patent applicants to obtain a patent on a
claim that directs to a new use of an old product. Because U.S. current practice
recognizes an inherent but unknown use of an old product and rejects a new use
claim as being anticipated by the old product, adoption of the SPLT will require the
United States to change the practice of interpreting a limitation of use and find pat-
entable novel uses of product claims. 573 However, the U.S. practice is better than
the SPLT practice, and Rule 12(4)(d) should be removed.
Use-of-product claims undermine the policy of limiting a patent term because
such claims enable patent applicants to obtain separate patents on the same product.
Pioneer drug manufacturers may try to patent second and further uses of a patented
product to extend the patent term of a product. 574 Even if a use-of-product claim is
construed restrictively to cover a product only for the recited use, such a claim in-
terpretation rule introduces serious confusion with the literal scope because suppli-
ers of an old product may be subjected to liability for indirect infringement once a
patent is granted for a new use, even though there is no way of knowing how pur-
chasers will ultimately use the product.575 Patentees also encounter difficulties in
enforcing a use-of-product claim because it is difficult to determine how the prod-
uct is used. 576 Although patentees can rely on indirect infringement doctrines,
competitors can readily avoid liability by taking measures to prohibit purchasers
from using the product for the patented use. 577 Further, use-of-product claims in-
troduce unnecessary complexity in the patent system with new medical usage of a
WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 12(4)(d).
572 See ROBERT MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 489 (1992).
'7 For a comparison of SPLT and U.S. current practice with respect to the use of product claims, see
supra note 270.
114 For problems associated with a new use of old product, see Sir Robin Jacobs, Novelty of Use
Claims, 27 I.I.C. 170 (1996); Gerald Paterson, The Novelty of Use Claims, 27 I.I.C. 179 (1996).
5 In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324, 325 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
576 Id.
-11 ROBERT MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 491-92 (1992).
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product. 578 Due to these concerns, U.S. courts reject use-of-product claims for an-
ticipation and obviousness and only allow a process claim to cover the use.
579
However, Rule 12(4)(d) might not be necessary because use-of-product
claims would not survive the novelty determination under the SPLT. According to
guidelines under Rule 14, a claim that is directed to a new use of an old product
cannot distinguish the old product if a patent office introduces evidence to show the
new use is inherent in the old product disclosed in a primary prior art reference.
580
Such claims survive a determination of novelty that focuses on the technical effect
under the EPC and other countries that follow the European approach because the
technical effect underlying the use recited in the claim is viewed as a technical fea-
ture that distinguishes the old product in which the new use was inherent but was
not made available to the public. 581 However, the SPLT's novelty assessment does
not mention a technical effect and more closely parallels the U.S. aproach that fo-
cuses on physical characteristics when examining a product claim.582 This means
that Rule 12(4)(d) addresses a claim interpretation rule for a use-of-product claim
unnecessarily, and it should be removed because such claims will be rejected for
lack of novelty.
E. Conditions of Patentability
1. Patent Eligible Subject Matter
The most recent draft of the SPLT includes in the definition of patentable
subject matter products and processes "in all fields of technology." 583 WIPO's In-
ternational Bureau adopted the European Community's proposal to include this
terminology to parallel WTO-TRIPS Article 27(1).584 The U.S. Delegation sup-
EPC recently adopted a revision to clarify the patentability of further medical use of an old prod-
uct. Revisions available at http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2002/O202Bulletin/
EuropeanPatentConvRevision.html; 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18, 13 I.L.M. 270,
285; Regarding all complex issues associated with the patentability of claims directed to medical
uses of a product, see GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 518 (2d ed., 2001). Al-
though the US does not face this difficulty, to prevent applicants from patenting on medical meth-
ods, the US needs to apply immunity on medical methods under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
In re Shetty, 566 F.2d 81, 84, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753, 756 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
o Patent offices can introduce evidence to show an inherent element, such as a new use in an old
product. WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, guide-
lines under rule 14, G3.04(iii).
5' MOBIL OIL/Friction Reducing Additive, supra note 271, at 109. In this case, the EPO Enlarged
Board clearly distinguished "made available to the public" from "inherent." However, the SPLT
Guidelines use the term "inherent" to explain what is made available to the public by a primary
prior art reference.
582 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, guidelines under
rule 14, G3.01.
WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 93, art. 12(l).
WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 30-31.
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ported the broad definition of patentable subject matter in the draft presented at the
sixth session.585 Inclusion of the language "all fields of technology" will not re-
quire the United States to change its current practice because a requirement to pro-
tect subject matter that is in a technology field is in line with the scope of patent
eligible subject matter endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The scope of patentable subject matter in the United States appears to be very
broad because the patent statute simply defines "inventions" to include discover-
ies 586 and categories of invention. 587 U.S. case law also suggests a very broad
scope of patentable subject matter because the Federal Circuit test for patentable
subject matter focuses only on whether the invention produces a "useful, concrete
and tangible result." 588 However, this test may be overly broad and inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of "invention" and with the CCPA's inter-
pretation of "useful arts" unless the test is interpreted to limit patent eligibility to
subject matter (1) that results from the application of the laws of nature and (2) that
is within a technological art. This narrower scope would be in line with patent eli-
gible subject matter in other countries, such as Japan and the EPC countries.
The "useful, concrete and tangible result" test represents the Federal Circuit's
attempt to clarify the test, stated by the Supreme Court in Diehr,589 as to whether
the claim is directed to a mathematical formula in the abstract. However, the test is
overly broad because it is inconsistent with the scope for a patent eligible "inven-
tion" carefully defined by the Supreme Court in cases involving issues of patent
eligibility. In Benson 590 and Diehr,59 1 the Court cited Funk Bros592 and defined
patent eligible subject matter as resulting "from the application of the law of nature
to produce a new and useful end." 593 The Federal Circuit restated the test in State
Street Bank594 and In re Alappat,595 but the court failed to include the important
'1. Id. at 30.
-16 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2000).
387 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1557.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).
590 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (1972).
391 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 8-9 (1981).
. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280, 281
(1948).
Id. at 130, 76 U.S.P.Q. at 281.
114 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1596, 1600-01 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541-42, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1555-56.
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requirement of "resulting from the application of the law of nature." 596 Thus, to be
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the "useful, concrete and tangible result"
test should mean resulting "from the application of the law of nature."
The requirement of "application of the law of nature" is a central element in
defining patent eligible subject matter because it is the key to distinguishing "tech-
nological art" from other arts. One old but well-accepted definition for the term
"technology" is "the principles, processes, and nomenclatures of the more con-
spicuous arts, particularly those which involve application of science." 597 One can
substitute the "law of nature" for the term "science" because the task of science is
to discover the law of nature. Thus, the Supreme Court's definition implicitly in-
corporates the "technological art" requirement.
The "application of a law of nature" requirement also supports the underlying
policy of the patent system to distinguish the technological art from other arts.
CCPA, a predecessor court to the Federal Circuit, interpreted the copyright and pat-
ent clause598 to support the requirement that patent eligible subject matter be in a
"technological art." In Bergy, Judge Rich, who authored State Street Bank, limited
the scope of patent eligible subject matter by interpreting the term "useful art" in
the Constitution to correspond to "technological art."u599 This view is fully sup-
ported by Supreme Court precedent that required the application of a law of nature
to the exclusion of non-technological art that has nothing to do with the promotion
of progress in the useful arts. Accordingly, in light of the Federal Circuit's own
precedent and the Supreme Court precedent, the SPLT's requirement that pat-
entable subject matter include all fields of technology is perfectly in line with the
American definition of patentable subject matter.600
Coincidentally, the definition used in Funk Bros., Benson, and Diehr is con-
sistent with the definition used by many other countries. For example, although the
European Patent Convention (EPC) does not provide a concrete definition of patent
eligible subject matter,60 1 it limits the exclusion of patent eligibility to inventions
falling within excluded categories. 602 Thus, the results from application of discov-
196 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130, 76 U.S.P.Q. at 281.
9 John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1167 (1999)
(citation omitted).
'9' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958-59, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 359 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("[T]he consti-
tutionally-stated [sic] purpose of granting patent rights to inventors for their discoveries is the
promotion of progress in the 'useful Arts,' [sic] rather than in science.... [T]he present day
equivalent of the term 'useful arts' employed by the Founding Fathers is 'technological arts.' ").
'00 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 1.01.
6" European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 52(2), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
18, 13 I.L.M. 270, 285.
602 Id. at art. 52(3).
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eries, scientific theories, etc. should meet the patent eligibility requirement. To dis-
tinguish the excluded categories from those that are patent eligible, the EPO re-
quires subject matter to have a "technical character. 603 This requirement that the
inventions apply a law of nature or be a technological art follows the long-standing
German practice that requires technical character in claimed subject matter.60 4 A
close review of German case law reveals that the application of a law of nature is
used to distinguish whether the subject matter has a technical character and is pat-
ent eligible. 6
°5
Further, the application of a law of nature and the technological art require-
ments are also in line with those for patent eligible subject matter under the Japa-
nese Patent Law. Japanese Patent Law defines an invention that has patent eligible
subject matter as "an advanced technological idea utilizing a law of nature." 606
This statutory definition includes two important elements: (1) the claimed subject
matter must relate to a technological art and (2) the claimed subject matter must re-
sult from an application or utilization of a law of nature, instead of from the law it-
self.607 This is why the Japanese delegation proposed to add these requirements in
the SPLT draft. 60
8
A controversy currently surrounds the patent eligibility of computer software
and business methods. Different determinations regarding the patent eligibility of
these types of inventions do not come from the application of the "technological
art" or "law of nature" limitations but, instead, are the result of the inconsistent ap-
plication of such limitations. In Europe, for example, the EPO applies the limita-
tion by requiring a "technological contribution." 609 The European Commission
also endorsed this requirement. 6 1° The EPO's analysis can be seen in its examina-
10, EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 2.2; EPO Decision T 0935/97,
Computer Program Product Il/ IBM. For a general discussion, see SINGER, supra note 328, at 113.
0 FRIEDRICH-KERL BEIER, FUTURE PROBLEMS OF PATENT LAW 421 (1972).
611 See, e.g., Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court of Germany, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT, 1969 (672) (Mar. 27, 1969) (subject matter that controls natural forces to produce
a desired result is patentable.); Judgment of the Federal Patent Court of Germany,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUDESPATENTGERICHTS, 6 (145) (Jan. 15, 1965) (Technical means the effect
of harnessed natural forces and controlled utilization of natural phenomena.).
Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 2(2).
- For more explanation of "statutory invention" under the JPL, see JPO Examination Guidelines,
supra note 212, part VII, ch. 2.2, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/
PartVII- 1 .pdf.
WIPO Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 31.
T 0931/95 Pension Benefit System Partnership/Improved Pension Benefits System, 2001 OFFICIAL
JOURNAL OF EPO 441,454-55 (2001).
610 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Patentability of
Computer-Implemented Inventions, 2002 O.J. (C 151 E) 129; Stefan Schohe, What's Happening
in Europe: Business Patent Value, Presented at CASRIP Representing Technology Startup Semi-
nar (Jan. 16, 200 1).
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tion of the presence of a technological contribution in Pension Benefit System Part-
nership,611 where it dissected the claims into old and new elements and then ig-
nored the old elements as general teaching on the use of data-processing means.
The test led to a conclusion of lack of eligibility when the remaining elements were
found to be of an administrative, actuarial, or financial character.
The U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected the dissection of claims into old
and new elements in the Diehr case.612 The Diehr Court correctly pointed out613
that the question of patent eligibility should not be confused with the question of
novelty, which is obviously what the EPO did. Although the requirement of tech-
nological character or technology field was proper, it was improperly applied by
not analyzing the claimed invention as a whole. This improper application of the
requirement of "technical character" leads to exclusion of innovations in new fields
of endeavor,6 14 such as computer implemented business methods that apply a law
of nature through utilization of hardware resources. 6 15
Further, the EPO's patent eligibility analysis adheres to the view of defining
subject matter in terms of a technical problem by requiring a technical effect that
results from a solution of the technical problem. 6' 6 The EPO uniformly adopts this
view for determining novelty 617 and inventive step.618 However, no article or rulein the SPLT endorses focusing on a technical problem.
The current SPLT draft limits eligible subject matter to all technology fields,
i.e. relating to a technological art or application of a law of nature, which moves the
current definition more in line with the U.S. definition of patentable subject matter
as established by Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. Under this defini-
tion, computer software and business methods implemented by software are patent
eligible inventions because they result from the application of a law of nature by
611 Pension Benefit System Partnership/Improved Pension Benefits System, supra note 609, at 454-
55.
62 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 9 (1981).
613 Id.
6,4 The US delegation criticized the unnecessarily limited scope of patentable subject matter resulting
from the EPO's application of technical character requirement. WIPO Draft Report (6th Session),
supra note 89, at 31.
6t5 T 0931/95 Pension Benefit System Partnership/Improved Pension Benefits System, supra note
609, at 449.
616 As a result, EPO analysis ignores elements that do not relate to a technical character and, thus, are
unable to produce a technical effect in determining the patent eligible subject matter.
617 EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 9.5.
616 For determining the novelty of use of known product claims, EPO focuses a technical effect that is
newly discovered by the inventor. See MOBIL OIL/Friction Reducing Additive, supra note 581,
at 105.
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utilizing hardware resources of computers. 619 However, such a business method,
when independent from computer implementation, should be excluded from pat-
entable subject matter because it falls into the category of an abstract idea, or it
does not relate to a technical art.62 0 Japan follows the same definition and reaches
the same result.62 1 It is, therefore, not worthwhile for the U.S. Delegation to delay
negotiations by insisting on the removal of the language "all fields of technology."
2. Utility
Since the most recent SPLT draft provides three options for the definition of
utility,622 changes resulting from the adoption of the SPLT will depend on which623
option is selected. Among the three options, WIPO's International Bureau
should select the first option, which gives the broadest definition of utility because
it reflects the best practice among those adopted by the USPTO, JPO, and EPO.
Adoption of the first option will not lead to any significant change in current U.S.
practice.
Policy considerations underlying industrial applicability and utility are sub-
stantially the same in different jurisdictions. Europe and Japan use the industrial
applicability requirement to exclude medical methods from patentability and secure
the freedom for medical practitioners to provide the best treatments to their pa-
tients.624 However, this exception introduces unnecessary complexity resulting
from the difficulty in defining medical methods.625 It also introduces further com-
619 See, e.g., AT & T Corp. v. Excel Communs. Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356-58, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1447, 1450-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
620 Although, in an unpublished opinion not serving as precedent, the USPTO Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interference rejected claims directing a method of evaluating intangible asset of interest
for lack of patent eligible subject matter. Ex parte Bowman, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 2001).
621 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part 4, ch. 1, 2.1, available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partl-l.pdf. The JPO also published policies concerning
business method patents, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/tt2l 11-055.htm.
622 WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), supra note 89, art. 12.
623 For a discussion of the three options, see supra Part III.E.2.
624 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 52(4), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
18, 13 I.L.M. 270, 285; Japanse patent law, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(l); JPO Examination
Guidelines, supra note 212, part II, ch. 1, 2.1, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/
infoe/Guidelines/Partl-l.pdf. However, at the November 2000 Munich conference, a revision of
EPC is adopted to move the prohibition on the grant of patent for medical methods from the cate-
gory of lack of industrial applicability to the category of exceptions to the patentability. This revi-
sion will come into effect when all EPC members ratify the revision or after two years from its
ratification by at least 15 members. Ladas & Parry, European Patent Law - Revision available at:
http://www.ladas.com/BULLETNS/2002/0202Builetin/EuropeanPatentConvRevision.html.
623 To clarify the scope, the EPO and JPL Examination Guidelines include a lengthy explanation of
what constitutes a medical method. EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV,
§ 4.2; JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part II, ch. 1, 2.1, available at http://
www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partll- I.pdf.
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plexity by allowing the patentability of second and subsequent medical use of an
old product. 626 These countries also provide immunity from infringement liability
for the acts of a pharmacist preparing a patented medicine in accordance with a
medical prescription and acts concerning the medicine so prepared.627
In contrast, the United States does not exclude medical methods for lack of
utility. 628 However, it provides immunity for a medical practitioner's performance
of a medical activity using patented medical methods.629 Although the immunity
issue relates to infringement instead of examination, the United States shares the
same concern over the freedom of medical practitioners to engage in their profes-
sion. This approach is better than European and Japanese approach in protecting
the examination process from the complexity resulting from the difficulty in defin-
ing excepted medical methods.
Further, other countries maintain the concept of beneficial utility and exclude
immoral inventions, the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to
public order. 630 The concept of beneficial utility to invalidate immoral or illegal
inventions exists in the United States, but U.S. courts substantially limit its applica-
bility. 631
Finally, the US patent system requires specific utility, which prevents inven-
tors from obtaining a patent prematurely and requires the invention be reduced to
practice to identify its usefulness. 632 The specification must describe the invention
use sufficiently to the degree that one skilled in the art would believe the use, with-
out any reasonable doubt, meets the enablement requirement. 633 In contrast, Euro-
pean and Japanese patent systems require that the invention "can be made;" thus,
the possible use of an invention is sufficient enough to meet their industrial appli-
cable requirement. 634 This requirement appears lower than the utility requirement
626 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 54(3), 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090)
19, 13 I.L.M. 270, 286. For a general discussion, GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT
SYSTEM 518 (2d ed. 2001).
627 Community Patent Convention of Dec. 15, 1975, am. Dec. 15 1989, art. 27(c), 1989 O.J. (L. 401)
10; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 69(3).
For a general discussion of patent eligibility with respect to medical methods, see CHISUM, supra
note 59, § 1.03[3].
629 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
616 European Patent Convention, supra note 13, art. 53, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 7090) 18,
13 I.L.M. 270, 286; Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 32.
6131 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1700, 1703
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
6132 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 695 (1966).
6131 it re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1439-40 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
614 EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 4. 1; JPO Examination Guidelines,
supra note 212, part II, ch. 1, 2.1, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartI- 1.pdf.
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under U.S. law, but the EPO and JPO require the description of a specific use of the
invention of unpredictable art in the specification to meet their enablement re-
quirement. 635 Thus, there is no significant difference in the degree of description
required for meeting the requirements regarding the use of the invention under 35
U.S.C. and the EPC and JPL, except for a very limited special area of technol-
ogy. 63
6
In short, the first option reflects the best practice among the three options. If
the first option is selected, the broadest definition does not require patent offices to
exclude medical methods, thereby avoiding the complexity issue resulting from the
definition difficulty, which the EPO and JPO currently suffer. Even if the third op-
tion, which restates the USPTO's interpretation of U.S. case law, is not selected,
the first option should be interpreted to require a specific utility reflecting the EPO
and JPL enablement requirements, which are consistent with U.S. case law. There-
fore, the impact from the adoption of the SPLT should be minimal.
3. Novelty
Adoption of the most recent SPLT draft will not require any significant
change in U.S. practice regarding anticipation. 637 In determining whether an ele-
ment is implicitly disclosed in a prima r prior-art reference, SPLT Regulations in-
clude the term "inherently disclosed" 63 and adopt the U.S. case law "inherency"
test.639 The EPO's view on the scope of a primary prior-art reference also includes
implicit teaching. 640 However, the EPO distinguishes its test for finding an im-
plicit teaching or implicit element from the U.S. inherency test. 641
Despite express endorsement in the SPLT Regulations and Guidelines, the in-
herency doctrine should be restrictively applied because the doctrine is redundant
631 EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 4.6; JPO Examination Guidelines,
supra note 212, part VII, ch. 1, 1.3.1, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartVl-
l.pdf.
The USPTO had examination results different from those of EPO and JPO regarding the utility of
nucleic acid molecule-related inventions, which utility is inferred based on homology search. See
Trilateral Project B3b Mutual Understanding in Search and Examination Comparative Study on
Biotechnology Patent Practices (Theme: Nucleic acid molecule-related inventions whose func-
tions are inferred based on homology search), The Trilateral Cooperation, at http:H
www.european-patent-office.org/tws/sr-3-b3b-biosearch.htm.
637 For a comparison of SPLT and current US practice with respect to the novelty, see supra Part
II.E.3.
63 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 14(2).
639 Cont'l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1749
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
640 T290/86 BLENDAX/Cleaning Plaque, 1992 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF EPO 414, 423-25 (1992). For
a general discussion of the interpretation of teaching in prior art, see SINGER, supra note 176, at
149.
"' MOBIL OIL/Friction Reducing Additive, supra note 581, at 111, § 10.1.
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with non-obviousness or inventive step requirements. The inherency doctrine was
developed to expand the rejection for lack of novelty when patent statutes did not
have a separate requirement of non-obviousness or inventive step.642 Introduction
of a separate requirement for non-obviousness or inventive step eliminated the need
to expand the novelty requirement. 643 A review of inherency cases reveals that any
inherent feature or result could be examined under the non-obviousness standard.
The application of the inherency doctrine, instead of the non-obviousness or
inventive step requirement, enables patent offices to escape the burden of showing
primafacie obviousness. It also prevents applicants from taking advantage of a va-
riety of doctrines designed to guard against the use of hindsight in determining non-
obviousness.644 For example, the doctrine of analogous art 645 is not applicable un-
der the novelty standard, which allows patent offices to cite any unrelated technol-
ogy to reject claims.646 A patent office does not need to show a motivation or sug-
gestion under the inherency doctrine. 647 To guarantee applicants the advantage of
safe-guard doctrines to prevent hindsight, patent offices should apply the inherency
doctrine restrictively.
4. Inventive Step/Non-obviousness
Adoption of the most recent SPLT draft will not bring a significant change in
U.S. practice regarding non-obviousness. 648 Rule 15(4) restates a suggestion or
motivation test uniformly adopted by U.S. courts to prevent patent office examiners
from using hindsight. 64  The EPO and JPO both adopted a suggestion/motivation
test similar to that used by the USPTO. 650 However, information in the prior art
that gives rise to a motivation is interpreted differently among patent offices.651
642 See generally Toshiko Takenaka, The Substantial Identity Rule Under the Japanese Novelty Stan-
dard, 9 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 220 (1991).
643 Id.
I" For a general discussion of hindsight, see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 5.03[2][c].
64 Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767 (Fed. Cir.
1993). For a general discussion of the doctrine of analogous art, see CHISUM, supra note 59, §
5.03[l].
64 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 3.02[3].
64 In re Gal, 980 F.2d 717, 720, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For a general
discussion of suggestion test, see CHISUM, supra note 59, § 5.04[1][e].
648 For a comparison between SPTL and current US practice with respect to non-obviousness, see
supra Part II.E.4.
641 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, rule 15(4).
610 SINGER, supra note 176, at 181; JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part II, ch. 2,
2.5(1), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/PartIl-2.pdf.
6 1 The Japanese delegation requests more of an explanation regarding motivation to combine prior
art references and proposed to list factors to be considered for finding such motivation. WIPO
Draft Report (6th Session), supra note 89, at 34.
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Thus, the most recent draft lists factors that patent offices should consider in find-
ing a motivation or suggestion.
65 2
The factors in the SPLT guidelines closely parallels those listed in the JPO
guidelines. 653 However, this list should not be read to mean that mere relevance of
fields of the art, problems to be solved, or functions and characteristics of the art
justifies finding a motivation without pointing out a particular portion of the prior
art that provided the motivation or suggestion. Otherwise, examiners will use hind-
sight to reach a conclusion of obviousness. To avoid such hindsight, in determining
non-obviousness of a highly sophisticated technology, the Federal Circuit rejected
arguments made by the USPTO that relied mostly on the high level of general
knowledge for finding a suggestion and motivation to combine references. 654 The
court emphasized the safeguard function of the suggestion-to-combine requirement
and has required the USPTO to identify the principle known to one skilled in the art
that suggests the claimed combination.
655
The Guidelines under Rule 15 (1)656 restate the four-step factual inquiry that
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted for setting a platform for non-obviousness deter-
mination under §103.657 Since Guideline (1) does not require identifying the most
relevant prior art or determination of a problem to be solved by the invention, the
inventive step/non-obviousness assessment in the SPLT Guidelines is clearly dif-
ferent from the problem-solution approach that the EPO adopts.
658
The SPLT Guidelines should be read to prohibit or at least discourage Euro-
pean countries and others from using the problem-solution approach because of a
serious flaw relating to the steps for objectively determining the problem the inven-
652 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, guidelines under
rule 15.
611 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 212, part II, ch. 2, 2.5(2), available at http://
www.jpo.go.jp/infoe/Guidelines/Partll-2.pdf.
654
/research/buttonTFLink? m=59db7561941d329b7bf7ab121624765c& xfercite
=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b149%20F.3d
%201350%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e& butType=3& butStat=254& butinfo
=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%2 I%5bCDATA%5b1998%20U.S.
%20App.%20LEXIS%2016414%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e& fmtstr=FULL
&docnum= 1 & startdoc= 1 & startchk=l &wchp=dGLSzV-
lSlbz& md5=8fc6bd84251cb76c83626495c3f831b2n re Rouffet,149 F.3d 1350, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
655 Id. at 1357, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 at 1457-58.
656 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (6th Session), supra note 294, guidelines under
rule 15.
611 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
6I EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 9.5.
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tion is designed to solve.659 According to EPO practice, examiners identify the
most relevant prior art and compare the claimed subject matter and that of the most
relevant prior art to determine the problem objectively. 660 This step is susceptible
to hindsight because it requires examiners to look at the invention before address-
ing the obviousness assessment.661 European examiners are supposed to ignore the
solution disclosed in the invention when they define the problem of the invention.
However, they often define the problem in terms of the solution because it is diffi-
cult to ignore the solution once they see it.
662
The danger of using hindsight in the problem-solution approach is well repre-
sented in a Federal Circuit case, Monarch Knitting.663 The Federal Circuit rejected
the district court's analysis, which was obviously influenced by arguments ad-
vanced by the European parties, holding that the court defined the problem in terms
of the solution set forth by the invention and, thus, used hindsight. The problem-
solution approach can lead to a patent grant on a new use of an old product because
its examination focuses on the problem the invention was designed to solve. 664
The problem-solution approach can also lead to an improper application of the
technical-character test, which results in exclusion of computer implemented busi-
ness methods. 6
65
The Guidelines under Rule 15, (2) lists factors and secondary considerations
that U.S. courts have established as objective indicia for rebutting the patent of-
61 The EPO is keenly aware of the problem, thus the EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285,
part C, ch. IV, § 9.5 provides:
In the second stage one establishes in an objective way the technical problem to be
solved. To do this, one studies the application (or the patent), the closest prior art, and
the difference in terms of features (either structural or functional) between the invention
and the closest prior art and then formulates the technical problem.
660 The EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C., ch. IV, § 9.5 provides:
In the problem and solution approach there are three main stages:
(1) determining the closest prior art,
(2) establishing the technical problem to be solved, and
(3) considering whether or not the claimed invention, starting from the closest
prior art and the technical problem, would have been obvious to the skilled per-
son.
61 For a general discussion of the problem solution approach, see George S. Szabo, The Problem and
Solution Approach in the European Patent Office, 26 I.I.C. (1995).
662 G. Knesch, Assessing Inventive Step in Examination and Opposition Proceedings, 1994 EPI
INFORMATION 95, 95, Mar. 1994.
663 Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
614 MOBIL OIL/Friction Reducing Additive, supra note 271.
66 See supra note 616.
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fice's prima facie case of obviousness. 66 6 The EPO and JPO also use these factors
to examine inventive step but tend to give less attention to commercial success than
that given by the USPTO and the Federal Circuit. This may be because of the lack
of competency of these patent offices in assessing evidence of commercial success.
In addition, patent offices outside the U.S. often express serious concern over the
risk of misuse of the commercial-success factor and emphasize that the examiner
should confirm that the commercial success results from the technical features of
the invention. 66 7 However, the use of commercial success is more precise and ac-
curately reflects technical merit under the nexus requirement used by the Federal
Circuit.6 68 Other offices may need refinement of the rules to examine the risk-
minimizing factors, as has been done by the Federal Circuit.
Secondary considerations are particularly significant in some types of inven-
tions such as combination inventions. 669 Since all technical considerations to show
prima facie obviousness are negative tests, commercial success, a positive test, is
important to balance the positions of applicants and the patent office in disputing
non-obviousness. The use of commercial success is economically sound, although
some commentators criticize the extensive use of commercial success from an eco-
nomic perspective. 6 70 Since evidence of commercial success is available only con-
cerning inventions that are on the market, the use of commercial success encour-
ages the introduction of products into the market and secures reimbursement of
investments associated with the commercialization of the invention. Accordingly,
other countries should adopt the U.S. practice and should give more weight to
commercial success.
F. Other Issues
One major problem in the most recent SPLT draft is that it does not define
who is an inventor.6 7 1 Inventorship is one of the most important concepts of patent
666 WIPO Draft Regulations and Practice Guidelines (7th Session), supra note 135, guidelines under
rule 15 G4.04.
667 EPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 285, part C, ch. IV, § 9.9.
666 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (1998).
669 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 5.04. For a discussion of the non-obviousness assessment of combina-
tion inventions, see Alan P. Klein, Comment. Is the Federal Circuit Adopting the Supreme
Court's Obviousness Standard for Inventions Combining Old Elements?, 71 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 460 (1989); Robert W. Harris, Prospects for Supreme Court Review of
the Federal Circuit Standards for Obviousness of Inventions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 66 (1986).
670 Robert Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innova-
tion, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988).
671 The SPLT merely defines an inventor as "any person who, at or before the filing date of the appli-
cation, had the right to the patent." WIPO Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (7th Session), su-
pra note 93, art. 9(2).
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law because the determination of ownership starts from inventorship.67 2 Different
definitions of inventorship lead to different ownership of the same invention in dif-
ferent countries, and this results in serious confusion. However, the definition of
inventorship is not clear from U.S. case law, although the U.S. has a rich history of
inventorship disputes through its interference proceedings. 673 Since other countries
allow employers to file an application, and inventorship disputes are rare, it is very
unlikely that these countries have a clear definition of inventor. Therefore, to har-
monize standards as to who is originally entitled to a patent, the SPLT should in-
clude a definition of inventor.
Although the SPLT's scope is limited to the patent-granting process, the
SPLT should also cover issues relating to limitations on the scope of exclusive
rights as it closely relates to conditions of patentability. TRIPS allows member
states to provide limited exceptions to the exclusive right as long as such exceptions
do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.674 These excep-
tions reflect immunity from infringement claims given by other countries. One ex-
ample is immunity for private exploitation of a patented invention. 675 Another
example is immunity for exploitation of a patented invention for the purpose of ex-
periments. 6
76
Although courts in the United States developed a common law "experimental-
use exemption," recent case law indicates that the scope of the exception is so nar-
row that it is almost non-existent except for §271(e).677 The SPLT should include
an article or rule dealing with these exceptions because they closely relate to the
scope of patent eligible subject matter and specific utility. Particularly, the avail-
ability of an experimental-use exception affects the determination of whether a pat-
ent should be awarded to some subject matters in basic science, such as biotechnol-
ogy. Such subject matter is traditionally excluded from patentability for lack of
patent eligibility or lack of specific utility because public researchers can still en-
gage in further developments under the experimental-use exception, even if a patent
is granted on the basic innovation. The freedom for researchers in public research
672 Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1218, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1405 (E.D.
Pa. 1991); CHISUM, supra note 59, § 22.02.
673 CHISUM, supra note 59, § 2.04.
674 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 30, 33 I.L.M. at 95.
671 See, e.g., Community Patent Convention, supra note 627, art. 27(a); Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent
law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 68.
676 See, e.g., Community Patent Convention, supra note 627, art. 27(b); Tokkyo Ho [Japanese patent
law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 69(1). For a general discussion of the experimental use exception
under the patent systems in European countries, see DAVID GILAT, EXPERIMENTAL USE AND
PATENTS 1 (1995).
677 Janice Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent In-
fringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001).
[VOL. 11:259
The Best Patent Practice or Mere Compromise?
institutions to engage in research and development in basic science is essential for
the promotion of science and the useful arts.6 7 8 Patents should not create any ob-
stacles to hinder their efforts to further developments. The Federal Circuit created
such obstacles by refusing to give immunity from patent enforcement to the activity
of a university professor attempting to design around the claimed invention.
679
The scope of immunity available under the experimental-use exception in
other countries is broader than that of United States. 680 In Germany, trials and tests
conducted to find new technical features for further developments are allowed, re-
gardless of the reason for performing the tests or trials. 681 The Supreme Court of
Japan interprets the experimental-use exemption broadly to give immunity not only
to tests for further developments but also to clinical trials that are conducted to ob-
tain data for a government market.682 Without any discussion of immunity, it will
be difficult to attain harmonization for patentable subject matter and specific utility.
IV. Proposal for Maintaining First-To-Invent Exception for Domestic
Inventors
The first-to-file system with a generous one-year grace period proposed in the
SPLT will bring simplicity to the U.S. system and remove pitfalls for inventors who
believe that the United States follows a true first-to-invent system that grants a pat-
ent to the first-to-conceive instead of the first-to-reduce the invention to practice
through an application or testing. 683 A worldwide grace period will save thousands
of U.S. inventor rights that are lost every year outside the United States because of
pre-filing disclosure.684 Since many SPLT provisions are based on U.S. practice,
678 Suzanne T. Michel, Comment: The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to Fed-
erally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 391-93 (1992).
67 See generally Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
680 David L. Parker, Symposium: Intellectual Property: Article: Patent Infringement Exemptions for
Life Science Research, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 615 (1994); William Cornish, Experimental Use of
Patented Inventions in European Community States, 29 I.I.C. 735 (1998).
681 Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trial) I, 1997 WL 1104814 (BGH, 1997), Klinische Versuche
(Clinical Trial) II, 1998 WL 1043174 (BGH, 1998) (Judgment of the Supreme Court of Germany
GRUR 1996) Andries van der Merwe, Experimental Use and Submission of Data for Regulatory
Approval, 31 I.I.C. 380 (2000).
682 Judgment of the Japanese Supreme Court (SAIKO SAIBANSHO), Apr. 16, 1999, translation available
at http://www.law.washington.edu/easrip/newsletter/newsv5i4jp3.htm. For a general discussion
of experimental use exception under Japanese patent law, see Jennifer A. Johnson, Note, The Ex-
perimental Use Exception in Japan: A Model for U.S. Patent Law?, 12 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 499
(2003).
663 For a general discussion of a proposal to simplify the U.S. patent system, see Toshiko Takenaka,
Rethinking the United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative Law Perspective: A
Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 621 (2002).
684 See supra note 458.
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the SPLT gives the United States an opportunity to export its patent-owner friendly
jurisprudence to the major markets for U.S. patent owners, such as Europe and Ja-
pan. In addition, the SPLT will make it possible for patent offices to recognize the
results of examinations done by other offices and remove redundant prior-art
searches and examinations, which will significantly reduce costs for patent pro-
curement in multiple countries.
Some U.S. inventors may not be convinced of these benefits and may still re-
sist adopting a system that will require abandonment of the long established prac-
tice of granting patents to the first-to-invent. A substantial number of responses
from the public, particularly from individual inventors and small entities, indicate a
strong sentiment to retain the first-to-invent system and objection to the first-to-file
system, which is believed to place small inventors at a significant disadvantage in
the race to the patent office. 685 Past experiences at the USPTO indicate that objec-
tions from these inventors prove to be powerful and may be a substantial obstacle
to the implementation of the responsibilities of the U.S. under the SPLT.
686
Further, a legal commentator comparing the pros and cons of harmonization
versus diversity of patent systems identifies reflection of local preferences as a
benefit of diversity. 687 The desire to reflect local preferences is particularly keen
for small inventors whose interest is solely dedicated to the domestic market.
Unlike the United States, other countries traditionally have a separate second-tier
patent protection regime, generally known as utility model or petty patent, to ac-
commodate small inventors.688 This idea of a second-tier patent protection regime
is particularly popular in Europe where the European Commission took the initia-
tive of harmonizing the different regimes. 689 However, a second-tier regime has
very little appeal to the U.S. patent community because legal commentators cannot
611 Public Comments Submitted in Response to Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, Requests for Comments on the International effort to Harmonize the Substantive Require-
ments of Patent Laws, 66 FED. REG. 15, 409 (Mar. 19, 2001). Similar objections submitted in re-
sponse to the invitation of the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform in 1992. See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 42, at 314.
686 Due to strong objections from small inventors, the USPTO failed to fulfill some commitments un-
der the USPTO and JPO Commissioner Agreements. See Toshiko Takenaka, Impact of 1999 Pat-
ent Reforms: A Comparative Law Perspective, 7-1 CASRIP NEWSLETTER 2 (Winter 2000), avail-
able at http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/newsletter/newsv7i I us I .pdf.
617 Duffy, supra note 17.
688 The German utility model system was developed to save minor improvements developed by in-
dustry, which improvements were rejected by the German Patent Office for lack of inventive step.
Japan and other Asian countries followed the German example to adopt a utility model system
particularly aiming for protection of inventions made by domestic industry. See generally
CHRISTOPHER HEATH, UTILITY MODELS IN EAST AND WEST, CHITEKI ZAISANKEN Ho No
GENDAITEKI KADAI (CURRENT TOPICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS), 47 (1998).
689 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrange-
ments for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model, COM (97) 691 final, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/indprop/soften.pdf.
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find enough justification for additional protection for second-rate innovations.690
Instead of creating a separate regime, the United States instituted an option to in-
corporate within the system measures to address the local need. For example, the
small entity system allows small inventors who qualify under certain conditions
691
a fifty percent discount on regular official fees. Furthermore, the newly intro-
duced early publication system allows inventors who do not file a foreign applica-
tion to request nondisclosure of their application.
693
Therefore, in the event the USPTO is unable to convince small inventors of
the benefits of the first-to-file system, the United States should be allowed to ex-
pand the current exception to early publication for domestic inventors to include
first-to-invent priority. Under this exception, only applicants who do not wish to
file an application outside the United States will be allowed to take advantage of
the first-to-invent exception and can establish an earlier invention date under the §
102(g) priority rule. This exception facilitates the U.S. shift to the first-to-file sys-
tem without delay and enables small inventors who are interested in markets out-
side the United States to take advantage of the world-wide grace period while giv-
ing small inventors, interested in only the U.S. market, an option to take advantage
of the first-to-invent system. Further, the impact of this exception on the current
practice is very marginal because it is very unlikely that the commercial value of an
invention exclusive to the U.S. market will justify the high cost of interference pro-
ceedings and record keeping necessary to establish priority.
694
The only negative side of this exception is that U.S. trade partners may still
criticize the U.S. for following the first-to-invent system. However, the U.S. can
argue that this exception should be allowed because it does not conflict with the
goal of the SPLT. Since the SPLT aims to facilitate mutual recognition of exami-
nation results among participating patent offices, allowing applicants that file only
in the United States to use the first-to-invent system will have no effect on this
goal. Eventually, inventors will realize that the first-to-file system serves them bet-
ter than the first-to-invent. The U.S. can then eliminate the exception completely.
Conclusion
The resumed international effort for harmonization under the SPLT gives the
United States an opportunity to review its current system and learn from other
countries. A review of the most recent SPLT draft and a comparison of the draft
690 See Mark Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151 (1999); J.H. Reichman,
Industrial Designs and Utility Models Under the European Communities' Proposed Initiatives: A
Critical Appraisal, 2 INT'L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL'Y Ch. 48 (1996).
01 37 C.F.R. § 1.9 (1998).
-2 37 C.F.R. § 1.16-.17 (1998).
693 35 U.S.C. § 122 (b)(2)(B)(2001).
b9l See supra note 355.
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with the current U.S. patent practice reveal a relatively minor impact resulting from
adoption of the SPLT. Concerning practices under the SPLT that are different from
current U.S. practice, some reflect a compromise with European/Japanese practices,
even if the U.S. practice is better than such practices. Others reflect the best prac-
tices among the three jurisdictions, and, thus, the U.S. should adopt them. If the
draft is revised to reflect only the best practices, the impact will be marginal.
Execution of the SPLT will necessitate modification of the first-to-invent sys-
tem to comply with the first-to-file principle, but the changes will remove the com-
plexity inherent in the present system and will require only marginal changes in
current U.S. practice. In contrast, the benefits resulting from the worldwide grace
period and the expansive collaboration among patent offices substantially outweigh
any disadvantages caused by the necessary changes.
Although for simplicity and the effective use of administrative resources, it is
preferable to eliminate the first-to-invent principle completely, maintaining a lim-
ited exception might be necessary for the United States to avoid unnecessary delay
in engaging in the negotiations. If the exception is limited to applicants who file
applications only domestically, the impact on U.S. partners is marginal. This is
particularly with respect to the goal of the SPLT, which is mutual recognition of
examination results. By experiencing the hardships inherent in the U.S. first-to-
invent priority rule for establishing an early invention through actual reduction to
practice, first-to-invent advocates will realize the ineffectiveness of keeping this
useless exception. However, if there is in fact a compelling policy reason to retain
the first-to-invent system to reflect local preferences, the first-to-invent priority rule
will survive.
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